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A B S T R A C T
In this society people are always connected, and everyday they manage a
lot of personal data also risking to be eavesdropped. Quantum science is
one the most promising field of the next years, from quantum computing to
quantum communications and above all quantum cryptography. Quantum
cryptography is the first commercial application of quantum physics and
moreover it results one of the most reliable solution for security problem. Us-
ing Quantum Physic law’s it is possible to establish secure communications
between two users, guaranteeing unconditionally security in the transmis-
sion of data. Unfortunately due to the intrinsic losses inside optical fibers,
it is not possible to establish a quantum link over 300 km until quantum re-
peater will be achievable. The natural extension of terrestrial quantum links
are space communications, where however the problems due to environ-
ment, temperature and pressure are totally new for quantum devices. The
study investigated the possibility of sending quantum signals through at-
mosphere, in particular trying to realize quantum communications between
Earth and Space. In this perspective we used Laser Ranging corner-cubes
mounted into satellites to recreate a space quantum link. It was possible to
prove that even with high losses, variable attenuation, and high backgorund
a quantum key distribution system works, and an unconditionally secure
key, needful for encryption, can be generated. With this experiments we
demonstrate that not only free-space quantum key distribution is a ready
technology, but also that quantum satellite communications is nowadays
possible and realizable. Moreover these results open the way to look to-
wards a global space quantum network, where optical station (OGS) could
talk with satellite and vice-versa. This work was supported by the Strate-
gic Project QUANTUMFUTURE of University of Padova, by ESAGNSS pro-
gram and realized in Luxor laboratories in Padova. The principal tests were
made at Telespazio (Matera) using the Matera Laser Ranging Observatory
and into Thales Alenia Space (Torino).
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S O M M A R I O
Le persone al giorno d’oggi sono continuamente connesse e ogni giorno
maneggiano dati sensibili, rischiando di venire intercettati e truffati. La fisica
quantistica si inserisce in questo settore come uno dei campi più promet-
tenti per gli anni futuri, dal computer quantistico, alle comunicazioni ot-
tiche e in particolare la crittografia quantistica (QKD), aiutano lo sviluppo
di sistemi incondizionatamente sicuri. La crittografia quantistica è stata la
prima applicazione commerciale della fisica quantistica, rappresentando in-
oltre una soluzione versatile e sicura per la trasmissione di dati in modo
incondizionatamente sicuro. Sfruttando le leggi della meccanica quantistica,
come il teroema di non clonabilità e il fatto che ogni misura perburba lo
stato, è possibile creare una chiave crittografica fra due utenti che consente,
sotto alcune condizioni, di comunicare in modo cmatematicamente sicuro.
Esistono già da alcuni anni sistemi commerciali di crittogafia quantistica in
fibra ottica. Sfortunatamente a causa delle perdite intrinsiche della fibra non
è possibile comunicare oltre i 300 km, fino a quando i ripetitori quantistici
non saranno realizzati con alta efficienza. In questo settore si inserisce lo
studio presentato in questa tesi, cercando una valida alternativa ai collega-
menti in fibra ottica. La naturale estensione dei link quantistici terrestri è
rappresentata dalle comunicazioni quantistiche satellitari, dove nonostante
i problemi legati all’ambiente di utilizzo (temperatura, pressione, particelle
ionizzate, etc) sono presenti parecchi risultati che lasciano ben sperare. En-
trando in dettaglio lo studio presentato studia gli effetti della propagazione
di un fascio ottico quantistico in atmosfera, in particolare nella condizione
di un link quantistico fra Terra e Spazio. In questa prospettiva sono stati in-
dividuati come possibili dispostivi i retroriflettori utilizzati nelle misisoni di
Laser Raanging, utilizzati solitamente per lo studio della geodesia spaziale.
Sfruttando questi satelliti abbiamo ricreato un canale quantistico in down-
link dove fosse possibile sperimentare i protocolli quantistici come la QKD.
Nonostante le condizioni di lavoro molto sfavorevoli, (alte perdite, attenu-
azione variabile, puntamento instabile) è stato dimostrato che è possibile in-
viare nello Spazio un fotone, in un particolare stato quantistico e misurarne
le sue caratteristiche. Questo risultato apre la strada alla crittografia quan-
tistica in spazio libero, dimostrando come nonostante ci sia ancora molto
strada da fare nell’ambito della fisica quantistica, alcune tecnologie sono
mature e pronte per essere implementate in scala globale. In una prospet-
tiva futura questo risultato dimostra come sia possibile immaginare una rete
di satelliti quantistici in grado di comunicare con le stazioni base a terra
ma anche fra loro. Questo lavoro è stato supportato dal progetto strategico
di Ateneo QuantumFuture dell’Università degli studi di Padova, dai fondi
ESAGNSS e realizzato sia nei laboratori Luxor del CNR UOS di Padova. I
test principali sono stati eseguti nel Telespazio di Matera (ASI) e a Torino
nella sede di Thales Alenia Space.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Quantum physics is one the most curios and interesting discoveries of the
last 120 years. For a lot of time it was considered not only a useless science
but too complicated to understand and impractical. Luckily more and more
scientists began to look at Quantum Physics with a lot of interest. This fact
bring the community to deal about quantum and the new theory about
the completion of classical mechanic physic. Thanks to that and to other
discoveries, Quantum Science became an important axiom in the physics
field.
In particular the possibility to use Quantum Physics in order to establish
secure communications was more attractive from various point of view.
Cryptography was one of the most interesting field from the ancient age
to the present. The necessity of exchanging secret information between two
users, without anyone else could look at the messages, has always passion-
ate man.
The development of communications systems were quite slow until the
World War II, when the discovery of the telegraph and subsequently of the
phone, has laid the foundations of modern telecommunications.
Modern telecommunications grown up in a exponential way during the
Twentieth century, defining the past century as "The information age". The
strategic importance of communications has request the possibility of ex-
changing information in a secure way. In fact during the last 50 years the
practice of secure link has become more and more frequently. In the case
of governments institution, patents and discoveries from industry, to our
daily lives, everyone need a way to communicate his restricted data in a
secure way. Classical cryptography based its security on mathematical algo-
rithms, in fact the difficulty that an eavesdropper has to extract information
is directly proportional to the computing capacity. In the case of a quan-
tum computer being built in the nearly future, the cryptographic system
available today becomes in few time obsolete and insecure.
In this context QKD plays a crucial role allowing to establish a secure
communication between two parties.
In fact QKD is a technique for sharing a random secure secret key, which
will be used for Alice and Bob (respectively the transmitter and the receiver)
for encrypting and decrypting the messages. For this purpose, an optical
link is necessary to Alice and Bob to communicate using the principle of
Quantum Mechanic (QM) and so permitting to discover a possible eaves-
dropper. Moreover QKD may be considered the first successful example of
a quantum information protocol available in everyday applications. Indeed,
commercial devices trough optical cables are already accessible worldwide.
In the case of long distances, moving terminals and satellites space commu-
nications, the possibility of using free-space links is also very attractive.
In this perspective the aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that Quantum
Communications (QC) is not only something bound to the laboratory re-
search, but also a mature technology able to resolve some problems and
helping the world in the struggle versus the enemies.
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In this perspective, with the experiment presented, for the first time we
proved the possibility to communicate through a quantum link with space
satellites and moreover that in a near future it is possible to think about a
global quantum network.
Let’s now introduce the chapters description and a small resume of the
argument described and studied.
In Chapter 1 we report a brief summary of the basic principles of QM, in
particular paying attention to qubit definition and to all the tools necessary
to understand real applications of theory concepts.
From Chapter 2 to Chapter 7 we describe our activities and experiments in
the field of quantum communications.
Chapter 2 we introduce the concept of QKD, we explain the basic principles
of the system, some protocols and moreover we define security from math-
ematical point of view.
Furthermore in order to create a secure communication between Earth
and Space, we researched and worked in finite key regime, where the work
conditions are limited by environment constraints. We demonstrate that also
in presence of high level of noise and finite key regime it is possible to create
a secure key: this results will be very useful for satellites link because the
good time for acquisition is very limited to decades of minutes.
In Chapter 3 we study the propagation of a quantum beam in atmosphere,
trying to understand which are the principal effects and how they could
be mitigated. In this perspective we reported an experiment made in 2012
in Canary Archipelago, where we demonstrated how it is possible to take
advantage from atmosphere effects in secure key generation rate.
Chapter 4, 5 and 6 we leave terrestrial links looking towards satellite commu-
nications. Nowadays there are not orbiting quantum transmitter or receiver
available for QC, so we recreate a quantum space link between satellites and
Earth. In this perspective we used corner-cube retroreflectors mounted on
satellites to simulated a downlink quantum channel and realizing a quan-
tum link between satellites and an Optical ground station (OGS).
In satellites communications, the estimation of the channel parameters is
a fundamental request.In fact in Chapter 4 we present the theory about the
estimation of the link, explaining how it was possible to calculate all the
constants appearing in the experiments.
In Chapter 5 we introduce Polarimeter, an instrument useful for studying
the polarization of photons sent into Space. This have been very useful for
QKD experiment because it permits a primary verification of which satellites
are available for QC.
In Chapter 6 we report the principal results obtained in Matera 3 experiment,
realizing the outcomes of this task. Moreover we point out a new record for
single photon qbit transmission, where it was possible to receive a single
photon from a distance of 7000 km.
In Chapter 7 we report an experiment in collaboration with TASI (Thales
Alenia Space) regards a quantum payload for Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS) satellite. In fact we studied and realized an OQL system,
where a complete optical QKD transmitter and receiver were implemented
and tested in order to demonstrate the feasibility of QC between satellite in
Space. Moreover this experiment opens the way for a global network of QKD
where Earth-satellite and even satellite to satellite communications could be
possible.
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Finally in Chapter 8 we summarize the main results of the thesis and we
propose some new experiments that could be implemented and realized
with the know-how acquired during these years.
3

I N T R O D U Z I O N E
La fisica quantistica è una delle scoperte più interessanti e affascinanti degli
ultimi 120 anni. Per molto tempo gli scienziati l’hanno ritenuta pressoché
inutile, teorica e incomprensibile. Inoltre, non riuscivano ad intravedere pos-
sibili applicazioni nella società. Per questi motivi è sempre stata considerata
una materia di nicchia. Tuttavia negli anni, gradualmente, la comunità sci-
entifica si è approcciata allo studio della Fisica Quantistica, capendone e
cominciando ad esplorarne l’enorme potenziale. Grazie alle successive scop-
erte la Fisica Quantistica assunse una valenza internazionale, fino a divenire
un punto fermo del XX secolo. In particolare, è possibile giustificare la sud-
detta affermazione grazie alle leggi fondamentali della Meccanica quantis-
tica e alle loro applicazioni, quale ad esempio la possibilità di scambiare
informazioni in modo completamente sicuro.
La ricerca di metodi per rendere un messaggio nascosto, così da renderlo
non comprensibile ai non autorizzati, ha da sempre appassionato l’uomo. Si
ritrovano esempi antichi di crittografia a partire dai Mesopotamici.
Lo sviluppo dei sistemi di comunicazione è stato piuttosto lento fino alla sec-
onda guerra mondiale, quando le scoperte del telegrafo e, successivamente,
del telefono hanno posto le basi delle moderne telecomunicazioni. Esse sono
cresciute in modo esponenziale nel corso del XX secolo, definito da alcuni
come "L’era dell’informazione".
La società odierna basa la sua importanza sulla possibilità di scambiare le
informazioni in modo sicuro e riservato. Infatti, negli ultimi 50 anni l’uso
della crittografia è divenuto sempre più radicato. Innumerevoli sono gli es-
empi quotidiani in cui è necessaria la massima riservatezza e integrità. Si
pensi, per fare alcuni esempi, ai governi europei e mondiali, alle istituzioni,
ai brevetti delle scoperte industriali e, per finire, ai nostri dati sensibili.
La crittografia oggi utilizzata (classica), basa la sua sicurezza su algoritmi
matematici, e sulla difficoltà che un eventuale attaccante incontrerebbe se
venisse a conoscenza del messaggio cifrato.
Possiamo definire la sicurezza garantita dalla crittografia classica come una
sicurezza legata alla potenza di calcolo dell’attaccante. È stato dimostrato
che nel caso (non ormai così remoto) i cui fosse disponibile un computer
quantistico, gli attuali sistemi crittografici sarebbero da considerare insicuri.
Infatti, l’esecuzione e il compimento di operazioni molto complesse, come
la fattorizzazione di numeri primi, da parte di un computer moderno può
durare anche decenni. La stessa operazione eseguita da un computer quan-
tistico potrebbe essere ultimata in tempi molto rapidi. A causa di questa
problematica, da anni gli scienziati cercano una tecnica che possa fornire un
modo completamente sicuro di scambiare informazione indipendentemente
dalla potenza di calcolo dell’attaccante. In questo contesto, la crittografia
quantistica svolge un ruolo fondamentale che permette di stabilire una co-
municazione sicura tra due parti. Infatti la crittografia quantistica è una tec-
nica per la condivisione di una chiave casuale, in seguito utilizzata da Alice
e Bob (rispettivamente il trasmettitore e il ricevitore) per codificare e decod-
ificare i messaggi. La comunicazione sicura è basata su un link ottico fra i
due interlocutori dove, grazie alle leggi della meccanica quantistica, siamo
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in grado di capire se la trasmissione è stata intercettata o meno. Inoltre la
crittografia quantistica può essere considerata come il primo esempio di
un protocollo di informazione quantistica disponibile nelle applicazioni di
tutti i giorni. In effetti, esistono già da alcuni anni dispositivi commerciali
in fibra ottica che implementano alcuni protocolli di crittografia quantistica.
Tuttavia, a causa delle perdite intrinseche della fibra ottica non è possibile
superare la distanza di 300 km mediante un solo link. In questo contesto
la propagazione quantistica in atmosfera è divenuta molto attraente negli
ultimi anni, soprattutto considerando la possibilità di creare una comuni-
cazione sicura tra terminali mobili.
Alla luce di questa affermazione, il lavoro di tesi si propone di dimostrare
che le Comunicazioni Quantistiche non sono solamente un campo di ricerca
sperimentale, ma si stanno affacciando come tecnologia matura potenzial-
mente applicabile nella società. Riportiamo ora una breve descrizione degli
argomenti trattati in ogni capitolo, sottolineando gli scopi iniziali e i risultati
ottenuti.
Nel Capitolo 1 è riportata una breve sintesi dei principi di base della Mec-
canica Quantistica, in particolare prestando attenzione alla definizione di
qubit e a tutti gli strumenti necessari per comprendere gli esperimenti pre-
sentati.
Dal Capitolo 2 al Capitolo 7 sono descritte le attività di ricerca ed alcuni
esperimenti nel campo delle comunicazioni quantistiche.
In particolare nel capitolo 2 viene introdotto il concetto di crittografia
quantistica, spiegando i principi base del sistema, i protocolli più utilizzati
e introducendo la definizione di sicurezza dal punto di vista matematico.
Essendo inoltre il nostro obiettivo l’estensione delle attuali comunicazioni
quantistiche, mediante un collegamento Terra e Spazio, ci siamo concentrati
nel regime di "chiave finita", dove le condizioni di lavoro sono limitate da
vincoli ambientali.
Grazie a questo esperimento abbiamo dimostrato come, anche in presenza
di alti livelli di rumore e di un numero limitato di bit, sia possibile creare
una chiave incondizionatamente sicura: questo risultato è molto utile nel
caso di link satellitari dove il tempo disponibile per l’acquisizione è limitato
a decine di minuti.
Nel Capitolo 3 invece, viene studiata la propagazione di un fascio ottico in
atmosfera, cercando di capire quali sono gli effetti principali e come potreb-
bero essere mitigati. In questa prospettiva riportiamo un esperimento realiz-
zato nel 2012 nell’Arcipelago delle Canarie, dove si dimostra come sia possi-
bile sfruttare gli effetti dell’atmosfera nella generazione di una chiave sicura.
Nello specifico abbiamo utilizzato le fluttuazioni intrinseche dell’atmosfera
per sondare il canale e sfruttare questo fenomeno, sia per diminuire gli er-
rori, sia per aumentare il numero finale di bit ricevuti. Questo metodo è
applicabile negli attuali sistemi di crittografia quantistica in spazio libero,
permettendo così di migliorare l’efficienza e il rate di chiave.
Nel Capitolo 4, 5 e 6 i protagonisti non sono più i collegamenti terrestri,
bensì le comunicazioni Terra satellite. Al giorno d’oggi, non sono presenti
in orbita trasmettitori o ricevitori quantistici. Per questo motivo abbiamo
ricreato un collegamento quantistico tra i satelliti e la Terra utilizzando i
retroriflettori montati su alcuni satelliti, utilizzati dalla comunità di Laser
Ranging spaziale. Siamo quindi stati in grado di simulare sperimentalmente
un link quantistico fra un satellite e una stazione base ricevente.
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Nelle comunicazioni a lunga distanza e soprattutto in quelle satellitari, la
stima dei parametri del canale è molto importante.
In particolare nel Capitolo 4 sono presentati alcuni concetti di teoria alla
base delle moderne telecomunicazioni sia terrestri che spaziali, spiegando
in particolare come sia stato possibile calcolare tutti i parametri presenti
negli esperimenti.
Nel Capitolo 5 introduciamo il Polarimetro, uno strumento utile per studi-
are la polarizzazione dei fotoni inviati nello spazio. Questo si è dimostrato
molto valido perché ha permesso una verifica primaria di quali satelliti fos-
sero utilizzabili per le comunicazioni quantistiche.
Nel Capitolo 6 invece vengono riportati i risultati ottenuti nell’esperimento
Matera 3. In questo esperimento è stato possibile inviare per la prima volta
dei singoli fotoni polarizzati da un satellite e misurarne la loro polariz-
zazione. Questa misura apre la strada verso la crittografia quantistica satel-
litare, dimostrando come sia possibile trasmettere e ricevere singoli fotoni
a grandissima distanza. Siamo inoltre riusciti a far propagare un singolo
fotone da una distanza maggiore ai 7000 km. Questo pone un nuovo limite
per le trasmissioni quantistiche.
Nel capitolo 7 invece viene riportato un esperimento in collaborazione con
THALES Italia riguardante un payload quantistico per il sistema di nav-
igazione satellitare GNSS. Abbiamo infatti realizzato un sistema comple-
tamente ottico in grado di simulare il comportamento di due satelliti nel
processo di scambio e riconciliazione di chiavi quantistiche. Il sistema in-
oltre è stato testato, con risultati positivi, in un link in spazio libero di 500
m. Questo esperimento apre la strada ad una rete globale di crittografia
quantistica in cui saranno possibili sia comunicazioni terra-satellite, sia col-
legamenti intra satellitari.
Infine nel capitolo 8 vengono riassunti i principali risultati della tesi e pro-
posti alcuni possibili esperimenti futuri, potenzialmente attuabili utilizzando
il prezioso il know-how acquisito in questi anni.
Riteniamo che i nostri piccoli contributi alla comunità scientifica siano in-
vece di grande interesse per le Comunicazioni quantistiche, dove i nostri
esperimenti possano in parte contribuire ad una futura una rete quantistica
globale.

1Q U A N T U M M E C H A N I C S A N D Q U B I T
Quantum information science is a combination of Computer Science, Quan-
tum Physics and Information Theory. It is a completely interdisciplinary
field, combining together the physics model and axioms of QM, the protocol
and algorithm of Computer Science (CS) with the aim of exchanging and ma-
nipulate information. In this Chapter we report some basic concepts of QM.
The aim is to introduce the necessary equation, theorems and postulates in
order to completely understand the content of this thesis. For major detail
see [34].
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Figure 1.1: Representation of some research field and applications born from Quan-
tum theory.
1.1 postulates of quantum mechanics
Quantum theory ia a mathematical model of the physics world. In order to
define this model it is necessary to introduce mathematical formalism on
which are based the fundamental concepts of QM. In particular QM is ruled
by few postulates, which for the aim of this works can be summarized in
four core hypothesis:
Postulate 1. In QM a state of a physical system is described by a complex wave
function or equivalently from a vector in an Hilbert Space Ψ(r, t). The function
Ψ(·) is completely integrable and normalizable (∫allspace|Ψ|2 = 1).
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Postulate 2. The evolution of a quantum closed system is described by a unitary
transformation. The state |ψ〉 of the system at time t1 is related to the state |ψ′〉 of
the system at time t2 by an operator U which depends from t1 and t2 time:
|ψ′〉 = U|ψ〉 (1.1)
This definition doesn’t give any information about a particular state, but
it only describes the evolution of the quantum system. Another more pre-
cise definition and where the variable t, time is described by a continuous
variable is the Schrödinger equation:
i h¯
d|ψ〉
dt
= H |ψ〉 (1.2)
depending on th Hamiltonian operator H1. The equation could also be writ-
ten as:
d
dt
|ψ(t)〉 = −i H |ψ(t)〉 (1.3)
The knowledge of the Hamiltonian of the system describes completely the
system dynamics.
Postulate 3. All the dynamical variables in a system can be represented by a linear
hermitian operator with eigenvalues λi and eigenvectors |λi〉. The outcome of a mea-
sure will be one of the eigenvalues with probability |〈λi|Ψ〉|2 and the measurement
will reduce the state of the system from |Ψi〉 to |λi〉.
Postulate 4. Interactions and composite of quantum systems are completely de-
scribed by the tensor product of the single component states: |Ψ12〉 = |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ2〉.
1.2 quantum computation and qubits
Before defining what are the basic elements of a quantum system, we would
like to introduce the general criteria useful for exploring quantum comput-
ing and in general quantum system. We report here the David DiVincenzo
principles explaining the needful criteria in order to successfully implement
a quantum information process [34]. The five core requirements for the im-
plementation of quantum computing are:
1. a scalable physical system with well characterized qubits (memory)
2. the ability to initialize the initial state of the qubits, such as |000·〉
3. a long relative decoherenece times, much longer than the gate opera-
tions time
4. a "universal" set of quantum gates with high fidelity for speedy oper-
ations
5. qubit-specific measurement capabilities without modify other neigh-
bors qubits
He also added two supplementary criteria relating to the transmission and
movement of information:
1 The average value of Hamiltonian operator describes the system energy.
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6. The ability to interconvert stationary and flying qubits
7. The ability to faithfully transmit flying qubits between specified loca-
tion.
These 7 criteria represents a complete set of operations necessary for explor-
ing a QC physical system. However, before considering the complexity of the
entire system, it is necessary to introduce some basic concepts of QM.
1.2.1 Qubit
The Qubit word means literally quantum bit. It represents the information
as a quanta, thus the smallest part where can be encoded data. As in the
classical system, based on operation between bits, from a quantum point of
view, the core of the system are based on qubits.
In a more stringent definition, the qubit symbolize the state of a vector
Hilbert two-dimensional space. A generic qubit |ψ〉, represents in a vector
space V, with |0〉 and |1〉 orthogonal can be symbolized as:
|ψ〉 = a|0〉+ b|1〉 . (1.4)
The main difference between classical bit and qubit rely in the fact that a
classical bit can be represented only in two values 0 or 1, while a qubit
can assumes infinite values, thanks to the superposition of the base state
|0〉 and |1〉. It is not possible with a single measure recover the value of
the parameters a an b, in fact a measurement on a qubit return |0〉 with a
probability a2, and the state |1〉 with probability b2. Moreover after the qubit
measurement, the state will collapse in one of the two base states, so we can
say that after the measurement we know, with a probability equal to one the
state of the system. Some examples of qubits are: polarization of photons,
electron spin, spin of core atom, ions in resonant cavities, etc.
A useful representation for a generic qubit, is the Bloch sphere (Figure 1.2),
where a qubit is represented by a single vector into an unit sphere.
Z
Figure 1.2: The Bloch sphere is a graphical representation of the state of a single
qubit.
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1.2.2 Copy of a qubit
In the classical system the copy of a bit is a simple operation, while in the
case of a quantum state a perfect copy of a qubit is not allowed. The no-
cloning theorem proves as a generic quantum state cannot be copied. Here
we report a small proof of the famous theorem: let’s consider a physical
state |ψ〉 that we would clone, and the generic state |s〉 where we carry
the copy. The total state state of the system is based on two qubits, so the
output values are given by the tensor product |ψ〉 ⊗ |s〉. The linear operator
that describes the copy operation works as follows:
U(|ψ〉 ⊗ |s〉) = |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ; (1.5)
and in the same way for a state |φ〉 :
U(|φ〉 ⊗ |s〉) = |φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉 . (1.6)
Then calculating the internal product between the two equation results:
(U(|ψ〉 ⊗ |s〉)) · (U(|φ〉 ⊗ |s〉)) = (|ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉) · (|φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉) . (1.7)
and using linearity property we have:(|ψ〉 ⊗ |s〉) · (|φ〉 ⊗ |s〉) = (|ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉, |φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉) (1.8)
〈ψ|φ〉〈s|s〉 = 〈ψ|φ〉〈ψ|φ〉 (1.9)
Considering the fact that the vector |s〉 has unitary norm, the equation be-
come:
〈ψ|φ〉 = 〈ψ|φ〉2 (1.10)
and the only solution are 〈ψ|φ〉 = 0 and 〈ψ|φ〉 = 1, thus only in the case that
the two states are equal or orthogonal. this means that copy operator could
works only in the above written cases. This theorem will be very useful for
our experiments and in particular it is one of the basic principle of QKD.
1.2.3 Qubit manipulation and Gates
One important characteristic in an physical system is the possibility of con-
trolling the variables, in particular the possibility of making operations,
changing the states and processing information. In fact the second DiVin-
cenzo criteria tells us how to initialize our qubits, moving our qubit in a
particular position of the Bloch sphere.
From a mathematical point of view, using 4 unique rotations, it is possible
to transform any input state into another qubit. The 4 rotations don’t alter
the final vector and they works along each Cartesian axis.
The Pauli matrices, as a result of the exponential Hamiltonian operator de-
riving from Schrödinger equation |Ψ〉 = exp(−iHˆt/h¯)|Ψ(0)〉, can perfectly
represent one rotation about the respective axis. They are defined as:
σˆI =
[
1 0
0 1
]
σˆX =
[
0 1
1 0
]
σˆY =
[
0 −i
i 0
]
σˆZ =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
(1.11)
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It follows:
RI(θ) = e
−iθσˆI /2 =
[
e−iθ/2 0
0 e−iθ/2
]
(1.12)
RX(θ) = e
−iθσˆX /2 =
[
cos θ2 −i sin θ2
−i sin θ2 cos θ2
]
(1.13)
RY(θ) = e
−iθσˆY /2 =
[
cos θ2 − sin θ2
sin θ2 cos
θ
2
]
(1.14)
RZ(θ) = e
−iθσˆZ /2 =
[
e−iθ/2 0
0 e−iθ/2
]
(1.15)
An example of unit transformation θ = pi, corresponding to a single rotation
about the y axis, should intuitively flip the qubit from 0 to −1. Using the
definition |0〉 =
[
0 1
]T
and |1〉 =
[
1 0
]T
we obtain:
RY(pi)|0〉 =
[
0 −1
1 0
] [
0
1
]
=
[
−1
0
]
= −|1〉 (1.16)
The physical concept behind this operations is that using an Hamiltonian
with Pauli operators permits to initialize and control a single qubit state.
There exist also 4 simple operations deriving from special rotation: they are
known as Pauli gates, X, Y, Z and the Hadamard gate. The Pauli gates
are simply transformation matrices equivalent to the original Pauli matrices.
The Pauli Y gate, known as a conjugate bit flip, maps the state |0〉 → i|1〉
and |1〉 → −i|0〉. It corresponds to a pi rotation about the Y axis on the
Bloch sphere. The Pauli Z gate is a phase flip gate, it leaves the |0〉 state
unchanged but |1〉 → −|1〉. This is also a pi rotation about the Z axis on the
Bloch sphere.
The Hadamard gate instead2 puts the qubits onto the equator of the Block
sphere in a superposition state. Specially, |0〉 → 1/√2(|0〉+ |1〉) and |1〉 →
1/
√
2(|0〉 − |1〉). This is equivalent to pi rotation about the (1, 0, 1) axis or
the (~x +~z)/
√
2. Finally the Pauli X gate represents the not operation and
maps the states |0〉 → |1〉 and |1〉 → |0〉. Examples of how it is possible to
obtain a not gate:
B = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0| =
(
0 1
0 0
)
+
(
0 0
1 0
)
=
(
0 1
1 0
)
(1.17)
1.3 multiple qubit
As natural extension of the presented analysis in the case of a single qubit,
it is possible to deal also multiple qubits. We must distinguish two possibil-
ities:
• the qubits are uncorrelated (one operation made in one qubit, didn’t
modify the other one)
2 The Hadamard transformation matrix is 1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
.
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• the qubits are correlated ( the state of one qubit is bound to the other,
and moreover from the knowledge of a state it is possible to recover
information about the other)
From a mathematical point of view, in the case of two space vectors V and
W with the respective basis {v1, v2} and {w1, w2} from the tensor product
we have:{
v1 ⊗ w1, v1 ⊗ w2, v2 ⊗ w1, v2 ⊗ w2
}
(1.18)
and the space dimension becomes dim(V ⊗W) = dim(V) × dim(W) . In
a system with two qubits, each one with its own base ({|0〉, |1〉}), we will
obtain:{|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉} (1.19)
As reported for two qubit, can be extended for n qubit, and the state repre-
sentation becomes:
|ψ〉 = c0|00〉+ c1|01〉+ c2|10〉+ c3|11〉 (1.20)
where |c0|2 + |c1|2 + |c2|2 + |c3|2 = 1. In the case we want to measure a quan-
tum state based of n qubit, and reminding that the measurement process is
a probabilistic, the obtained result of the first qubit in {|0〉, |1〉} base will be:
|ψ〉 = a|00〉+ b|01〉+ c|10〉+ d|11〉 (1.21)
highlighting the first qubit we have:
|ψ〉 = |0〉 ⊗ (a|0〉+ b|1〉)+ |1〉 ⊗ (c|0〉+ d|1〉) = (1.22)
=
√
n |0〉 ⊗
(
a√
n
|0〉+ b√
n
|1〉
)
+
+
√
m |1〉 ⊗
(
c√
m
|0〉+ d√
m
|1〉
) (1.23)
where n = |a|2 + |b|2 and m = |c|2 + |d|2. At the end of the process, a
measure of the first qubit give the following result:
• |0〉 with a probability n, and the final state will be:
|0〉 ⊗
(
a√
n |0〉+ b√n |1〉
)
• |1〉 with a probability m, and the final state will be:
|1〉 ⊗
(
c√
m |0〉+ d√m |1〉
)
1.3.1 Quantum entanglement
In previous paragraph we report examples of correlated system, where the
alteration of one qubit is bound to the other and vice-versa. It is possible to
define Entanglement state a state where it is not possible to go back at a1, a2,
b1, b2 parameters describing the state:
|ψ〉 = (a1|0〉+ b1|1〉)⊗ (a2|0〉+ b2|1〉) . (1.24)
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An example of an entangled qubit is:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) (1.25)
It is worth to note that any measure in one qubit change also the state of
the other qubit. From a mathematical point of view, if we measure the first
qubit, without having already measured the second one, it results that:
P[qubit1 = |0〉] | qubit2 non measured] = 12
P[qubit1 = |1〉] | qubit2 non measured] = 12
The result change completely in the case that the second qubit was already
measured with a |0〉 result:
P[qubit1 = |0〉] | qubit2 measured] = 1
P[qubit1 = |1〉] | qubit2 measured] = 0
In the case where the measurement made on the second qubit was |1〉, the
probability values will be inverted.
bell states Usually entangled state is created by particular interactions
between subatomic particles. There are more ways to produce an entan-
gled state. One of the most famous and used method is the SPDC down-
conversion3 to generate a pair of entangled photons in polarization [49].
Other methods include the use of the Hong-Ou-Mandel effect: by the use of
a fiber coupler to confine and mix photons, the use of quantum dots to trap
electrons until decay occurs, are all method that permits the creation of an
entangled state [48]. A particular protocol, know as entanglement swapping
permits to create entangled photons using quantum systems never interact-
ing directly [28, 81].
hadamard gates One important way to create an entanglement state
using one simple transformation, is to perform an Hadamard gate (see 1.2.3.
By applying on a 0 qubit an Hadamard rotation and then using the output
state as the control bit of a CNOT 4 gate, it follows that:
|Ψ1〉 = UHad |0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) (1.26)
|Ψ12〉 = |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)⊗ |0〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |10〉) (1.27)
|Ψent〉 = UCNOT |Ψ12〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) (1.28)
3 SPDC: spontaneous parameter down conversion is optical quantum process where a non lin-
ear crystal is used to split one photon into pairs of photons. These photons generated have
combined energies and momenta equal to the energy and momentum of the original photon.
Moreover they are phase-matched in the frequency domain, and have correlated polarizations.
4 The CNOT gate can be represented by the matrix

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

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In this way it is possible to create the 4 maximally entangled states called
Bell states, defined as:
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) (1.29)
|φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) (1.30)
|Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) (1.31)
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉) (1.32)
quantum teleportation One of the most fascinating thing of QM is
the possibility to perform a quantum teleportation of the state information.
In 1993 C. Bennet and colleagues invent a protocol where a maximally en-
tangled qubits, in addition to some classical information, could effectively
teleport an unknown state of a qubit between two distant and different loca-
tions.
Our aim it to transmit a generic quibit from A to a different location B. In
order to achieve this teleportation scheme, it is necessary three qubits, the
transmitted qubit a, the messenger b and the receiver qubit c. The first step
is to create a maximally entangled state between the qubit b and c. After
this operation c is sent toward the location B, using a quantum channel as
optical-fiber or free-space link. Then applying a CNOT gate between the
qubit a and b and subsequently an Hadamard rotation on a the preparation
process is completed. When we measured the qubit a and b collapsing their
state, instantaneously information about qubit a is teleported to qubit c.
In this process qubit a will be destroyed after the measurement, and in
according with the no-cloning theorem no copies are created. It should be
noted that qubit b never leaves the location A and the teleportation happens
between qubit a and qubit c.
The qubit b and c are prepared in the Bell state 1√
2
(|0b 0c〉+ |1b 1c〉) while
the unknown qubit a, which we want to teleport from location A to B is
in the state |Ψa〉 = α|0a〉+ β|1a〉. From the property reported in the above
paragraphs, it results that the entire system is in the state:
|Ψ∑〉 = |Ψa〉|Ψbc〉 =
1√
2
(α|000〉+ α|011〉+ β|100〉+ β|111〉) (1.33)
When it is applied the CNOT gate to the first qubit, we obtain:
UCNOT(a,b) |Ψ∑〉 =
1√
2
(α|000〉+ α|011〉+ β|110〉+ β|101〉) (1.34)
now applying the Hadamard transformation, see equation (2) to qubit a so
that |0a〉 → 1√2 (|0a〉+ |1b〉) and |1a〉 →
1√
2
(|0a〉 − |1b〉) the system becomes:
UHad(a)UCNOT(a,b)|Ψ∑〉 =
1
2
[ |0a0b〉 (α|0c〉+ β|1c〉)+
|1a0b〉 (α|0c〉− β|1c〉)+ |0a1b〉 (β|0c〉+ α|1c〉)+ |0a1b〉 (β|0c〉+ α|1c〉) ]
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Figure 1.3: Teleportation scheme: an entangled Bell state is created. The photons b
and c are sent to the location A and B respectively. After the rotation,
transformation and measurement process between the qubit a and b, we
have teleported the qubit a into the qubit c. The classical channel is nec-
essary to transfer information about the measured make in location A.
We can note that |Ψc〉5 looks nearly identical to |Ψa〉 except a rotation. Once
the measurement in location A of qubits a and b is made, the result of this
measure is sent classically to location B. In this way it is known the exact
rotations to perform into qubit c in order to obtain the original state a. The
term of teleportation, sometimes abused, consist on the transport of infor-
mation about a quantum state, located in a place A to a different place
B without direct interaction. During the last years it was proved that it is
also possible to teleport a quantum state using electrons and entangled dia-
monds respect to photons [84]. Maybe in future the scientists will discover
more information about entanglement state, but until now we have to use
it and this process represents one good use of this phenomenon. Moreover
teleportation or other protocol using entangled state would be very useful
looking to a future mixed quantum network based on satellite, base stations
and repetition node.
5 |Ψc〉 = |0a0b〉(α|0c〉 + β|1c〉) + |1a0b〉(α|0c〉 − β|1c〉) + |0a1b〉(β|0c〉 + α|1c〉) + |1a1b〉(β|0c〉 −
α|1c〉)

2Q U A N T U M K E Y D I S T R I B U T I O N
Nowadays telecommunications play a crucial role in our daily lives, ev-
eryone is always connected and during all the day there are a continuous
exchange of information. In this scenario, Secure communications become
more and more important in many areas, e.g. on-line purchases, emails and
video chats. Quantum cryptography (QCy) or QKD applies fundamental laws
of quantum physics to guarantee secure communications. The security of
quantum cryptography was proven in the last 30 years. The security anal-
ysis of the QKD system is usually based on the assumption that the com-
ponent parts are considered ideals. From a practical point of view instead,
the device imperfections and usury of the components must be taken into
account for a completely investigation of the system. In this chapter we
present the fundamental of QKD, introducing the layered model of the sys-
tem and explaining how it is possible to implement a completely quantum
cryptography working system.
A particular section will be dedicated to finite key analysis. This kind of
analysis will offer a novel approach against the classical one, allowing an
improvement of the final rate especially in a very bad scenario like satellite
communications, where the attenuation of the channel is very high.
2.1 cryptography and quantum cryptography (soa)
The discovery and the theory formalization of QM in the XX century has
opened new horizons in science and techniques. Governments and scientific
community made a lot of effort in QM field, in fact in the last 15 years it was
possible to appreciate big ideas and results. However before this technology
becomes present in our daily lives a lot of work is still considerable. The
research is very closely linked to the technological development, in fact a
lot of idea are not yet implemented for the lack of mature technology, but in
the last two year quantum devices have become more and more important
(e.g. quantum memory, quantum repeater, etc ).
QKD was the first practical QM idea implemented in the 1984 thanks to
Charles H. Bennet and Gilles Brassard [15]. This idea, thought by Stephen
Wiesner in the 1970 [115], was realized only fourteen years later. Even though
the concept was very simple and a lot of devices were available in those
years, the idea met resistance also in the scientific community. Only ten
years later, Information community was ready to understand the infinite
potentially of QM. Here we resume the basic history of QCy:
• 1970, Stephen Wiesner, “Conjugate coding:” noisy transmission of two
or more “complementary messages” using single photons in comple-
mentary polarization bases
• 1984, Bennet and Brassard, BB84 Protocol: the first QKD system was
realized
19
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• 1991, Artur Ekert EPR-Ekert protocol: it was invented the E91 protocol
using maximally entangled state to distill quantum keys
These three discoveries encase all the science about QKD development in the
last 30 years. Obviously during all this time a lot of advancements were
made in QM field, but the basic principles of all the protocols can be ex-
tracted from there.
2.1.1 Classical cryptography
From the ancient age cryptography was one the most important fields of
interest, above all in war context where the messages and the news about
the enemy were very important to to take advantage in the battle.
The basic scheme of Cryptographic system is reported in Figure 2.1, there
are a sender and a receiver and sometimes an eavesdropper. The sender in
order to communicate in a secret way with his own partner, must hide or
modify the plain text so that it becomes very difficult for an eavesdropper
to extract information about the message.
In cryptography, one of the classical famous method to encrypt information
was a cipher, historically very used (Caesar or Napoleon cipher) but now
abandoned for its few security.
A cipher is a sort of secret alphabet, where every letter (or groups of letters)
are substituted with another one, so that it is possible to rewrite the message
in an secret way. In this case, obviously also the other partner must known
the cypher dictionary.
This ciphers are not very reliable, above all after the development of mod-
ern computer, where the scheme like cipher cryptography becomes very
simple to decrypt using tools such as frequency analysis. However mechani-
cal or electro-mechanical classical ciphers were used until modern years and
Enigma was one of the most known cypher.
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Figure 2.1: Base scheme of classical cryptography system: the sender Alice encrypts
the message and sends it to Bob through a communication channel. Eve
tries to extract information about the message using cryptanalysis meth-
ods. Bob once he received the message from Alice is able to decrypt the
ciphertext and recover the message.
2.1.2 RSA cryptosystem
From the birth of Information science and of the computers, Rivest Shamir
Adleman (RSA) algorithm is one of the most used public-key cryptosystems
for secure data transmission. In this particular scheme the encryption key
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is public (accessible by everyone), while the encryption key is secret. This
asymmetry in the protocol guarantees the security algorithm, in fact the
difficulty of an eavesdropper to factoring the product of two large prime
numbers is very huge, and an analysis with a nowadays computers will
take also a lot of years [87].
A user that would use RSA encryption must choose two large prime num-
bers, and then publish only the second one. This number represents the
public key, that anyone can use to encrypt messages. In the conditions that
the public key is large enough, only who knowns the prime (secret) number
could decrypts the message.
The method of RSA encryption can be subdivided in three steps: the key
generation, the encryption of the message and the decryption.
• key generation: the public key, known by everyone is used for encrypt-
ing messages. Messages encrypted with the public key can only be
decrypted with the private key.
• encryption: once Bob receive the public key from Alice, he will send
the message M to Alice. Before doing this operation, Bob has to turn
M into an integer m, such that 0 6 m < n using a reversible protocol
known as a padding scheme. Then he computes c as c ≡ me( mod n)
and transmits the ciphertext to Alice.
• decryption: Alice can recover the integer number m from the ciphertext
c using her private key d and computing c ≡ cd( mod n). Once she
knows the parameter m, she can recover the original message M by
reversing the padding scheme
2.2 the fundamental of qkd
Let’s now see how QM is the basic core for QKD. A QKD system is based on
two different communications channels, a quantum channel ruled by QM
laws, useful for key exchange with photons, and a classical channel used for
error correction and privacy amplification actions.
The quantum channel is confidential and restricted to Alice and Bob users,
while classical channel may be realized with a public communication links
(e.g. Internet network, LAN, free-space optical classical link, optical fiber,
etc) and it is accessible to everybody. In fact an important characteristic of
classical channel is that everyone could read the encrypted message, how-
ever from Shannon’s proof if it was used One Time Pad (OTP) (see 2.3.1)
encryption, it would have been impossible for an eavesdropper to recover
the message.
In Figure 2.2 it is reported the base scheme of a QKD system, where Alice
and Bob exchange keys through quantum channel and use a secure part of
these keys for encrypting data and sharing through classical channel.
The big difference between classical and quantum cryptography resides
in the way they protect information: Classical cryptography (CC) uses the-
ory codes to improve the complexity of the algorithm through which it is
possible to encrypt data; from the other point of view QCy uses the laws of
Quantum Physics (QP) in order to achieve a unconditionally security on the
keys that will be used to encrypt data with OTP1 method. From the theo-
retical point of view it is possible to imagine a uncrackbable cryptographic
1 see OTP paragraph 2.3.1
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Il canale pubblico classico, è un semplice mezzo fisico che Alice e
Bob usano per comunicare informazioni che possono essere intercetta-
te da chiunque.
Figura 3.1.: Schema dei canali classico e quantistico.
La crittografia classica, vista nel Capitolo 1 può essere riassunta in
questa semplice frase:
La crittografia classica usa l’informazione e la teoria dei codici per aumen-
tare la difficoltà degli algoritmi e renderla così meno accessibile e più difficile
da decriptare all’Evedropper.
L’idea innovativa che regola le basi della QC è molto semplice e può
essere riassunta in poche parole:
Ogni misura in un sistema quantistico perturba il sistema stesso.
I teoremi e gli assiomi che sono alla base della precedente frase sono
riportati e dimostrati nel Capitolo 2.
In linea teorica l’affermazione precedente mostra che è possibile
realizzare un sistema di crittografia infallibile.
Realmente ci sono delle pesanti limitazioni tecniche a questa asso-
luta sicurezza, quali il problema di generare e rilevare i singoli fotoni,
l’assoluta casualità delle chiavi, ecc. I passi da fare sono ancora molti,
ma la ricerca in questo campo prosegue in modo molto intenso, con
risultati molto importanti. Successivamente vedremo in dettaglio le
problematiche tecniche e analizzeremo meglio in concetto di sicurezza
infallibile.
Figure 2.2: Base scheme of QKD system.
system based on the simple scheme presented in Figure 2.2. However from
an experimental vision the situation is quite different: it is necessary to de-
cide the trade off between the security that your system require and how
many information Eve could access. This problem i not due to the limita-
tion of QM but only to t chnical imperfections of the instruments used in the
QKD system. This is very important looking to the future where the trans-
mission of secure data will b mor and more preci us and QKD will be one
of the easiest and the secure way to do it.
In this chapter we analyzed into details the concept of quantum security,
unconditionally security and in particular we will show the mathematical
models behind these concepts.
2.3 definition of the security analysis of qkd
The basic laws of QP presented in Chapter 1 are here recalled in order to
explain how QCy works. The idea that every m asure perturbs the quantum
state of the photons an moreover that is not possible to obtain a perfect
copy of a generic quantum state plays good for us. In fact if an eavesdropper
would measure our photons, during the transmission through the quantum
channel and then resend them, we are able to detect the difference thanks
to the principles of QM.
Otherwise on the transmission trough the classical channel, Alice and
Bob could be intercepted, but before this action the channel must be authen-
ticated (with a pre-shared key) in order to escape every loss of information.
Moreover also in the case that Eve is able to obtain information about the
encrypted message, it would not be a problem if all the steps of QKD were
performed in the correct way.
The first step of a QKD protocol is the exchange and the measurement of
quantum states on the quantum channel.
Depending of the protocols Alice, must specify which quantum state she
send (|ψ(Sn)〉) for the sequence of n symbols Sn = {S1, . . . , Sn}. The other
user, Bob has to measure and decode the signals but above all he has to
estimate the total losses in order to evaluate the presence of a possible eaves-
dropper.
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An important characteristic of Alice encoding is that the chosen states of
the protocol must be non-orthogonal, otherwise Eve could decode the se-
quence without introducing errors but only measuring the qubits in the
right bases [51].
It is possible to subdivide QKD protocols in two big groups: Prepare and
Measure (PM) scheme, where Alice prepares the states and then sends to Bob,
and Entanglement based (EB) scheme where a couple of entangled photons
are sent simultaneously to Alice and Bob. Once the users have received
photons, they can measured and establish a secure key. The principle of this
protocols relies in the entanglement phenomena, in fact the measures made
by Alice and Bob are perfectly correlated, in the sense that the results of the
measurement of the two particles are surely in one orthogonal base. In this
way if Eve try to extract information about the quantum state, she destroys
these correlations so that Alice and Bob can detect.
Depending on the conditions of the channel, from the final key rate require-
ments and obviously from the final use of the system, one can choose which
is the best configuration. Moreover the security proof for EB protocol trans-
lates immediately to the corresponding PM one and vice-versa.
Once Alice an Bob has exchange enough data (N symbols), they can start
the processing step, sending some important information through the clas-
sical channel. In all QKD protocols the statistic of the data transmission must
be estimated by Alice and Bob: error rate in decoding (QBER), loss of coher-
ence, loss of the channel, transmission rate, detection rates, etc.
The most important parameter is the Bit error rate (BER), because depend-
ing on the measured value the data could be good or unusable. Due to the
chosen protocol the level of the threshold is different. This step is called
Parameter Estimation (PE) and usually it is preceded by a sifting phase,
where Alice and Bob exchange through the classical channel the measured
base or the detection position’s, in order to share the same l 6 N symbols.
This symbols all together make the key; it is in part correlated and only
partially secret. Now we are going to see how create a perfect secure key
starting from sifted bits. The length of the secure key (k of length l) depends
on how much information Eve has extracted from the raw key.
2.3.1 One Time Pad
OTP is the unique method to encrypt message in the unconditional secure
way. Invented by Gilbert Vernam in 1917, and demonstrated by Shannon in
the ’50 years, this technique uses one time a completely random pre-shared
key. In particular at least the dimension of the key must be of the same
length of the message to encrypt [98]. Vernam cipher works as follow:
• the two users share an identical key. The length of the key at least
equal to the dimension of the plain text 2
• Alice can encrypt the message only adding the plain text to the key 3
• Bob deciphers the encrypted message and then he destroys the key
2 plain text is information a sender wishes to transmit to a receiver.
3 ⊕ sum using xor operation.
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This method works only under some restrict conditions: Alice and Bob must
share a secret identical key composed by true random bits.4 It was proved
by Vernam that it is impossible, from the mathematical point of view, that
an eavesdropper can decrypts the cypher text, if all the hypothesis written
above are respected. The main problem in this method is the difficulty of cre-
ating a shared key between the two users, because classical method didn’t
allow this kind of operation. However in the past, usually during the wars
period, a lot of spies and soldiers had small textbooks, with insignificant
words that they used for exchanging secure messages using this encryption
method. This technique becames more important when in year 1984 Ben-
nett and Brassard invent the QKD, thus associating OTP encryption with a
quantum channel it was possible to create an unbreakable communication
system [15].
2.4 layered model
In the next sessions we will introduce the Layered model of QKD. This defini-
tions were written by Ueli Maurer, and we will give a short summery of the
main postulates useful for our experiments. For a more detail descriptions,
we remand the reader to consult the seminal paper [73].
The author propose in his work a practical scheme for generating a secret
key in the case of realistic noisy channel also in the presence of an eaves-
dropper. It proves that this kind of analysis is completely in accord with the
information-theoretic approach. The model, reported in Figure 2.3 could be
divided in six steps:
• two parties, Alice and Bob aim to create a secret shared key
• these keys could be represented as random variables SA and SB, so
that SA = SB = S
• in this scenario Eve has negligible information
• Alice transmits a random sequence X
• a part of information is collected by Bob Y, however also Eve eaves-
drops the channel and obtained the sequence Z
• X and Y are called raw keys and they are obtained without no post-
processing
In the case where the information extracted by Eve is bigger than the in-
formation between Alice and Bob, from a mathematical point of view it is
possible to write:
I(X; Z) > I(X; Y) (2.1)
where I(X; Z) represents the mutual information between Alice and Eve,
and I(X; Y) between Alice and Bob.
However, also in this particular scenario, it is show by [73] that is possible
to extract secret key thanks to post-processing action. In this particular case
the following conditions must be satisfied:
4 The goodness of the random bits can be identified with some particular criteria. If the generated
numbers are not completely random, the security of the process could be compromised.
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analysis of some practical solutions; the described results are used for the experiments
described in chapter 4. Finally, we describe two results obtained in the framework of
privacy amplification against selective individual attacks and presented in [C1] and in
[J1].
3.1 Information-theoretic secret key agreement: system mo-
del
A novel approach to information-theoretic secret key agreement has been proposed by Ueli
Maurer in his seminal paper [35]. In this work, the author provides a practical scheme for
generating a shared secret key in an adversarial scenario with noisy channels, and proves
that it is secure against attackers with unlimited computing power, that is, according
to an information-theoretic approach. This scheme, which, in fact, does not rely on the
laws of quantum mechanics, finds probably its most notable application in quantum key
distribution. In this section, we provide an overview on the general scheme, whereas in
the following sections we detail its building blocks as applied to quantum key distribution.
Let us start by describing the proposed system model, depicted in figure 3.1.
A fA(·, ·) fB(·, ·) BE
pY Z|X(·)X Y
Z
SA SB
C
C C
Figura 3.1: Information-theoretic secret key agreement system model.
Two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, aim at creating a pair of shared secret keys,
represented by the random variables SA and SB, so that SA = SB = S and a potential
eavesdropper, Eve, has negligible information on them.
In order to do that, Alice transmits a random sequence, X, over an insecure, noisy
channel with two outputs: the first one, Y , is the noisier version of X received by Bob,
whereas the second one, Z, represents the eavesdropped sequence. X and Y are called raw
keys, in that they are obtained by a raw physical transmission with no post-processing.
In Maurer’s scheme, the first step is in fact the transmission over an insecure channel,
with the aim of sharing some correlated information between Alice and Bob, but, unfor-
tunately, introducing some correlation also with the eavesdropper. In principle, Eve may
even share more correlation than Bob with Alice. Formally, this can be written as follows:
I(X;Z) > I(X;Y ), (3.1)
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Figure 2.3: Information-theoretic secret key agreement system model.
(correctness) P[SA 6= SB] < εcor (2.2)
(secrecy) I[SA, SB : Z, C] < εsec (2.3)
where εcor and εsec are usually very small (e.g. 10−9, 10−10). Then Alice and
Bob communicate using a public authenticated channel in order to exchange
information about the raw keys. In this hypothesis Eve has a completely
access to this channel but she cannot modified the message or substitutes
Alice or Bob.
Once that Alice and Bob have created and distilled the keys, they start
with post-processing function. From Alice side she applies a fA(·) functions,
while from Bob side he executes fB(·) in order to extract the secret key pair
(SA, SB). To fix the base steps of a QKD system let’s take an overview of the
main actions, see Figure 2.4.
• physical transmission over an insecure channel
• public discussion to obtain sifted keys: XS at Alice’s side and YS at
Bob’s side (advantage distillation I(XS, YS) > I(XS; Z, C′) )
• Alice and Bob apply post-selection functions:( f ′A(·, ·), f ′B(·, ·))
• information reconciliation to correct the errors, denoted by the func-
tions: ( f ′′A(·, ·), f ′′B (·, ·))
• reconciled sequences pair, (XR, YR) guarantees the inequality P[XR 6=
YR] < εcor
• privacy amplification step with the aim to decrease the information of
Eve about the key (SA, SB)
• privacy amplification is performed using ( f ′′′A (·, ·), f ′′′B (·, ·)) functions
• at the end of this process Alice and Bob shared the same identical
secure key S = SA = SB
An intuitive plot, showing how the crucial quantities involved in the differ-
ent phases of the described secret key agreement scheme change, is shown
in Figure 2.4.
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Figura 3.2: Information-theoretic secret key agreement procedure.
is jointly performed by Alice and Bob by exploiting the public channel. In particular, the
information reconciliation functions are denoted by f
00
A(·, ·) and f
00
B(·, ·), they take as input
the sifted keys and the exchanged public communication, and they output the reconciled
sequences pair, (XR, YR), so that
P [XR 6= YR] < "cor, (3.5)
with "cor arbitrarily small. Condition (3.5) implies, in fact, the correctness constraint (3.3),
since the final key is essentially derived by randomly choosing a compression function which
is then applied to both reconciled keys (see section 3.6). We stress that there exist di↵erent
approaches to information reconciliation, which are going to be detailed in section 3.5.
As a final step, the so-called privacy amplification takes place. Its objective is to
produce a key pair, (SA, SB) such that the attacker has negligible information on it, that
is, such that the secrecy constraint (3.3) is fulfilled. This task is accomplished by means
of the privacy amplification functions f
000
A (·, ·) and f
000
B (·, ·), which take as input both the
reconciled strings and the exchanged public communication, and output the final key. In
the hypothesis that the two final keys are identical, we denote them by S = SA = SB.
An intuitive plot, showing how the crucial quantities involved in the di↵erent phases of
the described secret key agreement scheme change, is shown in figure 3.3. In the following
sections, we are going to describe in more detail these three phases as applied to our focus
scenario, that is, quantum key distribution.
The performance of a secret key agreement scheme are quantitatively described by the
secret key rate. In particular, this rate can be defined as the ratio of the number of final
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Figure 2.4: Information-theoretic secret key agreement procedure.
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Figura 3.3: Evolution of information-theoretic measures involved in a secret key agreement
protocol.
key bits to the number of sent raw key bits or to the number of sifted bits; in the first
case, we denote this quantity as rraw, in the second as rsift. Hence, if we denote by `(·)
the operator length of a string, we can define these rates as
rraw ,
`(S)
`(X)
, rsift ,
`(S)
`(XS)
. (3.6)
Secret key rates can be derived in the asymptotic limit, that is, by assuming keys
of infinite length, or by taking into account non-idealities of practical solutions, such as
finite-length e↵ects and ine ciencies of the protocol. Asymptotic secret key rates will
be discussed for the specific QKD protocols in §3.4, whereas finite-length e↵ects will be
treated in §3.6.2.
3.2 Taxonomy of QKD protocols
Quantum key distribution protocols re nothing but secret key agreeme schemes, where
the insecure channel consists of a quantum channel. Depending on the key distribution
technique and on the information coding scheme [51], QKD schemes can be distinguished
into di↵erent families. In general, the system model for secret key agreement proposed
in figure 3.1 is not suitable for describing all QKD protocols, but is appropriate for the
sub-class of schemes we hereby consider, as explained at the end of this section.
As for the distribution technique, there exist two types of QKD protocols: prepare-
and-measure (PM) and entanglement-based (EB) schemes. In PM protocols (see, e.g.,
[52, 53]), Alice prepares a sequence of quantum signals and sends them through a quantum
channel to the receiver, Bob, who measures them. On the contrary, in EB schemes, pairs
of entangled signals (see, e.g., [54]) are emitted by an entanglement source and then
measured by Alice and Bob, who then act as two separate receivers. As shown in [55], in
some scenarios EB protocols are essentially equivalent to PM schemes. Nevertheless, they
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Figure 2.5: Evolution of information-theoretic measures involved in a secret key
agreement protocol.
2.5 security of qkd
In a theoretical scenario where the symbols N (numbers of sifted bits) stretch
asymptotically to infinite, the secret key rate follows the expression: r =
lim
N→∞
l/n
From th other side in a r ali tic case, another important parameter must
als be taken into account: the raw-key rate (R): the number of raw bits
generated per unit ti e.
This number in part depends form the protocol, but above all it strictly
correla ed to the real devices are you adopti g and to the environmental
conditions. It is possible to define t secret key rate s
K = R · r (2.4)
For a detailed of this quantity see [92] section III. Another analysis will be
take into account when the dimension of the key N is finite. In particular a
reduction of the final secret key rate is expected p incipally for two reasons:
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the parameter estimation is less precise due to the fixed bits, and above all
because some hypothesis are true only in the case of asymptotic limit. In the
next section we will discuss more precisely the finite key analysis, showing
our results in term of the final key rate.
2.5.1 Unconditional security and its conditions
The main difference between CC and QCy arises in the fact that theoretically
using QKD it is possible to achieve an unconditionally secure transmission.
In technical term it means that security can be proved without imposing
restriction on the computational resources by an eavesdropper. As reported
and explain in Chapter 1 QM achieve a perfect check of the system and the
possibility to detect the presence of an eavesdropper through the intrinsic
laws of QP.
However this axiom must be made quantitative; in other words we must
define before the key agreement how much information Eve can extract.
From a mathematical point of view the observed perturbation, made by
Eve allows the computation of a bound. In this perspective security QKD is
guarantee only under some conditons:
• Eve cannot be inside Alice’s or Bob’s apparatus
• the Quantum random number generator (QRNG) must be trusted
• the classical channel use for PE must be authenticated
• the power of Eve il limited to the physics laws
If one of these requirements will not be satisfied the security of the system
could be compromised [92].
2.5.2 The concept of security
We used the definition of security made by Scarani et al in [92]. One of the
easiest way to define the security of a system is to measure the difference be-
tween a perfect key and the generated key. We can assume that the quantity
ε is the unit of measure of the secrecy of the key.
A key is defined as "ε-secure" when the created key and the perfect one
differs from a ε quantity. One important characteristic of a criteria definition
is the possibility to add more requirements without any contradiction or
loss of value. In particular the definition of security reported by Scarani
in [92] satisfy the composability criteria. If a key with security ε is used on
a ε′ task, the composability property assume that the whole procedure is at
least ε+ ε′ secure.
An example of a composable definition of security is the following equation:
1
2
‖ρKE − τK ⊕ ρE‖1 6 ε (2.5)
where ρKE represents the state with correlation between the final key and
Eve and τk the completely mixed state on the possible final keys K. The
ρE variable can be assumed as whatever state of Eve. The maximum failure
probability in this security criteria is defined by the variable ε. Once defined
the security of our key, it is desirable derive a proof of that definition. In our
case several techniques have been used:
28 quantum key distribution
• a first proofs, made by Mayers and base on the uncertainty principle
[75]. Recently reviewed by Koashi [62]
• some security proofs were based on the generalized techniques, made
by Shor and Preskill ([99]), on the correspondence between entangle-
ment and classical post processing
• the most recent techniques use information-theoretical notions [85, 11].
The core of the proof, relies on a strict relationship between the security
requirements and the dimension of the secret key. In other words, it results
very simple to write a relationship of the form:
P(‖ρKE − τk ⊕ ρE‖1 > 2ε) . e l−F(ρKE ,ε) (2.6)
The security requirements will be satisfied in all the cases which l & F(ρKE, ε).
2.5.3 Attack model
The objective of QKD is providing an unconditionally secure cryptographic
keys. In particular, depending on the assumption made toward Eve, differ-
ent bounds on the secrecy level can be derived. According to the traditional
classification, three attacks categories, with increasing generality, can be dis-
tinguished:
individual attacks Individual attacks (IAs) are one of the most con-
strained attacks on a QKD system; they assume that:
IA.1 the eavesdropper uses always the same attack strategy and considers
each qubit independently from the others
IA.2 all the quantum measurements made by the eavesdropped on the
qubits are performed before the classical post-processing [71, 89]
One of the most famous individual attacks are the Intercept-and-resend (IRs)
attacks. In a IRs Eve independently intercepts, measures and then retrans-
mits qubits. This is one of the simplest attacks, in fact Eve has to measures
each qubit, with a black machine like Bob receiver and depending to the
obtained results, she sends the new qubit to the real Bob.
collective attacks Collective attacks (CAs) are a generalization of IAs,
and characterized by the following properties:
CA.1 the eavesdropper uses always the same attack strategy and considers
each qubit independently from the others (as (IA.1))
CA.2 this time Eve can uses devices as quantum memories to store the
qubits and postpone the measurement in a later convenient time [16]
general attacks The family of General attacks (GAs) fall down the as-
sumption made in the IAs and in CAs that is the eavesdropper considers each
qubit independently from the others (IA.1) and (CA.1). In fact in literature
this kind of attack is known by the name of joint or coherent attack, be-
cause it does not impose any restriction on the attack strategy, except those
defined in security definition 2.5.1.
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2.5.4 QKD protocols
In this section, we report some remarkable examples of QKD protocols, use-
ful for the complete understanding of the work and above all because some
of them are implemented in the experiments presented in this work. The
most famous and one the most implemented protocol was the BB84 [15],
but we will introduce also the simplest version B92 [14] and a revision of
the BB84 useful in the finite key regime [104]. All these protocols use a
polarized encoding technique, thus the polarization of the sent qubits de-
termines which bits we have sent. There exist other schemes, such as the
six-states [20], the SARG [90] protocols or Time-Bin protocols [72] which ex-
ploit other degrees of freedom like phase delay. For a complete overview
of QKD protocols both Continuous Variable (CV) and Discrete Variable (DV),
the interested reader can refer to [43] and [92].
bb84 protocol The Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol [15] was the first
QKD scheme that has been proposed and realized. In this scheme informa-
tion is encoded into single polarized photons, in particular there exist two
polarization bases, hereby denoted by X and Z, each one define by a pair of
orthogonal polarization states. As it is possible to see from Table 2.1 X-basis
is called horizontal-vertical basis, linked to the quantum state | 〉 or | 〉
states. From the other side Z-basis is called diagonal basis and it is specified
by | 〉 or | 〉 states.
Table 2.1: Example of bit-qubit mapping of BB84 protocol
Bit X-Basis Z -Basis
0
1
The protocol works as follow:
• Alice choose randomly, using a QRNG5 which bit of the two basis send
to Bob {xm} i.i.d in {0, 1}
• Alice prepares the state to be sent throughout the quantum channel
{Am}, i.i.d. in{X,Z}
• Alice send a sequence of polarized photons (qubits) to Bob, for each
random bit xi Alice send |ψi〉
• Bob for each qubits choose randomly in which basis measure the state;
every measure corresponds to a bit, {Bm}, i.i.d. in{X,Z}
• after the measure, Alice and Bob hold different key, named raw key
• using classical channel Alice and Bob compare basis used in the trans-
mission and detection. Different basis have to be discarded, while bits
obtained with same basis form the key
• at the end of this process Alice and Bob share the same key
5 Quantum Random Number generator
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YS = {yi : Ai = Bi} (2.7)
When the two basis are identical, it is known that there are a strong corre-
lation between sent and receive qubits; from the other point of view when
the two qubits results different and obviously discarder, the result is uncor-
related and it could be due to an Eavesdropper presence or a very noisy
channel. The procedure describe above take into account a PM-scheme dis-
tribution protocol, where Alice before sending quantm bits to Bob have to
prepare photons in the correct state. Moreover the states that Alice sends to
Bob are decided a priori. From the other side there exist EB-scheme where
the protocols use entanglement properties to create quantum states. In the
following paragraphs we will describe in detail also EB-scheme.
Table 2.2: Example of BB84 protocol
Random bits Alice xi 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
Random basis Alice Am
Sent photons |ψxm〉
Random basis Bob Bm
Raw key ym 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
Basis publication
Basis comparison OK OK OK OK OK
Sifted key yS,m 0 0 1 1 0
Error estimation Bob or Alice, once they have exchanged a sequence of
qubits (or viceversa), sends to the other a random subset C of sifted key bits
for estimating the bit error rate Q in the quantum channel (Quantum bit
error rate (QBER)). More specifically, the estimated qber Qˆ is defined as:
Qˆ = ∑ c∈C
xS,c ⊕ yS,c
|C| (2.8)
The estimated QBER is a crucial parameter for the classical post-processing
phase, that is, for information reconciliation and for privacy amplification,
and affects the final secret key rate.
In the ideal case that the quantum channel is ideal and no adversary
is attacking the system, the BB84 protocol directly produces a secret key.
On the contrary, if an attacker is present, she obviously interact with the
quantum channel before she knows the chosen state-preparation and state-
measurement bases. Hence, the sifting procedure applied to QKD, enables
the legitimate parties to get an advantageous position with respect to the
eavesdropper. This operation however reduces the final rate, since, on aver-
age, only 1/2 of the times Alice’s and Bob’s basis choice will match. The
efficiency of the BB84 protocol, in the absence of losses, is ηBB84 = 12 . The
final key rate in the assumption of asymptotic key rate results: ( derived in
rBB84 = R[1− 2h2(Q)] (2.9)
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where h2(p) represents the binary entropy function6 and R represents the
sifted key rate. Let us now describe what happens if an eavesdropper in-
dependently attacks each sent qubit with probability p, by first measuring
and resending it to Bob; this attack is known as intercept-and-resend attack
(IA.2). In this example Eve has to choose which bases use for the quantum
projection, in order to extract the information encoded in the photon. It was
demonstrate by Shor in [99] that the best way for Eve to get information is
to mimic a legitimate receiver, thus to to choose uniformly at random the
measurement basis, E. In this situation, Eve guess the state preparation ba-
sis with probability 1/2, and she takes the wrong basis with probability 1/2.
When she picks the correct basis, she gets the right result, whereas when
she picks the wrong basis, she gets a uniformly random result, thanks to
the complete non-orthogonality of the states in the X and in the Z bases.
Then she have to retransmit the qubit in order to confuse Bob, by preparing
it in the same basis she used for the measurement. In a realistic hypothesis
of quasi-fixed QBER Q and of and ideal setup (no errors and losses introduce
by Eve), it is possible to derive the bit error rate in the case of IRs:
QIR(q) =
(
1− q)Q + q(Q
2
+
1
4
)
=
(
1− q
2
)
Q +
q
4
(2.10)
whereas losses will not be affected. Therefore, the QBER measured at Bob
linearly increases with the attack rate q, up to its maximum value
QIR(1) =
Q
2
+
1
4
(2.11)
Hence, it results very clear that Eve has to find a trade-off for getting as
much information as possible without been revealed. At the same time, Al-
ice and Bob have to estimate as precisely as possible the attack rate q, in
order to compensate for the eavesdropped information during the privacy
amplification phase.
efficient bb84 protocol As seen in section 2.5.4, the BB84 protocol
has a raw-sifted efficiency ηBB84 = 1/2 that is, in the absence of losses, only
half of the raw bits sent by Alice yields a sifted sequence at Bob. Looking
toward an higher efficiency of this protocol , a variant of the BB84 protocol,
that we refer to as efficient BB84 (e-BB84), has been proposed in [104]. In
standard BB84, both polarization bases are used for raw key transmission
and for attack estimation, and their choice is unbiased. In e-BB84, instead,
one basis (say X) carries the raw key sequence, whereas the other basis (say
Z) is used for eavesdropping detection. Also, the choice of the two bases at
Alice and Bob is biased: intuitively, the basis carrying the raw key is chosen
with higher probability, while the detection basis is chosen less frequently.
Let us describe it in more detail. The e-BB84 protocol is characterized by the
sifted key length n and by the number of bits used for parameter estimation
k; both parameters can be chosen according to the required secret key length
and channel conditions as described below. Also, the choice of n and k
yields the probability of picking each of the two bases, namely,
pX =
1
1 +
√
k/n
, pZ = 1 − pX (2.12)
The protocol consists of the following subsequent steps:
6 h2(x) h2(p) = p log(p)− (1− p) log (1− p)
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• quantum transmission
1. Alice randomly generates a sequence of bits, {xm}m∈[1,M] i.i.d. in
{0, 1}
2. a biased sequence of state-preparation bases {Am}m∈[1,M] in X,Z,
chosen with probabilities pX and pZ, respectively where M is
such that the condition in the sifting phase is met.
3. for each random bit xi, Alice prepares a qubit |ψxi 〉, in the form
of a single photon polarized in the Ai basis, and sends it through
the quantum channel.
4. Bob randomly generates a biased sequence of state-measurement
bases, {Bm} in {pX,Z }, chosen with probabilities pX and pZ,
respectively
5. Bob measures each received qubit, |ψxi 〉, in the Bi basis and gets
the measured bit yi.
• Sifting (advantage distillation) Alice and Bob exchange the state prepa-
ration and the state-measurement bases through the public channel ,
{Am} and {Bm}, and discard the bits for which their choice differs.
Also, they distinguish the bits measured in the X basis and the ones
measured in the Z basis, thus defining the following subsets:
X = {i : Ai = X, Bi = X} (2.13)
Z = {i : Ai = Z, Bi = Z} (2.14)
The quantum communication is repeated as long as either |X | < n
or|Z| < k. Then, Alice and Bob pick the same n and k indexes, ran-
domly chosen, in X and in Z , respectively, thus defining the subsets
Xn and in Zk. Finally the following sifted sequences are defined:
XX = {XX,i} = {xi : i ∈ Xn}, (sifted key at A) (2.15)
YY = {XX,i} = {yi : i ∈ Xn}, (sifted key at B) (2.16)
XX = {XX,i} = {xi : i ∈ Zk}, (estimation bit at A) (2.17)
YX = {YX,i} = {yi : i ∈ Zk}, (estimation bit at B) (2.18)
• Error estimation Bob sends to Alice the whole sequence of estimation
bits {YZ,m} in order to compute the bit error rate QZ on the eaves-
dropping detection basis, yielding:
Qˆ = ∑ c∈Z
XZ,c ⊕YZ,c
|Z| (2.19)
Again, this QBER is a crucial design parameter for the classical post-
processing phase, and, in particular, for the privacy amplification phase.
On the other hand, the QBER on the X-basis, QX, is the main design pa-
rameter for the information reconciliation phase, and should be known
to the legitimate parties. As it can easily be seen, the efficiency of the
protocol e-BB84 results: ηe−BB84 = p2X and is therefore higher than the
efficiency of BB84 (see (2.5.4)) as soon as pX > 1/2. Also, the asymp-
totic (secret to sifted) key rate for the efficient BB84 directly follows
from the one of BB84, that is:
re−BB84 = R[1− h2(QX)− h2(QZ)] (2.20)
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b92 protocol The Bennett 1992 protocol [15] is a DV PM protocol, where
information is encoded in two non-orthogonal quantum states. In particular,
a state-preparation basis, P, and a state measurement basis, M, are defined,
so that the following map is defined:
Table 2.3: Example of bit-qubit mapping of B92 protocol
Bit P-Basis M -Basis
0
1
The protocol works as follow:
• Alice generates randomly, using a QRNG7 a sequence of bits {xm} i.i.d
in {0, 1}
• For each random bit {xi}, Alice prepares a qubit |ψxi 〉, in the form
of a single photon polarized in the corresponding P-basis state, and
sends it through the quantum channel. The choice is now determinis-
tic, whereas in the BB84 protocol it was random.
• Bob randomly generates a sequence of M-basis states, {Bm}, i.i.d. in
{P,M}.
• Bob projects each received qubit, |ψxi 〉, onto the Bi polarization, and
gets the measured bit yi. If |ψyi 〉 is orthogonal to Bi, then no detector
clicks; otherwise, the right detector clicks with probability 1/2 and
does not click with probability 1/2.
• Bob sends to Alice, through the public channel, the indexes D of the
the qubits that produced a click at the receiver
• at the end of this process Alice and Bob share the same key
XS = {xi : i ∈ D} (2.21)
YS = {yi : i ∈ D} (2.22)
Table 2.4: Example of B92 protocol
Random bits Alice xm 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
Sent photons |ψxm〉
Random basis Bob Bm
Sifted key ym 0 0 1
The efficiency of the B92 protocol (in the absence of losses) immediately
follows from the described scheme
ηB92 =
1
2
(
P[xi = 0, Bi = | 〉] + P[xi = 1, Bi = | 〉]
)
=
1
4
(2.23)
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Hence, results that B92 protocol has a lower efficiency as compared with
BB84, and a fortiori, with e-BB84. On the other hand, B92 relies on a simpli-
fied setup, which requires just two non orthogonal states at both the trans-
mitter and the receiver side, that is, half of the complexity of BB84.
Unfortunately, the described setup also comes with a significant security
threat. Due to the deterministic coding of qubits, in fact, an eavesdropper
who plays the man-in-the-middle can mimic Bob’s receiver, and re-transmit
the qubits which produced a click. This attack, known as unambiguous state
discrimination (USD) [35], introduces significant losses, yielding an overall
efficiency of (1/4)2 if each qubit is attacked, but does not affect the mea-
sured QBER at the receiver.
In the original paper by Bennett [14], the use of a strong reference was
suggested to avoid this problem, but this enhanced protocol becomes inse-
cure as soon as the channel losses get higher than a given threshold which
depends on the non-orthogonality of the signal states [36]. A further solu-
tion for making the B92 protocol more robust against losses and noise is the
one presented in [69], where the decoy-states principle is extended to B92
by using additional uninformative states. Finally, the asymptotic (secret to
sifted) key rate for the B92 protocol is:
rB92 = R[1− leakEC − IE] (2.24)
where leakEC(Q) > h2(Q) and IE = min(IAE, IBE).
2.5.5 Single photon remarks
All the protocols presented above assume one strong hypothesis, thus that
each sent qubit trough the quantum channel is composed by a single photon.
On this way Eve cannot measures the incoming photon without perturbing
it, and giving the possibility to Bob to understand that the measure is dis-
torted. In the case of multiple photons associated to a single qubit, an attack
like Photon Number Splitting (PNS) works in a very efficient way, in fact Eve
could measure one of the qubit photons without perturbing the measured
made by Bob [91]. In a experimental scenario, where usually the sources for
Alice are faint laser, this assumption is not often verified. It is possible to
study the static of the emitted photon in order to better understand an pre-
vent this kind of attacks. The probability of emission follows a poissonian
statics, while the probability of multi-photon emissions can be calculated as:
P[nph > 1|nph > 0] = 1− e
−µ(1+ µ)
1− e−µ (2.25)
Usually to prevent this problem, in the choose about the transmission rate
of Alice, it is decided that a lower emission rate could be allow in order to
decrease the probability of multi-photon emission. In other word we must
choose the parameter µ (mean photon number per pulse) lower than 1. Usu-
ally in a realistic QKD scenario typical values are 0.1 6 µ 6 0.4.
Due to the low performance of the final key rate (in the case of low µ),
scientist propose solutions to overcome this limitation, the best known pro-
tocol (with the same security of the others) are reported in [56, 67, 90] and
propose a decoy state method.
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The decoy state method works as follow: in addition to the encoded qubits,
Alice sometimes sends pulses with different level of µ which carry no infor-
mation about the key, but they are only useful for checking Eve’s presence.
Eve could not know the intensity of the qubits, and she can’t recognize if
such qubit is for key creation or for security check, in this case she measures
the qubit and for Alice and Bob result very simple to detect her presence.
Decoy state method was demonstrated in several works, both considering
optical fiber link [88] both in free-space scenario [109]. Also in the case of
finite key analysis it was proved that decoy state method works [46].
In all the experiment presented in this thesis, we never include decoy states
method both, but it would be better if all the analysis was made in the also
against PNS attack.
2.6 finite key analysis
In the last years, great efforts from the quantum communication community
were directed to this subject, due to its relevance for a number of application
scenarios [4, 92, 24]. We would like to underline that all previous published
experimental work on finite-size key security were based on a far more in-
efficient bound as compared with the one obtained in Tomamichel [104]. In
this work, we study the security and the generation rate of a protocol for
key exchange in the finite-key regime and in presence of noise, whose value
is experimentally varied up to the top limit [9]. The security is assessed
with reference to a recently introduced theoretical result [104], for which
“almost tight bounds on the minimum value" of exchanged qubits "required
to achieve a given level of security" were obtained [104], as well as for a real-
istic bound described below. In particular, by leveraging the optimal design
of the prepare-and-measure scheme complying with the above mentioned
tight theoretical bounds, we evaluate how the secret key rate scales in differ-
ent channel conditions, depending on the protocol parameters. We consider
two possible attack models, referring to two different levels of secrecy: prag-
matic secrecy, which ensures resiliency against individual attacks, and general
secrecy, which ensures resiliency against the most general quantum attacks.
2.6.1 Protocol for quantum key distribution.
We will adopt here the protocol described in [104], a derivation of the well
known BB84 protocol [15] and reported in 2.5.4.
According to this protocol, one of the two bases is used to encode the raw
key bits while the other basis is used to test the channel for the presence of
the eavesdropper. Moreover, the two bases are selected by Alice and Bob in
the preparation of the qubits and in their measure, respectively, with non
equal probabilities, unlike the standard BB84.
In order to obtain the final sifted keys, Alice and Bob keep the same n bits,
randomly chosen, from the X bits to form the sifted key strings X = {xi}
and X′ = {x′i}. Similarly they choose k random bits from the Z bits to ob-
tain the parameter estimation strings Z = {zi} and Z′ = {z′i}. Differently
from [104], we defined the sifted key as X and not as the union set of X and
Z. The X bits will be used to build the final secret key and the expected
number of errors between X and X′ is the crucial parameter in the design
of the information reconciliation protocol. The Z bits will be used to test
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Figure 2.6: The experiment was realized in the Luxor Laboratory of CNR IFN where
Alice and Bob was mounted in a stabilized optical table. It is possible
to see the four SPAD detectors used for the state measurement and the
optical fibers (orange cables) used both for collecting photons both for
introduce different noise light into the channel.
the presence of the eavesdropper and the number of errors between Z and
Z′ is used for dimensioning the privacy amplification procedure. Note that
the probabilities pX and pZ are chosen to satisfy p2Z/p
2
X = k/n in order
to minimize the number of exchanged photons before the quantum com-
munication is stopped. After the quantum transmission and the sifting of
the raw data, four subsequent tasks take place: parameters estimation, in-
formation reconciliation, error verification and privacy amplification. The
first task, parameters estimation, is required to measure the QBER on the
Z basis, QZ. Furthermore, we assume that the quantum channel is stable,
i.e., that QBER on the X-basis, QX, is constant in time (note that, in general,
QX 6= QZ). If QX increases (for instance because an attacker is tampering
with the channel), then the information reconciliation will fail. The failure
will be detected during the error verification phase, and the protocol will
abort. On the other hand, the empirical QBER in the Z basis is dynamically
computed at each protocol run as QˆZ = (∑ki=1 zi ⊕ z′i)/k, to check for the
presence of an eavesdropper. The protocol aborts if QˆZ > QZtol, where Q
Z
tol is
a given channel error tolerance on the Z basis which has been determined
a priori based on the expected behavior of the quantum channel and the
required level of security.
Information reconciliation allows Bob to compute an estimate Xˆ of X by
revealing LEC bits (LEC represents the classical information leakage). We
define Pfail as the upper bound to the probability of a reconciliation failure
and εcor as the upper bound to the probability that Xˆ differs from X. We
fixed a threshold QXmax such that the empirical QBER QˆX in the sifted key is
higher than QXmax with probability less than Pfail/2.
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2.6.2 General and pragmatic secrecy
In this work we consider two possible attacker models, which in turn entail
two different notions of secrecy, which we call general and pragmatic, respec-
tively. General secrecy, as defined in [104], requires that the final shared
keys are secret with respect to the most GAs, and it is based on the secrecy
criterion provided in [63]. We say that the distilled key S is εsec-GS (general
secret) if for any attack strategy
min
σE
1
2
‖ρSE −ωS ⊕ σE‖1 ≤ εsec(1− pabort) , (2.26)
being ‖ρ‖1 = Tr
√
ρρ†, pabort the probability that the protocol aborts, ρSE the
quantum state which describes the correlation between Alice’s classical key
S and the eavesdropper, ωS the fully mixed state on S, and σE a generic
quantum state on the eavesdropper’s Hilbert space. Then, if the bases X
and Z are chosen as described above and assuming that Alice uses an ideal
single photon source, the authors of [104] show that an εsec-GS key can be
extracted out of the reconciled key, with length:
` ≤ n(1− h˜2(QZtol + µ))− LEC − log2
2Pfail
ε2secεcor
(2.27)
where µ =
√
n+k
nk
k+1
k ln
2
εsec
, h2(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the bi-
nary Shannon entropy function, h˜2(x) = h2(x) for 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 and h˜2(x) = 1
for x > 0.5.
On the other hand, pragmatic secrecy [25] ensures that the final key is
secret with respect to IRs attacks [55], i.e., a specific class of selective indi-
vidual attacks, which, however, represents the most realistic and feasible
attack strategy based on the experimental technology nowadays available:
collective or more general attack models (see [92]), in fact, require ancillary
qubits and quantum memories in order to be deployed. While in a long-
term perspective (more than 50 years) general security is the goal, in the
near future (5− 10 years), we know that an ideal IRs attack is the best option
that an eavesdropper can choose because the quantum memory needed for
a general or coherent attack is not yet available.
In the Experimental Results subsection, we will show that there are situa-
tions in which no key can be extracted if general security is required, while
a pragmatically secure secret key can be obtained. In these cases, requiring
general security, a protection far above actual possibilities of an eavesdrop-
per, prevents key generation. Also, we would like to stress that pragmatic
secrecy, unlike computational secrecy, offers forward security: if a key is
produced today with pragmatic secrecy (without quantum memory avail-
able for Eve), the key or a message encrypted with it will be secure for any
future use.
As a criterion for pragmatic secrecy, we use a bound on the classical equiv-
ocation at the eavesdropper, namely we say that the distilled key S is δsec-PS
(pragmatic secret) if, for any IRs attack strategy and in the case that the
protocol is not aborting,
H(US)− H(S|V) ≤ δsec1− pabort (2.28)
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being US the uniform key with the same length as S, V the classical random
variable which summarizes all the information available to the eavesdropper
and H(S|V) the equivocation (conditional entropy) of S given V. Note that
eq. (2.28) implies the uniformity and the security conditions H(S) ≥ H(US)−
δsec
1−pabort (uniformity)
Iacc(S; E) ≤ δsec1−pabort (security)
(2.29)
where the accessible information Iacc is the maximum mutual information
I(S; V) = H(S)− H(S|V) that can be extracted from the quantum system
E [63]. Moreover, choosing δsec = 2ln 2 ε
2
sec in (2.28) implies condition (2.26)
for non-coherent attacks (see Methods section 2.7). It should be noted that,
as for incoherent individual attacks, eq. (2.28) guarantees composable secu-
rity, as the eavesdropper, without a quantum memory, cannot exploit the
“locking property” of the accessible information (see [63]). The pragmatic
security of the distilled key can be assessed through the following result,
the proof of which is provided in the Methods section. The distilled key S
is δsec-PS if
∃ a ∈N : f (a, `) ≤ δsec (2.30)
where
f (a, `) = ` max
q
[
Iq(a + 1, n− a)I1−q/2(k(1−QZtol), kQZtol + 1)
]
+
2−(nEC−`−a)
ln 2
, (2.31)
with nEC = n− LEC − dlog2(Pfail/εcor)e and Ix(a, b) denoting the regular-
ized incomplete beta function
Ix(a, b) =
B(x; a, b)
B(1; a, b)
, B(x; a, b) =
∫ x
0
ta−1(1− t)b−1 dt. (2.32)
Based on (2.30), we can therefore choose the optimal secret key length as
` = max
{
b : min
a
f (a, b) ≤ δsec
}
(2.33)
Please note that, in order to allow a comparison with the tight bound (2.27),
we have derived the secure key length in the hypothesis that Alice uses a
single photon source.
Finally, given the probability εrob that the protocol aborts even if the eaves-
dropper is inactive [104], we can compute the final secret key rate for both
general and pragmatic secrecy as
r(`, n, k, εrob) = (1− εrob) `M(n, k) (2.34)
where M(n, k) = n+ k+ 2
√
nk is the expected number of qubits that have to
be sent until n sifted key bits and k parameter estimation bits are collected.
2.6.3 Experimental results
We conducted experiments with different noisy channels yielding different
values for the average QBER QX and QZ, each of them realized with different
encoding probabilities (pZ, pX). We varied the noise value in the channel by
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Figure 2.7: Experimental bits: Joint empirical distribution of sent and received bits,
as obtained in one experiment with the best channel conditions (corre-
sponding to QX = 0.33% and QZ = 1.48%). The probabilities of sending
and measuring in the X and Z basis were pX = 0.51 and pZ = 0.49,
respectively.
coupling to the receiver an external unpolarized source of suitable inten-
sity, that increased the background signal. It is worth noting that by this
operation we are modelling the following depolarizing channel
C : ρ→ (1− P)ρ+ P
4
3
∑
j=0
σjρσj, (2.35)
where σj are the Pauli matrices, being σ0 the identity and P the parameter
representing the probability that any detected photon is coming from the
background.
In Figure 2.7 we show the joint empirical distribution of the transmitted
and received bits on the X and Z bases obtained in one run with the best
environmental conditions (i.e., with additional background), for the case
pZ = 49% and pX = 51%. As expected, in this case the QBER is very low:
the main source of errors are imperfections in the waveplates used in the
measurement, yielding QX = 0.33% and QZ = 1.48% on average. In Figure
2.8 we show the measured experimental key rates for each data set and for
both general and pragmatic secrecy. First of all, let us recall that, in order
to consistently compare the secrecy rates obtained with general and prag-
matic secrecy, the security parameters εsec and δsec have to be chosen so that
δsec =
2
ln 2 ε
2
sec. As a performance reference, we plot the asymptotic theoreti-
cal bound r = 1− h2(QX)− h2(QZ), holding in the limit of infinite length
keys (labelled as “asymptotic” in Figure 2.8) and the optimal theoretical
bound for εsec-GS keys (labelled as “numerically optimized pZ” in Figure
2.8). The experimental key rates are obtained by the following procedure:
for each data set the n-bit sifted key X and the k-bit parameter estimation
string Z (X′ and Z′) at Alice’s (Bob’s) side are obtained by the experiment.
The error correction is performed on X and X′ by using the Winnow scheme;
in particular, the Winnow parameters were chosen so that a maximum of 6
subsequent iterations is allowed with block sizes up to 256 bits. We then
performed privacy amplification by compressing the error-free keys by mul-
tiplication with a random binary Toeplitz matrix. The amount of compres-
sion depends on `, the secret key length, given by eq. (2.27) and (2.33) for
general and pragmatic security, respectively. On the other hand, the optimal
bound for εsec-GS keys is numerically derived by maximizing the secret key
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Figure 2.8: Experimental secret key rates r vs. sifted key length n for different prob-
abilities of encoding and measuring on the two bases pZ, pX = 1− pZ
and for different channel conditions (values of the average QBER QX, QZ):
(a) QX = 0.3 %, QZ = 1.5 %; (b) QX = 2.4 %, QZ = 3.9 %; (c) QX = 4.9 %,
QZ = 6.0 %; (d) QX = 8.3 %, QZ = 8.1 %. For each case we report the
key rates obtained for εsec-GS (solid lines) and δsec-PS (dashed lines) keys
with εsec = 10−10, δsec = 2ln 2 ε
2
sec, Pfail = 10−3 and a correctness param-
eter εcor = 10−10. The standard deviation of experimental rates are on
the order of 10−3 for both εsec-GS and δsec-PS keys. Error bars are not
reported in the plot for the sake of clarity. For comparison, we also re-
port the asymptotic key rate in the infinite length limit, and the εsec-GS
bound achievable by optimizing the probability pZ and the thresholds
QZtol, Q
X
max for each value of n.
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rate r (eq. (2.34), with ` given by eq. (2.27)) over pZ, QZtol and Q
X
max for each
n.
In the numerical procedure used to find the optimal bound for εsec-GS
keys, since an analytical expression is not available for LEC or εrob, LEC is
approximated as LEC = 1.1 · n · h2(QX) and, similarly, εrob is replaced by the
following upper bound [? ]:
εrob ≤ exp
[
− k(Q
Z
tol −QZ)2
1− 2QZ ln
(
1−QZ
QZ
)]
(2.36)
Experimental values obtained for εrob show that such bound is rather loose.
On the other hand, as QX increases, the approximate expression for LEC is
lower than the average value for the Winnow scheme. As a consequence,
the experimental secret key rates may slightly exceed the optimal bound in
some low QBER cases, as we can see in fig. 2.8.
As a further comment, we note that, for an asymmetric channel with
QX < QZ, using the Z basis for key encoding and X for eavesdropper
detection provides a higher optimal secret key rate (2.34). However, when
the two error rates QX and QZ have similar values, a minor gain in r is
obtained. For instance, when n = 106, εcor = εsec = 10−10, with QZ = 4%
and QX = 2%, we can achieve r = 0.31; by exchanging the role of Z and X,
r = 0.33 can be achieved.
In situations such as satellite quantum communications, the amount of sifted
bits is expected to fluctuate as it depends on the variable channel conditions
during the passage. From the experimental point of view it is easier to fix
the values of pZ and pX and accumulate data as long as possible. The value
of pX will constrain the ratio between k and n according to the relation
pX = 11+
√
k/n
. In the performed experiments, we thus fixed the value of pZ
and pX = 1− pZ. For each value of the background noise we run different
acquisitions with pZ belonging to the discrete set {9%, 16%, 28%, 40%, 49%}.
Experimental results for the εsec-GS key rates are plotted with thin solid
lines, while δsec-PS key rates are plotted with thin dashed lines; different
colors correspond to different (pZ, pX). We used Pfail = 10−3, εcor = 10−10
and εsec = 10−10. As expected, pragmatic secrecy always allows the achieve-
ment of higher secret key rates with respect to general secrecy, which pays
the price for the higher level of secrecy it provides. The gain becomes more
evident when the channel becomes noisier and the QBER increases. We also
observe that with QX = 4.9% εsec-GS keys secure are obtained for pZ = 16%,
pZ = 28%, pZ = 40% and pZ = 49% and not for pZ = 9%, whereas, when
QX = 8.3%, only keys secure against pragmatic secrecy can be extracted
with the parameters we used.
We point out that the bounds derived for the general and pragmatic se-
crecy do take into account statistical fluctuations: if the measured QˆZ is
greater than QZtol the protocol aborts, while for QˆZ < Q
Z
tol the protocol gives
a secure key with security parameter εsec. As an example, given QX = 4.9%,
QZ = 6.0%, n = 100000 and pZ = 9%, the parameter µ which takes into ac-
count these fluctuations for general secrecy (see eq. (2.27)), is approximately
equal to 0.15, a value which, for an experimentally realistic number of bits
disclosed during the information reconciliation procedure, and even with-
out the contribution of QZtol, yields the impossibility of producing a secret
key.
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Figure 2.9: Minimum number of received bits M(n, k) needed to obtain a εsec-GS key
of a given length ` (as labelled on each curve) versus the quantum BER
QX. Different colors divide the regions with different secret key lengths.
Crosses represent our experimental results, the colored regions and the
solid lines that delimit them are derived from the numerically optimized
bound, assuming QZ = QX.
Moreover, we notice that higher values of pZ (∼ 50%) better suit lower
values of n for both general and pragmatic secrecy in all considered cases:
for instance, when QX = 0.3% in the general secrecy case, pZ = 49% is
optimal for n < 3 · 103; on the other hand, as n increases, it is possible to
decrease pZ and when n ' 105 the highest rate is obtained with pZ =
16%. This feature can be understood in the following way: for a short sifted
key X, an almost equally long string Z (k ∼ n) is needed to reliably detect
eavesdropping; when n grows, less bits of Z (in percentage) are necessary.
In fact, in the large n limit, it is possible to choose k so that k/n vanishes as
n goes to infinity and the secret key rate approaches the asymptotic bound,
r = 1− h2(QX)− h2(QZ).
It is worth noting that, in the asymptotic limit, a biased choice of the
bases gives a higher secure key rate with respect to the BB84 protocol [15]
whenever pX >
√
1/2. In fact, in the infinite limit, the fraction of secure over
sifted bits is given by 1− 2H(Q) in both cases (for simplicity we here assume
QˆX = QˆZ = Q); however, a biased choice of the bases gives a number of
sifted bits that is approximately p2X > 1/2 of the sent bits (also in the finite
size regime), while for the BB84 protocol the sifted bits are 1/2 of the sent
bits. In particular, by using a large pX, namely pX ∼ 1, in the infinite key
limit we approach a double secret key rate with respect to BB84.
With the obtained data we also estimated the minimum number of re-
ceived qubits M that are needed in order to obtain a key of given length `.
In figure 2.9 we show this quantity as a function of the QBER (in this case we
assumed that QX = QZ). Solid lines represent the theoretical minimum M
necessary to obtain a general secret key for different lengths `. With mark-
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Figure 2.10: The qubits are generated by attenuating four differently polarized lasers.
The FPGA board controls which laser should be turned on in each qubit
transmission. At the receiver side, by a beam splitter with transitivity T,
Bob perform the measurement in the X (with probability T) or Z basis
(with probability 1− T). NPBS, beam splitter; PBS, polarizing beam split-
ter; HWP, half wave plate; Filters, neutral density filters, SPAD, single
photon avalanche diode.
ers of different colors we indicate the experimental received qubits for the
different values of `. Clearly, as the QBER grows, it is necessary to increase
the number of exchanged qubits to obtain a given key length `. On the other
hand, when the channel is almost noiseless, a secret key of reasonable length
can be extracted by using a relatively small number of qubits: for instance,
more than 1000 secure key bits can be obtained by exchanging less than
20000 photons (see Figure 2.9).
2.7 methods
The optical setup of our prototype implementing the quantum communi-
cation is shown in Figure 7.2. The transmitter (Alice) uses four infrared
(850nm) attenuated diode lasers driven by a Field Programmable Gate Ar-
ray (FPGA) to send the bits 0 and 1 encoded in the different polarization
bases of the photons. By properly configuring the FPGA, it is possible to set
the probabilities pX and pZ. The receiver (Bob) uses a variable beam split-
ter (BS) with transmission T to send the received qubits to the measures in
the two bases. The probability pX is equal to the transmissivity T of the BS.
On one BS output, a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) and two single photon
avalanche photodiodes (SPAD) measure the photons in the X basis; on the
other side a half-wave plate (HWP) is positioned before the PBS to allow
the measurement in the Z basis. The counts detected by the four SPAD are
stored on a second FPGA. A cable between the two FPGA is also used along
for synchronization. Concerning the transmitted qubits, we used the same
data structure of a recent free-space QKD implementation [25] based on the
B92 protocol [14]. A raw key is composed into N packets of 2880 bits each,
which are in turn divided into 12 frames for the ease of synchronization.
In fact, each frame consists of 11 header slots and 240 payload slots, each
with a duration of 800 ns. The header exhibits the pattern ”100000xxxx1”,
where ”xxxx” is the 4-bit frame number, encoded one bit per slot in a pulse-
duration modulation of the synchronization beam (a 400 ns or 200 ns pulse
encode the bit 1 or 0, respectively). As regards the payload slots, the first
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tively. A 808 nm laser beam is also used along for synchro-
nization. The receiver (Bob) uses a dichroic mirror (DM)
to separate the information qubits from the synchronization
signal: the latter is reflected and detected by an avalanche
photodiode, whereas the qubits, trasmitted by the DM, im-
pinge on a 50/50 beam splitter (BS). On either output of
the BS, a polarizer and a single photon avalanche photodiode
(SPAD) detect the  45  linear h | or horizontal h | po-
larization photons respectively. Each click of either SPAD
corresponds to the reception of a sifted 0 or 1, respectively.
The transmitted data structure is shown in Fig. 2. A raw
key of 288 kbit is divided into 50 packets of 5760 bits each,
which are in turn divided into 12 frames for the ease of
synchronization. In fact, each frame consists of 11 header
slots and 240 payload slots, each with a duration of 800 ns.
The header exhibits the pattern ‘100000xxxx1’, where ‘xxxx’
is the 4-bit frame number, encoded one bit per slot in a
pulse-duration modulation of the synchronization beam (a
400 ns or 200 ns pulse encode the bit 1 or 0, respectively). As
regards the payload slots, the first 200 ns are used to send the
synchronization beam, then, after the synchro-laser, Alice
waits 200 ns and then sends two bits separated by 200 ns.
The resulting raw key rate is therefore upper bounded as
Rraw  2.39Mbit/s.
The measured sifted key rate Rsift allows to estimate the
total loss along the source / channel / detector chain ↵ =
Rsift/Rraw. This includes also the fraction of pulses that
carry no photons, due to the Poissonian statistics of the
faint source, and the B92 protocol e ciency ⌘ = 1/4.
2.2 Attack model
We consider selective individual attacks, where Eve mea-
sures each photon independently with probability 0 < q < 1,
using either basis, (h |, h |) or (h |, h |), randomly cho-
sen. In the intercept and resend (IS) attack [8], each mea-
sured bit is resent with the same encoding as used by Alice,
thus increasing the error rate at Bob. In particular, observe
that by considering Alice and Bob’s sifted keys as input
and output, respectively, the quantum channel can be mod-
eled as a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with some error
probability ". When a single qubit is observed by Eve ac-
cording to an IS attack, the error probability at Bob for the
corresponding bit is set to 1/4 due to the random and in-
dependent choice of the basis used by Alice and Eve. More
precisely, it was shown in [9] that 1/4 is a lower bound on
the error probability induced by the IS attack, for any basis
chosen by the eavesdropper to measure the incoming qubits
and resend them to Bob. Hence, an individual IS attack
with probability q increases the QBER value to
"0 = (1  q)"+ 1
4
= "+ q
„
1
4
  "
«
, (1)
whereas it is conservatively assumed to leave channel losses
una↵ected.
On the other hand, in the unambiguous state discrimination
(USD) attack [10] only the 0’s that are measured with the
(h |, h |) basis and the 1’s that are measured with the
(h |, h |) basis are retransmitted to Bob, thereby intro-
ducing further losses at the legitimate receiver but no addi-
tional errors. When a qubit is observed by Eve and resent
according to the USD scheme, the random choice of the ba-
sis introduces a further loss factor of 1/4. Hence, individual
USD attacks with probability q increase channel losses to
the value
↵0 = (1  q)↵+ q↵
4
= ↵  3
4
q↵. (2)
Figure 2.11: A raw key of 288 kbit is divided into 50 packets of 5760 bits each, which
are in turn divided into 12 frames for the ease of synchronization. In
fact, each frame consists of 11 header slots and 240 payload slots, each
with a duration of 800 ns. The header exhibits the pattern ‘100000xxxx1’,
where ‘xxxx’ is the 4-bit frame number, encoded one bit per slot in a
pulse-duration modulation of the synchronization beam (a 400 ns or 200
ns pulse encode the bit 1 or0, respectively). The first 200 ns are use to
send the synchronization beam, then, after the synchro-laser, Alice waits
200 ns and th n sends the two qubits separa ed by 200 ns. The resulting
raw key rate is therefore upper bounded as Rraw ≤ 2.39Mbit/s.
200 ns are used to send the synchronization signal; th n, Alice waits 200
ns and sends two bits separated by 200 ns. It is worth noting that the ex-
perimental setup of this protocol i very similar to the original BB84: the
main difference lies in the interpretation of received bits in the two different
bases.
2.8 discussion
In conclusion, we have experimentally demonstrated the feasibility of key
distillation according to the finite-key analysis proposed in [104] and com-
pared it with a less stringent definition of security, called pragmatic, that
protects the protocol against intercept and resend attacks. We compared the
two analyses for different amounts of depolarizing noise added to the quan-
tum channel. With pragmatic security, a significantly secret key rate with
finite keys is demonstrated, even in conditions near the theoretical QX, QZ
bound of 11%. Its drawback is the insecurity against collective attacks, which
however are not presently available. We stress that, when the channel is very
noisy (QX = 8.3%) no key that is secure against the most general quantum
attack could be extracted up to 2 · 105 sifted bits; however, by considering
only intercept and resend attacks, in this case a secrect key rate up to 7.5%
was obtained. When QX, QZ > 11% it is not possible to obtain a secure key
even in the asymptotic large n limit. This shows that, for highly noisy chan-
nels, the use of pragmatic secrecy is a viable solution to obtain some secret
bits for a experimentally realistic number of exchanged photons. We believe
that our work can have important application for free-space quantum com-
munication and for all QKD scenarios in which the number of exchanged
qubits is limited by physical constraints, such as in the inter-satellites link
scenario.
3F R E E - S PA C E L O N G D I S TA N C E
O P T I C A L L I N K
In this chapter we study the propagation of a quantum beam through the
atmosphere, paying attention to some particular effects, like beam wonder-
ing, beam spreading and scintillations. We demonstrate in Chapter 2 how
it is possible to establish secure key also in presence of noise and in the
case of finite key regime. In order to bring laboratory experiment in real life
conditions we perform a free-space link in 2012, where it was possible to
establish a QKD experiment between two islands in the Canary archipelago.
It represent one of the most interesting scenario for a possible quantum
link, because the proximity of Sahara desert and badly weather conditions
make the environment very particular. From the astronomical point of view,
the blanket of clouds that hide the scattering of city light, create a perfect
conditions for space study and exploration; from the other side this clouds
creates a very turbulent channel once you look for an horizontal link, where
a sender, positioned in the Jacobus KapteinTelescope (JKT) telescope commu-
nicates with a receiver situated in OGS telescope. We explored atmosphere’s
effects, and we proved that polarized photons sent through 143 km of at-
mosphere have not be degraded. Moreover we introduce a new method of
analysis in order to use as a resource the atmospheric effects, so that to in-
crease the Signal to noise ratio (SNR) ratio and to be able to make QC also in
a very worst case conditions.
3.1 gaussian beam propagation
The treatment will be focused on Gaussian beam because it is one of the
most frequent case in experimental condition. We can define the optical in-
tensity of a Gaussian beam I(ρ) = |U(ρ)|2, where U(ρ) represents the elec-
tric field in the function of the axial and radial position, z an ρ =
√
x2 + y2.
I(ρ, z) = I0
[
w0
w(z)
]2
(3.1)
The peak of the function obviously is represented by the point ρ = 0 in the
z axis, and decreases monotonically as ρ increases. In the case of (ρ = 0) the
intensity reduces to:
I(0, z) =
I0
1+ (z/z0)2
(3.2)
In the condition of any transverse plane, the intensity of the beam assumes
its peak value on the beam axis, and decreases by a factor 1/e2 at the ra-
dial distance ρ = w(z). The relation of the beam width in function of the
parameter z is given by:
w(z) = w0
√
1+
z
z0
2
(3.3)
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the minimum value assumed by w(z), at the plane z = 0 is known as beam
waist o radius w0. Usually in optics a term very used is the spot size: 2w0.
In the hypothesis that z >> z0, the first term of the equation (3.3) become
neglected, in fact w(z) could be approximately at:
w(z) ' w0
z0
= θ0z (3.4)
where θ0 represents the half angle at which the cone of the beam diverges.
3.2 atmospheric model
Beam propagation in atmosphere is subject principally to many effects given
by temperature, wind, atmospheric conditions and many others. Small vari-
ations in temperature (< 1◦C) give rise to local random changes in the
wind speed, so that generations of whirls is amplified. Due to the continu-
ous change of temperature, the density of the atmosphere varies and hence
its refractive index. Usually these small variations are inconsistent, but in
the case that they can accumulate they become important in the study of an
optical beam propagation in atmosphere. The front wave of a propagated
optical beam (not only quantum), will be subject to variations related to the
refractive index. This can lead to effects of:
• beam wandering
• intensity fluctuations ("scintillation")
• enlargement of the beam ("beam spread")
These small variations on the refractive index, have a similar effects like a
series of small lenses positioned through the direction of propagations.
The consequences due to the small variations in the refractive index, have a
similar effect like a series of small lenses. The latter, focus and redirect the
beam, and possibly through interferential phenomena causes variations in
intensity.
It could be assumed from theory that, every single "lens" focus and redi-
rects the beam in different position. This phenomena explain the intensity
fluctuation of the bundle. Moreover the dimension of these lenses could
be approximated to the dimension of the vortex that generated it. Given
the complexity of this kind of study, the theory of turbulence is based on
statistical analysis. Statistical description of the process, makes possible the
generalization of useful models describing the average effects, such as: total
beam wandering, beam spread, scintillation [112].
3.2.1 Structural constant of the refraction index
One of the most method to represents turbulence intensity, is structural
constant intrinsic of the refraction index C2n. It is related with the geographic
position and altitude, but also it changes with the seasons, days and the
hours. From experimental observations, Hufnagel suggested the following
relation [61]:
C2n = {[2.2 · 10−53h10(W/27)2]e−h/1000+ 10−16e−h/1500}er(h,t) [m−2/3] (3.5)
where h is the height of the station in meters above sea level, W is the wind
correlation factor and r(h, t) is a zero mean Gaussian random variable; v(h)
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is the wind velocity at the height h. The correlation factor of the wind could
be expressed by the equation:
W =
[
1
15 km
∫ 20km
5km
v2(h) dh
]
(3.6)
For what concerns the wind velocity it can be used the Bufton’s model
v(z) = 5+ 30e−[(z−9400)/4800]
2
(3.7)
where the distance z and the velocity v are expressed respectively in [m]
and [m/s].
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where h is the height in meters at the sea level, W is the wind correlation factor and r(h,t) is
a zero mean Gaussian random variable; v(h) is t e wind velocity at the height h.
The wind co relation fac or is expressed by:
W =
"
(1/15km)
Z 20km
5km
v2(h)dh
#1/2
(1.6)
For the wind velocity can be used the Bufton’s model [89], [90]:
v(z) = 5 + 30e [(z 9400)/4800]
2
(1.7)
where z and v are expressed respectively in [m] and [m/s].
Below is reported a wind velocity profile, as a function of the altitude:
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Figure 1.1: Wind velocity profile
An useful quantity, that represents the maximum collecting diameter of an heterodyne receiver,
before that the distortions induced by the atmosphere limit the receiver performances, is the zeroth-
order turbulence momentum that provides a measure of the spatial coherence length, also called
Fried coherent length:
r0 = {0.423k2sec(⇠)µ0} 3/5 [m] (1.8)
where ⇠ is the zenith angle, µ0 is the zeroth-order of the turbulence moment, defined as:
µn :=
Z
C2n(h)h
n(h)dh (1.9)
At the same time, the atmospheric time constant is derived from the 5/3 velocity moment:
⌧0 = {2.91k2sec(⇠)v5/3} 3/5 [sec] (1.10)
where
Figure 3.1: A plot of the average wind profile versus the altitude using Butfon’s
model.
3.2.2 Turbulence effect
We concentrate our analysis in the regime of weak turbulence, where weak
phase perturbations occur, due to variations of the at ospheric density,
along the beam trajectory.
In this regime all the perturbations effects could be refer to a phase per-
turbation φ(r), where ri = (ri, θi) represents the polar coordinates. This
hypothesis constitutes a significant conceptual simplification. Our interest
is based in the time-evolution of the phase correlation between two points
r1 and r2. In mathematical terms it can be formalized as:
C(r1, r2) = 〈eiΦ(r1)−Φ(r2)〉 (3.8)
where our aim is to find a final explicit expression for the phase struc-
ture function. In the case of a beam propagation of distance L the phase
difference accumulated can be written as:
Φ(r1)−Φ(r2) = k
∫ L
0
[n(r1, z)− n(r2)]dz (3.9)
where k = 2pi/λ denotes the wave vector. From "Kolmogorov’s two-thirds
law”, the structure function for the phase results [70]:
DΦ(|r1 − r2|) = 6.88 |r1 − r2|r0
5/3
(3.10)
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The r0 parameters, usually named as Fried parameter, is correlated to the
optical consequences of the phase distortions. In fact without turbulence
the r0 parameter stretch to ∞.
Considering the propagation of a Gaussian beam in atmosphere, and using
the above theory concepts, it is possible to determine a relation between the
beam waist and the Fried parameter:
wo
r0
=
√
(wle/wdl)2 − 1
3
(3.11)
where wdl and wle are the 1/e far field radius of the diffraction-limited beam.
In the case of horizontal line of sight transmission, the atmosphere is
relatively uniform, in fact the the Fried parameter can be expressed as:
r0 = 3.02 (k2LC2n)
−3/5 (3.12)
typical values of the refractive index are in the range 10−17to 10−12 in a very
good case. For night-time operation and in the case of a good astronomical
sites we can use the following formulation, based on the Hufnagel-Valley
profile [107, 108]:
C2n(h) = 8.16 · 10−54h10e−h/1000 + 3.02 · 10−17e−h/1500 + 1.90 · 10−15e−h/100
From a vertical line of sight the Fried parameter could be approximated to:
r0 =
[
0.423 k2 sec ε
∫ 1
0
hC2n(h) dh
]−3/5
(3.13)
where ε indicates the zenith angle. As reported in the above paragraphs,
the atmospheric turbulence is source of spread on the range of high spatial
frequency, wander for low spatial frequency and intensity variations. In fact
eddies smaller than the beam size are cause of beam spreading, whereas
eddies larger than the beam size cause wander. Intensity fluctuations are
due to eddies of the order of
√
λL where λ is the wavelength of the radiation
and L is the propagation distance.
scintillation The intensity variations are usually expressed as the log
amplitude fluctuations. In an optical experiments with a small dimension
of the receiver telescope, the scintillations effects must be take into account,
while for a big receiving area these effects are mediated in all the aperture.
The scintillation could be expresses as:
σ2I = A[e
4σ2x − 1] [W/cm2] (3.14)
where A is the aperture average factor which in the hypothesis of weak
turbulence and small value of eddies l0 ca be estimated as:
A =
[
1+ 1.07
(
kD2
4L
)7/6]−1
(3.15)
in the case of a plane wave the parameter σ2x is approximated to the value
0.307 k7/6L11/6C2n, and for a spherical wave it becomes 0.124 k7/6L11/6C2n. L
represents the link distance, while D is the aperture diameter.
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beam wander A propagation of an optical beam in a turbulent atmo-
sphere, is affected by deviation from its nominal position. Depending on
the velocity of this effect we could divide wandering in jitter effect in the
case of fast movements and drift as a slow shift effect. It is possible to esti-
mate the tilt variance as:
α2 = 0.364
(
D
r0
)5/3 ( λ
D
)2
(3.16)
The tilt movement can be subdivided in:
• G-tilt through the mean gradient of the wave front (it represents what
is seen by a quadrant detector)
• Z-tilt through the normal to the plane that minimize the wave front
distortion (it represents the tilt terms on the Zernike’s expansion)
3.2.3 Space channel
In the previous sections we have understood that the sky is not transpar-
ent for optical frequency. In Figure 3.2 we present a simulated atmospheric
transmittance for a propagation at zenith angle. We underline the wave-
lengths of commercially available laser system using colored lines. As you
can see, the transmittance is better at higher wavelengths, but unfortunately
other factors (e.g. detectors efficiency, diffraction, source repetition rate) lim-
its the performance of the link .6
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Figure 2. Simulated atmospheric transmittance at a typical rural location, for
propagation at zenith (left) and for different elevation angles (right). Coloured
lines represent wavelengths of commercially available laser systems. Several
transmission windows are evident, within which optical transmission would
experience low loss. Generally, the transmission tends to be better at higher
wavelengths, but other factors (e.g. diffraction, sources and detectors) must be
taken into account to properly determine the best wavelength choice.
error can be averaged over time as additional beam broadening. Controlling for jitter is more
challenging on a satellite, thus a downlink will be more vulnerable to this effect. The pointing
accuracy must be better than the combined beam waist from diffraction and turbulence to avoid
becoming a dominant source of loss.
Transmittance through atmosphere is dependent on both wavelength (see figure 2, left) and
angle (figure 2, right), and is a result of the types and concentrations of molecules and particles
that are present. Several low-loss transmission windows can be found—most notable are those
at 665–685, 775–785, 1000–1070 and 1540–1680 nm, all of which support wavelengths of
commercial laser diodes. Using MODTRAN 5 [48], we model atmospheric transmittance of
a rural sea-level location with a visibility of 5 km, chosen to approximate ground stations near
large cities (such stations could be utilized to connect city-wide QKD networks globally).
Our numerical model incorporates all the aforementioned loss contributions, as well as
(wavelength dependent) scattering and absorption losses due to receiver optical components
and detectors, to determine the expected key rates. Diffraction is simulated by discretizing the
transmission beam intensity profile into a 50⇥ 50 grid. A radial intensity profile comprising
5000 samples spanning 50 m from the centre of the receiver is then calculated following
Rayleigh–Sommerfeld diffraction as propagated from each point of the transmission profile
grid. This discretization allows us to model our final beam profile for a wide range of beam
waists, shapes and telescope designs. Pointing error and atmospheric turbulence (in the case of
an uplink) are added using a two-dimensional convolution between the calculated diffraction
profile and the Gaussian distribution of pointing error and turbulence. The final intensity
profile is integrated over the receiving area to determine the received power (proportional
to the probability of receiving each photon). We then add the remaining loss contributions
(atmospheric and optical transmissions, detector efficiency). For details, see appendix A.
New Journal of Physics 15 (2013) 023006 (http://www.njp.org/)
Figure 3.2: Simulated atmospheric transmittance at a typical rural location, for prop-
agation at zenith. Colored lines represent wavelengths of commercially
available laser systems. Courtesy of ICQ Waterloo.
As we saw from the above paragraphs, the tra smission in atmosphere of
an optical beam will be affected by diffraction, systematic pointing error
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and atmospheric turbulence, which degrades the quality of the wave front
and obviously affecting the result of the transmission. Moreover the beam
diffraction depends on the working wavelength and in order to mitigate this
problem bigger telescope and particular optical design of the system must
be done. In this kind of scenario a trade-off between the working wavelength
and the dimension of the telescope is necessary to ensure acceptable results.
From other QKD experiments due in free-space channel, it is clear that tur-
bulence has no negative effect on polarization-based [52, 109]. Looking at
vertical link, and in particular to satellites communications, turbulence pre-
dominantly occurs in the lower 10 km of the atmosphere [40].
The total dimension of the beam size, comes from the combination of
diffraction and turbulence. Because turbulence is not correlated with the
transmitter aperture, this imposes a limitation on the aperture size of the
transmitter telescope.
As above explained, the transmittance of the atmosphere is dependent on
both wavelength (see 3.2) and angle, and it includes the concentrations of
molecules and particles present [19].
3.3 canary experiment
As we report in the above paragraphs, the effects of the free-space channel
(losses and background light) on quantum signal, in particular in presence
of atmospheric turbulence, impair the security of the QKD system. We intro-
duce a method to exploit the atmospheric turbulence as a resource for QKD.
An Adaptive Real Time Selection (ARTS) technique at the receiver allows
to take advantage of the fluctuating transmissivity of the channel, giving
rise to an increase of the secure key rate. QKD pioneering demonstrations
in free-space were realized generally during dark nights or by using very
narrow spectral filters that generally impose a low key rate already on ur-
ban scale [57, 22, 109, 37, 83, 68]. On the contrary, in ordinary conditions
the QBER will be higher than the secure threshold except for high channel
transmission. However, in the case of QKD over long links and in realistic
conditions, including daylight, a breakthrough in the protocol is needed to
limit background noise.
Here, we devise a method that exploits the atmospheric turbulence for secret
key generation, even in the conditions in which the average QBER is too high
for secure communication. In a link with fluctuating transmission coefficient
and a significant attenuation, due to turbulence and to the combination of
optical diffraction and scintillation, respectively, it is possible to devise a
solution to the high QBER problem on the basis of a sound characterization
of the channel transmission. A recent study pointed out that the temporal
profile of the transmissivity typically has peaks lasting a few milliseconds,
distributed in a low transmissivity background [26]. A post-selection tech-
nique based on estimating the QBER in short time frames would be ineffec-
tive here because the QBER value cannot be reliably estimated in such short
time scale [38]. Indeed, using current or even realistic transmission rates e.g.
100 MHz of repetition rate, the QBER statistics results too limited due to the
moderate rate. Moreover, such use of the received qubits further reduces the
key rate and has to be avoided.
The CAD1 and CAD2 distillation schemes discussed in [10] represent a gen-
eralization of Maurer’s advantage distillation technique [73] and presented
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in Chapter 2. Sequences of correct (possibly non consecutive) sifted bits are
joined together and one single secure bit is distilled out of each sequence.
The length of each sequence should be chosen according to a trade-off
scheme, because longer sequences allow to distill keys with higher chan-
nel QBER, but provide a lower key rate in the case of low QBER. However, in a
turbulent, rapidly time-varying channel, the effectiveness of such solutions
would be limited by the difficulty of choosing the suitable parameters of the
distillation strategy according to the varying QBER.
Another generalization of the advantage distillation of [74] was proposed
in [113]: parities for many pairs of bits are shared between Alice and Bob
along the public channel. Those pairs with non matching parities are dis-
carded, while the remaining ones (over which the QBER is lower) are syn-
drome decoded. However, the above presented distillation methods do not
take advantage of the intrinsic QBER variability of the channels, but they rely
on the assumption that the channel maintains its QBER stable long enough to
allow optimization of their parameters. On the contrary, the technique pro-
posed in [38] exploits the transmissivity peaks in the channel by observing
variations of the sifted bit rate on a millisecond time scale, and can hence be
quite effective in dealing with turbulent channels [95, 94].
Here we propose a ARTS scheme where transmissivity peaks are instanta-
neously detected. The scheme is based on the estimation of the link trans-
missivity in its intrinsic time scale by an auxiliary classical laser beam co-
propagating with the qubits but conveniently interleaved in time.
In this way the link scintillation is monitored in real-time and the selec-
tion of the time intervals of high channel transmissivity corresponding to a
viable QBER where a positive key generation rate is available.
3.3.1 Preliminary analysis
The link used in our demonstration is the 143 Km free-space channel be-
tween La Palma and Tenerife islands shown in Figure 3.3. At the transmitter
we generate the quantum bits by strongly attenuated lasers at 850 nm. In
the same location we also use a 30 mW1 classical laser beam (probe) at 808
nm to estimate the link transmissivity. We used two different wavelengths
to easily separate, by a dichroic mirror, the two signals at the receiver. The
quantum and probe signals are coupled into the same optical path of a cus-
tomly designed telescope (see Figure 3.3).
In order to test the ability of estimating the link transmissivity, we first
sent on the same free-space channel, two signals: the classical probe, de-
tected with a fast photodiode at the receiver, and a single strongly atten-
uated laser. The classical signal featured pulses of 100 µs duration at 1
kHz repetition rate, while the attenuated laser at 850 nm was a continuous
beam. At the receiver, the quantum signal was detected by a Single Photon
Avalanche Photodiode (SPAD) and acquired in packets with duration of 1
ms.
We would like to test the correspondence between the intensity of the re-
ceived classical beam and the photons received on the quantum channel. As
shown by the 11 s of acquisition time reported in Figure 3.4, there is a strong
1 At the transmitter the beam diameter size is of the order of 20 cm, guaranteeing class-1M
eye-safe beam.
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Figure 3.3: Experimental setup: Alice, located at JKT observatory in La Palma, sends
qubits by using two 850 nm FPGA-controlled attenuated lasers with dif-
ferent polarization. Qubit photons are combined with an atmospheric
probe laser (30 mW @ 808 nm) and transmitted through a suitably de-
signed telescope. The Alice telescope is also used to collect the beacon
laser sent by Bob, located at the Optical Ground Station in Tenerife, and
required for tracking the pointing of the transmitter. Bob receives both
the signals through the OGS telescope: the probe is monitored by an APD
and the qubits are detected with two SPADs. FPGA: Field Programmable
Gate Arrays; HWP: half-wave plate; NPBS: non-polarizing beam splitters;
PBS, polarizing beam splitter; SPAD, single-photon avalanche photodi-
ode; DM: dichroic mirror.
Figure 3.4: Comparison between the counts detected by the SPAD (green line) and
the voltage measured by the fast photodiode at the receiver (red line). In
the inset we show a zoomed detail of the acquisition (between 4.48 s and
5.54 s) in order to better appreciate the correlation between the quantum
and classical signal. We chose a particular inset but in all the acquisition
the two signals are correlated.
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correlation between the photon counts detected in each packet (green line)
and the voltage registered with the fast photodiode (red line).
To demonstrate the correlation we performed the ARTS method, consisting
in the following procedure. Given a set of L packets (each of 1 ms length), we
let Vi be the probe signal amplitude and Si the number of detected photons
in the quantum signal for the i-th packet, respectively. We set a threshold
value VT for the probe voltage and post-select only those packets such that
Vi > VT; in particular, we denote by I(VT) = {i ∈ [1, L] : Vi > VT} the
indexes of the packets for which the above condition holds and by NP(VT)
the corresponding number of packets, that is, NP(VT) = |{I(VT)}|. Further-
more, we define the following quantities:
S(VT) = ∑
i∈I(VT)
Si, S(VT) = S(VT)NP(VT) (3.17)
with S(VT) representing the total number of detected bits and S(VT) the
mean number of detection per packets after the post-selection performed
with threshold VT.
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Figure 3.5: Mean counts per packet S(VT) (normalized to the mean counts obtained
without thresholding) and fraction of total count S(VT)/S(VT = 0) in
function of the probe threshold.
The effect of the ARTS procedure can be clearly appreciated in figure 3.5,
where S(VT) (normalized to the mean counts obtained without threshold-
ing) is plotted (green line) as a function of the threshold: a higher thresh-
old value corresponds to a larger mean number of counts per packet. This
demonstrates that the probe and quantum signals are strongly correlated
and one can significantly improve the SNR by thresholding2. As side effect,
we have that the pre-selection also decreases the overall number of detec-
tions in the transmission S(VT) as can be noticed by considering the ratio
S(VT)/S(VT = 0) (blue line).
3.3.2 Application of ARTS method to QKD
We then apply the results previously described to a QKD experiment. In par-
ticular, we will show that, increasing the SNR by thresholding gives, in some
2 Here we define the SNR as the ratio between the overall signal (true signal plus background)
and the background
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cases, benefits in terms of the secret key length, even if the total number of
sifted bits will decrease. Indeed, when the QBER is above the maximum value
tolerable for QKD (11 % for the BB84 protocol) is not possible to produce se-
cure key. However, by the ARTS method we will reduce the QBER below the
limit, allowing secure key generation. We point out that at the receiver the
beam has a mean photon number per pulse below 1, namely it is the single
photon level. At the transmitter side, due to the 30 dB average attenuation
of the channel we are not working in the single photon regime.
First, given the number of errors Ei in the i-th packet, we define the overall
number of errors E(VT) and the quantum bit error rate Q(VT) in the post-
selected packets as
E(VT) = ∑
i∈I(VT)
Ei , Q(VT) =
E(VT)
S(VT)
. (3.18)
For evaluating the impact of the ARTS procedure on the performance of a
quantum key distribution system, it is important to study the two comple-
mentary effects of thresholding: on one side, the ARTS will increase the mean
detected bits per packet S(VT). On the other side it will decrease the total
detections S(VT). Both effects influence the achievable secret key rate of the
system, and an optimal trade-off should be found.
Being the length of the output secret key dependent on the number of
available sifted bits and on their bit error rate, as a first step we need to
derive an expression for both of these quantities. As demonstrated in [26],
the statistics of the transmission of a long free-space channel follows a log-
normal distribution. The measured probe voltage at the receiver, being con-
stant the transmitted intensity, follows the same distribution, given by
p(V; mV , σ2) =
1√
2piσ
1
V
e−[(ln
V
mV
+ 12 σ
2)]2/(2σ2). (3.19)
In the previous expression σ2 is defined as functions of the mean mV and of
the variance vV of the probe intensities distribution, that can be reported as:
σ2 = ln
(
1+ (vV/m2V)
)
. As an example, we show in Figure 3.6, the distribu-
tion of the measured voltages of the data used in Figure 3.4, that, according
to the theory [36, 26], follows a log-normal distribution.
In the following analysis, we assume that the number of detected pho-
tons and the probe intensity have completely correlated log-normal distri-
butions [26]. This hypothesis implies that both distributions have the same
parameter σ2. Then, we can predict the number of packets above threshold
NP(VT) and the number of sifted bits surviving the thresholding S(VT) in
case of null background by:
S(VT)/S(0) =
∫ +∞
VT
V
mV
p(V; mV , σ)dV
NP(VT)/NP(0) =
∫ +∞
VT
p(V; mV , σ)dV.
By taking into account the background clicks we get:
NP(VT) = NP(0)
1
2
[
1− erf
(
ln VTmV +
1
2σ
2√
2σ2
)]
S(VT) = nbNP(VT) +
1
2
[S(0)− nbNP(0)]
[
1− erf
(
ln VTmV − 12σ2√
2σ2
)] (3.20)
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Figure 3.6: Experimental occurrences of probe intensities (measured by photodiode
voltages) and lognormal fit. We show the experimental probabilities of
occurrence of different photodiode voltages corresponding to different
probe intensities. We also show the corresponding lognormal curve that
fits the experimental data. In the figure we report the lognormal parame-
ters obtained in the fit.
where nb is the average background count per packet. Indeed, experimental
data suggest that the hypothesis of complete correlation between quantum
and probe signal is not strictly satisfied, and equation (3.20) turns out to be
an approximation of the measured values. Still, it allows to derive a post-
selection threshold that allow to increase the secure key rate, as will be seen
in the following (e.g., in Figure 3.7).
We now define a further predictive model for estimating the bit error rate
on the quantum channel as a function of the probe threshold. Let us assume
that the average bit error rate on the quantum channel is mQ and that the
number of counts per packet due to background noise is nb. Now, since
background photons are not polarized, the corresponding bit error rate is
1/2, and we can write the predicted quantum bit error rate Qth as a function
of the threshold VT, namely,
Qth(VT) = mQ
(
1− nbS(VT)
)
+
1
2
nb
S(VT)
(3.21)
where the predicted value for S(VT) = S(VT)/NP(VT) is obtained by using
equation (3.20). Given these quantities, the asymptotic key rate of a QKD
system based on the BB84 protocol and the ARTS procedure (namely the
probe thresholding mechanism) reads as follows:
R(VT) =
S(VT)
S(0)
[1− 2h2 (Q(VT))] (3.22)
It is worth noting that considering the asymptotic rate instead of the finite-
lenght one [8, 104], may be considered a restrictive approach, especially
because the post-selection further reduces the number of available sifted
bits. However, it is sufficient to choose the size of the blocks before key
distillation (i.e., information reconciliation and privacy amplification) large
enough such that, without loss of generality, the asymptotic bound provides
a reasonable approximation of the actual rate.
In Figure 3.7, we finally compare the theoretical (solid lines) and the ex-
perimental values (circles and crosses) of the measured QBER and the asymp-
totic key rate as a function of the probe intensity threshold in a data acquisi-
tion. The theoretical curves for the QBER and for the key rate were obtained
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by substituting in equation (3.21) and in equation (3.22) the estimates for the
log-normal parameters mV and σ2 of the probe signal distribution. The other
two parameters, S(0) and NP(0), needed for predicting S(T) and NP(T), are
directly measured (they correspond to the total sifted bits and the total num-
ber of packets received respectively).
The data shown of Figure 3.7 correspond to an acquisition of 5 · 105 sifted
bits in condition of high background, simulated by a thermal light source
turned on in the receiver laboratory. The intensity of the background was
chosen in order to obtain a mean QBER larger than 11%. In particular, we
measured an average value of nb = 35.17 for the background clicks per
packet and we assume mQ = 5.6 · 10−2. As clearly shown in the figure,
equation (3.21) provides a good approximation of the experimental curve.
As shown by the same Figure, there is a strong correspondence between
the shape of the theoretical rate, Rth, and the measured rate, Rexp. The fact
that the experimental points do not fit the expected curve can be ascribed to
the discrepancy in the empirical joint distribution of probe intensities and
counts with respect to the model; in particular, we measured the following
fitting parameters for the normalized log-normal distributions: σ2V = 0.967
for the probe intensities and σ2S = 0.716 for the photon signal. However, the
derivation of the optimal threshold for maximizing the secret key length
(magenta dashed line) from the probe distribution yields the optimal VT
also for the experimental data. In particular, the optimal threshold inferred
from the probe distribution is V(th)T,opt = 375 mV, and coincide with the one
resulting from optimization on the experimental data, yielding a rate of
R(V(th)T,opt) = 5.55 · 10−2.
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Figure 3.7: Experimental QBER (Qexp) and secure key rate (Rexp) in function of the
probe threshold (measured by the photodiode voltage). With solid lines
with show the corresponding theoretical predictions (Qth and Rth).
We observe that, in the case of VT < 70 mV, is not possible to generate a
secure key, being the QBER higher than the theoretical maximum (i.e., Q =
11%). By increasing the threshold value above 70 mV a non-zero secret key
rate is achieved. With the optimal threshold value, the measured QBER is
Q(V(th)T,opt) = 8.38 · 10−2; a significant improvement with respect to the initial
value, Q(0) = 13.14 · 10−2 is therefore achieved. Finally, we observe that
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for increasing values of VT > V
(th)
T,opt the QBER still decreases, but so does
the rate, since the reduction in the residual number of sifted bits does not
compensate the advantage obtained from the lower QBER.
This result is of absolute practical relevance, as it shows that leveraging the
probe intensity information is an enabling factor for quantum key distri-
bution, since it allows to distill a secret key even when without the post-
selection it would not be possible.
As for the security of this post-selection approach as applied to a QKD sys-
tem, no advantage is given to a potential attacker in the true single photon
regime, being the thresholding nothing but a further sifting step on the re-
ceived bits [10, 114]. If the attacker tried to force Alice and Bob to post-select
a particular bit, in fact, she would alter the probe signal before the disclo-
sure of the preparation bases on the public channel, and, therefore, before
she could actually know if her measured bit is correct. On the other hand, al-
tering the probe statistics or interrupting the probe transmission would not
yield any advantage to the attacker, as it would just break the correlation
between the quantum and the classical signal and would thus result in a de-
nial of service attack. The security analysis gets more involved if we allow
photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. In that case, the attacker may force
Bob to receive just the qubits for which the PNS attack was successful, i.e.,
only those pulses with multiple photons. A decoy state protocol may coun-
teract this strategy, but its effectiveness with a turbulent and loss varying
free-space channel has to be investigated.
Finally we report a simulation where the ARTS method can be compared
with the technique introduced in [38], where a post-selection is performed
when the number of received sifted bits is above a given threshold, deter-
mined by the mean QBER of the channel. The post-selection is effective only
when the threshold is set in order to get at least several bits for coherence
time of the channel (typically of the order of few milliseconds): in fact, only
in this condition it is possible to post-select the correct instants of high trans-
missivity. In the case of very turbulent channel and extreme environmental
conditions (say mist or high humidity), the number of received bits per co-
herence time of the channel can be lower (or of the order) than 10: in this
case, the post-selection cannot be implemented and only the ARTS method
becomes effective.
In order to compare the two techniques we assume that the probe and the
signal statistic are perfectly correlated. The rate achievable in the two cases
are shown in figure 3.8, demonstrating that the ARTS methods outperform
the post-selection on the received sifted bits when the number of mean sifted
bits received per coherence time of the channel are below ∼ 10 and the SNR
is below 20.
experimental setup The transmitter (Alice) was located at the JKT ob-
servatory in the island of La Palma where two 850 nm attenuated lasers
provided the quantum signal and a 808 nm laser was used as atmospheric
probe. The polarization of the 850 nm lasers was set to the two different
bases by means of half wave plates and quarter wave plates. The encoding
of the quantum signal was then obtained by controlling the lasers with an
FPGA. Classical and quantum lasers were coupled into mode fibers and
injected into a fiber beam splitter. One of the two beam splitter output was
delivered toward to a suitably designed Galilean telescope whose main char-
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Figure 3.8: Comparison between the rates achievable by the ARTS, the post-selection
and the standard QKD technique (no selection). We assumed that the
channel QBER is 3% and the lognormal parameter is σ = 1, similar to the
parameter we measured in the tested free-space channel. The parameter
µ is the mean sifted bits per coherence time of the channel.
acteristic is a singlet aspheric lens of 230 mm diameter and 2200 mm of fo-
cal length. This lens allowed us to get, after 143 km of propagation, a beam
spot comparable to the dimensions of the primary mirror of the receiving
telescope in order to maximize the power transfer between the two parties.
To compensate the beam wandering induced by the atmosphere, we imple-
mented a feedback loop for controlling the transmitting direction: the fiber
delivering the signal to the transmitter was mounted on a X-Y-Z movable
stage placed close to the focal place of the 230 mm lens, with computer
controlled stepped motors. On this same stage, we mounted a CCD sensor
which acquired a green (532 nm) “beacon” laser sent by Tenerife toward
Alice telescope. The camera is placed in order to measure an image of the
singlet focal plane: the wandering of the beacon on the CCD was then ana-
lyzed in real time by a software that moves the X-Y-Z stage to compensate
the movement of the beacon spot on the camera.
At the receiver part (Bob), in Tenerife, we used the 1 m aperture tele-
scope of the ESA Optical Ground Station to receive the signals. After the
Coudè path, we collimated the beam and the classical and quantum signal
(at different wavelength) were divided by a dichroic mirror. The qubits were
measured in two bases, using PBS and waveplates. T he counts detected
by the two single-photon avalanche photodiodes(SPAD) were stored on a
FPGA. The probe beam is detected by an high-bandwidth APD (avalanche
photodetector) and then registered and stored by an oscilloscope.
For what concerns the transmitted qubits, in order to measure the QBER
of the channel, we used the same data structure of a recent free-space QKD
implementation based on the B92 protocol (see Chapter 2). A raw key is
composed into N packets of 2880 bits each, sent at the rate of 2.5 MHz; as
regards the payload slots, Alice sends two qubits separated by 200 ns. Due to
communication with the FPGA, each packets is sent every 20 ms resulting in
an average sending rate of 150 kHz. The two FPGAs are synchronized every
second by a pulse-per-second (pps) signal equipped by two GPS receivers
located in the two islands.
We want to point out that at the transmitter side, the pulses contain in av-
erage more than one photon, while at the receiver side we work in the single
photon regime. Our aim, in fact, was to simulate a possible realistic scenario
where one would employ fast (hundreds of MHz to GHz) free-space QKD
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systems which are nowadays commonly available. Since our system has a
transmission rate of 2.5 MHz, the detected rate is comparable to the rate
observable with a transmitter emitting true single photon pulses with a rep-
etition rate of about 1 GHz, considering fixed the amount of optical and
atmospheric attenuation.
3.4 conclusions
We have presented a proof of principle demonstration of a method exploit-
ing the atmospheric turbulence as a resource for QKD. The turbulence will
implies a fluctuating transmissivity of the channel used for quantum com-
munication. The ARTS method, easily integrable in current QKD systems, is
based on the sampling of a classical beam (probe signal) sent on the same
channel of the quantum bits. By measuring the intensity of the probe at the
receiver, it is possible to select in real time the best time slots of high channel
transmissivity. We demonstrated that with the ARTS method we were able
to decrease the measured QBER; moreover, this method allows to extract se-
cret key in extreme conditions, namely when the initial QBER is above the
security threshold of 11%.
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(a) Transmitter telescope. (b) X-Y stage.
(c) Sunrise. (d) Laboratory setup.
(e) FPGA. (f) Receiving telescope.
(g) Telescope detail. (h) OGS.
Figure 3.9: Pictures of the experimental Canary setup.
4L I N K B U D G E T E A RT H - S PA C E
The most promising application of QKD is the generation of a provably un-
conditionally secure key at distance, which is not possible with classical
cryptography. The use of satellites allows QC on a global scale, an impossi-
ble task on ground with current optical fiber technology, in which the signal
loses intensity at long distances. One of the fundamental requirement in or-
der to do QC in a Earth-Space channel, is that the degree of polarization is
maintained during all the communication process.
Previous works made by Paolo Villoresi’s group demonstrate its feasibil-
ity [17, 18, 111]; on the basis of these results, in this chapter we present avail-
able simulation about the achievable key rate, and a small review about the
complexity of the experiment due to the intrinsic limit of the devices. The
formulas and formalism used in next sessions were introduced by John J.
Degnan [32]. The most important parameter in a communication system is
the attenuation factor, also known as link-budget, which depending of his
value introduces limitations in the final performance.
A link budget is the accounting of all the gains and losses from the trans-
mitter, through the medium (free space, cable, waveguide, fiber, etc.) to the
receiver in a telecommunications system. In the next sessions we take in
exam a possible link budget between Earth and satellite, intersecting knowl-
edge of classical optical communications with radio telecommunications.
Considering the fact that we works with very distant targets, it is not pos-
sible to be sure of the value of all the parameters. In fact in the case of
very large losses, small variations of them (e.g. in the weather conditions)
could cause significant differences in the parameters and consequently in
the attenuation factor.
4.1 link efficiency
As for any classical communication scheme, to analyze and model the setup,
it is necessary to known the attenuation factor of the link and the noise
introduced in the system. In particular QC are weaker than classical, in fact
information is coded at single photon level [96], and in this way the signal
cannot be increased: therefore a sufficient SNR can be achieved only reducing
the link attenuation and the background noise.
As discussed in Chapter 3 on page 45, the main factor limiting the free-
space optical communication link is atmospheric turbulence. The refractive
index inhomogeneities induced by turbulence increase the beam spreading
to an extent significantly larger than what caused by diffraction.
Depending on their size, the turbulence eddies can cause two main effects:
beam wandering, if their dimension is large compared with the beam size;
beam broadening on the contrary [33].
In a real orbiting scenario, from an Earth station point of view (OGS),
the satellite is seen rising, orbiting and setting at different positions in the
sky, related to its orbit. At each time the satellite position can be defined,
in the Earth station reference system, by zenith and azimuth angles and
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by link distance. The thickness of the atmospheric layers crossed by the
beam depends on the zenith angle and, as we will show in the following,
influences the beam propagation and the link budget.
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Figure 4.1: Base scheme of a telecommunications system.
4.2 up-link and down-link scenario
The communication systems can be subdivide in three principal group: uni-
cast, multicast and broadcast. The difference is based on how many users
attend to the same communication.
• Unicast: communication between one source and one user
• Multicast: communication between one source and many users
• Broadcast: communication between one source and all the users.
In addition to this type of division, it is possible to distinguish between the
choice of the transmission medium in:
• Half-duplex it is not possible to send and receive contemporary mes-
sages
• Full-duplex: it is possible to send and receive contemporary messages
In the case of satellite communications, it is possible to differentiate two
different scenario: the first one where the transmitter is in space and the
base stations are positioned at Earth. This case is known as down-link scenario.
The other case take into account a receiver satellite orbiting around the Earth
and the base stations work as transmitter. This possibility is known as up-
link scenario. In the following section we describe the pro and cons of the
two cases, highlighting which could be the best choice for a future quantum
satellite.
4.2.1 Beam size distortions
To investigate the feasibility of QC, we have to take into account the distor-
tions introduced by the atmosphere that could downgrade the performance
of the link. A more detailed analysis is reported in Chapter 3. A Gaussian
beam of waist w0 and intensity I0, has an average spatial distribution of
intensity, given by [33, 17]:
〈I(r, L)〉 = I0e−2r2/w2LT (4.1)
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(b) Nightime operation.
Figure 4.2: Model for the uplink day-time and night-time background noise estima-
tion considering the two different sources of noise.
where r is the radial distance from the center of the beam, L is the link dis-
tance and wLT is the long-term beam radius defined as: w2LT = w
2
ST + 2〈β2〉.
Here β is the instantaneous beam displacement from the unperturbed posi-
tion, while wST is the short-term beam width. The long-term beam width,
for a collimated beam, is:
w2LT = w
2
0
(
1+
L2
Z20
)
+ 2
(
4L
Kro
)
(4.2)
where Z0 is the Rayleigh parameter of the beam, and r0 is the Fried param-
eter (for the uplink scenario), see Chapter 3.
r0 =
[
0.423 sec(θzen)k2
∫ L
ht
C2n(z)
(
L− z
L
)5/3
dz
]−3/5
(4.3)
For a circular or a near circular orbit, the effective link distance, also known
as slant range L, considering the geometry formed by an orbiting satellite
and an Earth station is given by the equation:
L = −(RE + ht) cos θzen +
√
(RE + ht)2 cos2 θzen + 2RE(hs − ht) + h2s − h2t
(4.4)
where RE is the Earth radius (6378 km), ht is the station height above sea
level, hs is the satellite height above sea level, and θzen is the zenith angle of
the satellite as observed from the station.
Using these formulas, the short-term beam radius can be estimated as:
w2ST = w
2
0
(
1+
L2
Z20
)
+ 2
{
4.2L
kr0
[
1− 0.26
(
r0
w0
)1/3]}2
(4.5)
It appears very clear that the turbulence effect has to be summarized by
an additive factor to the Gaussian beam. In order to compensate the tur-
bulence effect with an accurate pointing system, it could works also if the
beam displacement β is higher than wST . In the present simulation we deal
with a worst-case scenario, where the β is uncompensated. The effects of
turbulence could be summarized in a redistribution of the beam energy, in
fact the power P collected by a receiver can be estimated as:
P =
∫ R
0
ρe−2(ρ
2/w2LT)dρ (4.6)
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where R is the radius of the telescope. The probability of photons detection
could be derived from the ratio between the transmitted and received power
as:
η = η0
(
1− e2R2/w2LT
)
(4.7)
considering the detection efficiency, the pointing losses and the atmospheric
attenuation: the factor η0 can be approximable set to 0.1 at the zenith [7,
47]. More in general η0 can be related to the zenith angle by the following
equation that is an accurate approximation up to 70°.
η0 = ηP ηTX ηRX · 10
(
− 4.34 τ(0) sec(θzen)10
)
(4.8)
where ηP , ηTX , ηRX are the pointing losses, the transmitter losses and the
receiver losses. τ is the depth of path at the zenith, that given the atmo-
spheric transmittance (' 0.8 at 800 nm ) T = e−τ . In a downlink scenario,
where the source is orbiting and considering an optical beam it encounters
the atmosphere only in the last path of the channel.
This fact is very important because the effects of the turbulence are weaker
than up-link or horizontal link; in fact the turbulent eddies affecting the
beam are much smaller than beam diameter. Beam wandering become neg-
ligible compared to the beam spreading due to the short-term effect. More-
over in this case, beam spreading are less strong than the uplinlk. All this
considerations, de facto implies a lower attenuation factor in a downlink
scenario respect to the up-link one.
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2.4 QKD from satellite simulations
The model presented is the base to evaluate the feasibility of satellite-earth QKD links. We simu-
lated the link parameters (beam size, noise, attenuation, SNR) with MATLAB, for various families
of satellite:
• Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
• Medium Earth Orbit (MEO): Europe global positioning system (Galileo), USA global posi-
tioning system (GPS)
• Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO)
The orbit of a satellite seen from an Earth station, can be represented as a set of terns (zenith
angle, azimuth angle, link distance) evolving in time. The analysis of the link as a function of the
zenith angle, will be useful to estimat the l k budge in a real scenario. I our simulation we
focused on: a real Earth station (MLRO observatory) which has a telescope radius of 75cm and an
IFOV of 0.016 , and on a reasonable (for the actual state of the art) space termi l with a telescope
diameter of 20cm and an IFOV of 100µrad. We chose bandwidth  ⌫ = 1nm, a detection time
 t = 1ns and a wavelength   = 800nm.
2.4.1 Beam propagation simulations
As first we simulated the effects of the atmosphere on the beam propagatio for uplink and downlink.
As we previously said, the long term beam width represents i tuitively the beam width seen over
a long time exposure picture: it is due to the integration of the beam wandering effect.
Figure 2.2: Long term beam width wLT as a function of the link distance L. Simulation with an
Earth telescope radius rT = 75cm and a space telescope radius R = 10cm.
A beam affected at the start of its path by the degradation induced by atmosphere will arrive
at the receiver plane far away from the unperturbed expected position. On the same way, a beam
affected at the end of its path will be barely modified. This results, highlighted in Fig. 2.2, shows
that the effect of beam wandering is strongly different for the uplink and downlink, up to about
two orders of magnitude. A few ten thousand meters of beam radius are reached in a very long
distance (like GEO satellite) in the uplink, while a beam radius on the order of few hundred meters
Figure 4.3: Long term beam width wLT as a function of the link distance L. Simu-
lation with an Earth telescope radius rT = 75 cm and a space telescope
radius R = 10 cm.
In the next sections we will report a method to investigate the background
noise and the major sources of noise, in the case of down-link and up-link
scenario.
4.2.2 Up-link daytime operation
In the case of uplink scenario during daytime operation, Sun represents the
major source of background noise. Scattered light (assuming a Lambertian
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diffusion model) diffused by the Earth is collected by the telescope [17]. In
Figure 4.2 is reported a generic scheme of an up-link Earth satellite com-
munication. It is possible to estimate the number of background photons
collected by the receiver system, as a function of bandwidth units and time
units ∆ν[nm], ∆t[s].
NBday = aE
At
pi
(IFOV2) Hsun (4.9)
where aE is the Earth albedo; At is the area of the telescope in space; IFOV
is the telescope field of view; HSun is the solar spectral irradiance (photons
s−1 nm−1 m−1).
4.2.3 Up-link nightime operation
In the same way, it is possible to analyze the background noise for an up-
link scenario during night-time operation. The dominant sources of noise
are the Earth black-body emission, scattered light from human activities
and diffused moonlight. The noise related by moonlight can be evaluated
by:
NBnight = aE aM R
2
M
At
pi
IFOV2
d2EM
Hsun (4.10)
where aM is the Moon albedo; RM is the Moon radius; dEM is the Earth–Moon
distance. It can be assumed that the noise due to Earth black-body radiation
can be negligible for a real QKD system. Numerical estimation shown that it
is three order of magnitude less that of moonlight [17].
4.2.4 Downlink background noise
From the equation above reported and following the articles [17] and [19],
the noise power received by the telescope is:
Pb = Hbk Ω f ov At ∆ν (4.11)
where Hbk is the brightness of the sky background [W m−2 sr−1 µm−1]; Ωfov
is the field of view of the telescope in [sr]; At is the receiving telescope area
at the Earth station; ∆ν is the optical bandwidth [µm].
4.2.5 Signal to noise ratio
One the most important parameter in a communication system is the SNR,
because depending of his value it is possible to estimate the number of
expected errors introduced in the transmission. The SNR is defined as the
ratio between the single photons of signal and the noise photons at the
receiver:
SNR =
Signal
Noise
=
η
eN
(4.12)
where eN is the number of noise photons with a detection time ∆t for a
bandwidth ∆v.
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We can distinguish two different formulas for uplink and downlink scenario:
SNR =
η0(1− exp(−2At/(piw2LT)))d2EM
aEaMR2M IFOV
2Hsun
(4.13)
SNR =
η0(1− exp(−2At/(piw2LT)))hν
HbΩ f ov At∆v∆t
(4.14)
where h is the Planck constant. The contribution due to an imperfect QKD
system is neglected in this definition. We omit the formula in the case of day-
time operation, because due to the high level noise and it results unfeasible
a positive SNR.
4.3 radar equation
Each equation written until now, was based on the hypothesis that a orbit-
ing satellite, equipped with a transmitter or a receiver is nowadays available.
Unfortunately, we have mentioned a lot of times the lack of a quantum satel-
lite. Although we decide to experimentally simulate a quantum transmitter
using the Corner Cube Retroreflectors (CCRs) mounted in SLR satellites. In
this perspective we are going to introduce some basic principle, useful to
understand the experiments presented in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6. For
the complete description on how a SLR system works and a more detailed
analysis we invite the reader to see [32].
Thanks to the SNR equation it possible to estimate the expected number
of photons in the case of uplink and downlink:
ηp = ηdet
(
ET
λ
hν
)
ηtxGtΣ
(
1
4piL2
)
AtηrxT2a T
2
c (4.15)
where ηdet represents the detector quantum efficiency, ET is the laser pulse
energy, λ is the laser wavelength, h the Planck’s constant, c the speed of light
in vacuum, ηtx and ηrx the optical efficiency of transmitter and receiver, Σ
is the satellite cross section, L is the distance between satellite and base
station, At the effective area of the telescope receive aperture, Ta is the one-
way atmospheric transmission and Tc is the one way transmissivity of cirrus
clouds (if present).
In the following subsections we will enter into detail, reporting from Deg-
nan paper [32], the individual terms of the link equation (4.15) . Every single
terms should be discussed for a complete description and analysis of a SLR
system, but we will describe only the important terms for our experiments.
4.3.1 Transmitter gain
Usually a SLR station is equipped by a mode-locked laser which produce a
quasi-gaussian spatial and temporal profiles of the wave front. The transmit-
ter gain for a gaussian beam is given by the expression:
Gt(θ) =
8
θ2t
exp
[
−2
(
θ
θt
)2]
(4.16)
where θt is the half-angle far field divergence, between the beam center and
1/e2 intensity point and θ is the beam pointing error1. Pointing stability can
1 Pointing Error is the angular rotation from the desired pointing direction, or in other words it
is the difference between the actual pointing direction and the desired pointing direction.
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be affected both by internal and external number of factors ( e.g. physical
motion, heat buildup, cavity instability, air currents). Typical values for θt in
SLR system fall between 50 and 75 mircoradians (10− 15 arcseconds) which
implies a transmitter gain about Gt = 1.4 · 109.
Uplink
Downlink
Satellite
Ground	sta�on
Figure 4.4: Sketch of SLR facilities defining uplink and downlink channel.
Atmospheric turbulence, describe in Chapert 3, introduce particular effects
to the beam and also set a lower limit to the minimum bundle divergence
that can be achieved. In propagation trough the amount optical system, in
our case trough the Coudé path, the beam profile is usually radially trun-
cated by some limiting aperture and sometimes centrally obscured by the
secondary mirror. In a far field analysis the loss due to the secondary mirror,
produces secondary rings around the main central lobe. In order to consider
this phenomena in our experiment, a general expression for the transmitter
gain is given by:
Gt =
4piAt
λ2
gt(αt, β,γt, X) (4.17)
where At = pia2t is the area of the transmitting aperture and gt(αt, β,γt, X)
is a geometric factor. Usually if the target is in the far field of the transmitter
the expression become:
gt(αt, β,γt, X) =
(
2
α2t
)
(e−α
2
t − e−γ2t α2t ) (4.18)
where αt = at/w and γt = bt/at and at is the radius of the primary trans-
mitting aperture, w is the gaussian beam waist, and bt is the radius of an
obscuring secondary mirror.
The transmitter gain, as it is possible to see from (4.17) is proportional to
the inverse square of the wavelength. This factor implies a higher degree of
collimation for shorter wavelengths and must be taken into account in the
phase of design of the optical experiments.
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4.3.2 Cirrus Cloud
The presence of smog, fog and low clouds prevents the optical transmission;
moreover also in the case of very high humidity good data is not guaran-
tee. However, even when skies appears clear and weather conditions seems
good, sub-visible cirrus clouds are overhead about 50% of the time at most
locations. A global study of cloud thickness compute a mean cirrus cloud
thickness, when present of 1.341 km [45]. Experimentally it is proved that
cirrus transmittance is given by the equation
Tc = exp[−0.14(t sec θzen)2] (4.19)
where t is the cirrus cloud thickness and θzen is the zenith angle.
4.3.3 Retroreflector characteristics
In order to characterize the reflected optical beam, we have to study the
internal structure of the CCRs. For normally incident light, a single unspoiled
retroreflector has a peak optical-cross section Σcc defined by:
Σcc = ρAcc
(
4pi
Ω
)
= ρAcc
(
4piAcc
λ2
)
(4.20)
where ρ is the cube corner reflectivity (decreases with the passage of time),
Acc = piR2cc is the light collecting area of the corner cube, and 4pi/Ω is the
on-axis retroreflector gain. Ω is the effective solid angle occupied by the far
field diffraction pattern (FFDP) on the retroreflector.
For a circular entrance aperture, the FFDP of the reflected wave is the famil-
iar function given by:
Σ(x) = Σcc
(
2J1
x
(x)
)2
x = kRcc sin(θ) (4.21)
and θ is the angle from the cube face normal. At arbitrary incidence angle,
the area Acc is reduced by the factor
η(θinc) =
2
pi
(
sin−1µ−
√
2 tan θre f
)
cos θinc (4.22)
where θinc is the incident angle and θre f is the internal refracted angle as de-
termined by Snell’s law: θre f = sin−1[sin(θinc/n)] µ = (1− 2 tan2 θre f )1/2
where n is the cube index refraction. Thus the peak optical cross-section in
the center of the reflected lobe falls off as:
Σeff(θinc) = η2(θinc)Σcc (4.23)
One can further limit the effective incidence angle over which the retrore-
flecter responds by recessing the retroreflctor in its holder. It can be easily
shown that the effective are of the elliptical entrance aperture, as limited by
the recess, is given by:
Ae f f (θinc) = Acc
(
1− tan θinc
tan θmax
)
(4.24)
where θmax = cot−1(d/Dcc) and Dcc = 2Rcc.
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Table 4.1: Current and revised cross section for the SLR satellites.
Satellite Altitude [km] Current [106m2] Revised [106m2]
Starlette 815 0.65 1.8
Lageos-1 5850 7 15
Lageos-2 5625 7 15
Etalon-1 19105 60 65
Etalon-2 19135 60 65
BeaconC 927 3.6 13
Ajisia 1485 12 23
Stella 815 0.65 1.8
Jason-1 1336 0.3 0.8
GPS 20030 40 19
Envisat 800 0.3 0.85
Larets 691 0.5 0.6
Lares 1450 3.2 3
(a) Spoiler CCR. (b) Unspoiler CCR.
Figure 4.5: Example of spoiling and non spoiling satellite CCRs. On the left it is pos-
sible to see the spoiling retroreflector, in fact the mirrors are positioned
inside the ring of the structure. On the right it is possible to note that
there aren’t any structure before the CCR.
4.3.4 Velocity aberration
The far field diffraction pattern (FFDP) of a cube corner with a circular
entrance pupil consists of a principle main lobe surrounded by low intensity
rings. In the case of no relative motion between the satellite and the target,
the retroreflected FDFP should be centered in FOV of the telescope. Due to
the relatively motion between satellite and the base station the FFDP results
in a different position respect to the ideal one. The magnitude of the angular
displacement in the FFDP is given by the equation: The
α(hz, θzen,ω) = αmax(hz)
√
cos2ω+ τ2(hz, θzen) sin2 ω (4.25)
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where the maximum value, αmax and τ2(hz, θzen) is given by the expression
αmax =
2
c
√
R2Bg
RE + hs
τ2(hz, θzen) =
√
1−
(
RE sin θzen
RE + hs
)2
and RE is the Earth radius, g = 9.8 m/s2 is the gravitational acceleration
at the surface, hs is the satellite height above sea level, c is the speed of
light and the angle ω = cos−1[(rˆx pˆ) · vˆ] where rˆ is the position vector in
the satellite direction, pˆ the line-of-sight from station to satellite, and vˆ the
satellite velocity vector respectively.
4.3.5 Retroreflector spoiling
In the case we want to decrease the loss due to the velocity aberration effect,
there exist a "spoiler" for CCRs (see Figure 4.5). The goal of spoiling is to
concentrate more reflected energy into the annular region bordered by αmax
and αmin. Ideally an optimum cross-section is given by:
Σideal = ρAcc
(
4pi
Ωcc
)
= ρAcc
(
4pi
α2max − α2min
)
(4.26)
where 4pi/(α2max − α2min) is the ideal effective target gain and ωcc is solid
angle subtended by the annular ring of interest. A particular behavior of the
spoiler is that it introduces a slight variations into the cube corner dihedral
angles, complicating the FFDP. In fact in the case of normal incident beam
the initial single main Airy breaks into 2N lobes distributed within an an-
gular annulus. Each of the 2N lobes are created from a different sector of
the CCR entrance aperture. Because the distribution of energy within this
"annulus" is therefore highly nonuniform, the effective area for each lobe is
reduced to:
Ae f f = η(θinc)
Acc
2N
(4.27)
We can obtain an approximate expression of the peak intensity centered in
one of the 2N lobes, substituting the latter equation into the (4.20):
Σpeak(θinc, N) = η2(θinc)
Σcc
4N2
(4.28)
4.3.6 Satellite optical cross-section
The satellites cross section Σ, from a theory point of view achievable with
a single CCR must take into account the limitation due to the velocity aber-
ration effects. The received signals can be approximated as a sum of all the
contribution of several CCRs. Also for this reason modern geodetic satellite,
like Starlette, Lageos and Etalon are sphere in order to avoid the spread-
ing caused by the reflection of the flat panel array. The array size of a SLR
satellite is above determined by the orbiting distance, in order to achieve a
reasonable SNR value. Let’s consider a spherical satellite uniformly covered
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with CCRs. The density of CCRs as a function of incidence angle could be
approximated to:
N(θinc) = dθinc =
N
2
sin θincdθinc (4.29)
where N is the total number of CCRs on the satellite. An approximated rela-
tion is given by the following integral:
Σ = Σcc
∫ n/2
0
dθincN(θinc)η2(θinc) (4.30)
If the CCRs are not recessed in their holders, η(θinc) is given by (4.22). If their
angular response is limited by the recess, (4.24) suggests that the variation
can be well-approximated by the expression η(θinc) = 1− (θinc/thetamax)
where θmax is given by (4.3.3). Substituting the equations (4.29) and (4.3.6)
into (4.30) and evaluating the results integral yields a simple expression for
the target cross-section:
Σ =
ΣccN
2
[
1− sin
2( θmax2 )
(θmax
2 )
2
]
(4.31)
4.4 conclusion
In this chapter we present a sort of a review equations about satellite optical
communications and radar link. They would be very useful for a complete
description of the next experiments, reported in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
We would like to underline that these formulas are not derived by me, but
they are reported from a paper made by John Degnan [32] which has studied
for years SLR facilities.

5P O L A R I M E T E R
In order to achieve QKD through a Earth-Space channel, in the case of po-
larization encoding protocols (simplest) the degree of polarization of the
transmitted radiation must be preserved. It allows the exchange of crypto-
graphic keys from a sender (Alice) to a receiver (Bob). A possible way to
verify this fundamental requirement is to study the space channel using
Laser Ranging system and a polarimeter. In a SLR system the reflection is
done by optical components called CCRs, which ensure that the laser beam
is reflected back to the telescope direction.
At present time, the behavior of polarization reflected by a CCRs is well
known, in particular it has been widely proved that devices with a metal
coated reflecting surface maintain the degree of polarization, while the ones
without it cause a depolarizing effect on the incident beam. This was also
verified experimentally at LUXOR CNR laboratory in Padova. For these rea-
sons, satellites equipped with CCRs are expected to maintain the polarization
state of the laser ranging pulse.
In addition to the above descriptions, the Mueller matrix of the telescope
was measured at different positions, in order to study how it affects the po-
larized laser pulse that passes through it. Secondly, using Jones’ formalism,
a model of the overall system (telescope-satellite-telescope- polarimeter) was
made, so as to create a reference for the observations. If one assumes a Jones
matrix for the CCRs mounted on satellite equal to the one of a plane mirror,
it can be demonstrated that the considered experimental setup should main-
tain the chosen polarization state from one end to the other, regardless of
the telescope position.
5.1 polarization light
The first part of this chapter is only propaedeutics for a complete description
of an optical polarized beam, and for the complete understanding of the
presented experiment. The classical concept of polarized light refers to the
wave polarization state as a time evolving function of its electric field vector
E. If the extremity of the vector describes a stationary curves during the
observation time, the wave is defined as polarized, otherwise if the vector
takes random positions the wave is defined unpolarized.
Polarization is a property of electromagnetic radiation, describing the shape
and orientation of the locus of electric field vector extremity as a function of
time, at a given point of space.
When light passes through a medium or in the case that it is reflected by a
target, its polarization is modified. Variations in the state of polarization of
a wave enable the possibility to characterize every component of optical sys-
tems. The electric field vector of a monochromatic or quasi-monochromatic
wave, can be expressed in terms of three orthogonal components in the
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right-handed Cartesian coordinate system. For a wave propagating over the
z direction, the instantaneous electric field vector, can be expressed as:
E(z, t) =
[
Ex(z, t)
Ey(z, t)
]
=
[
E0x cos(ωt− kz + ϕx)
E0y cos(ωt− kz + ϕy)
]
(5.1)
From (5.1) we can obtain the locus of the extremities of the electric filed
vector:
(
Ex
E0x
)2
+
(
Ey
E0y
)2
− 2 Ex Ey
E0x E0y
cos ϕ = sin2 ϕ (5.2)
where ϕ = ϕx− ϕy. The above equation can degenerate in a circle or in a line
depending on which polarization are we considering. The corresponding
polarization will be defined as: elliptical right-handed (pi < ϕ < 0), elliptical
left-handed (0 < ϕ < pi), circular (ϕ = ±pi/2) and linear (ϕ = 0,pi).
Figure 5.1: Ellipse of polarization.
In the Figure 5.1 the elliptical polarization is reported. It lies in a rectan-
gle of dimension 2E0x × 2E0,y. Each polarization state can be unequivocally
described:
η = ellipticity
θ = azimuth
ν = tan ν =
E0y
Eox (0 ≤ ν ≤ pi/2)
(5.3)
This parameters are related to the electric field vector by the following equa-
tion: 
tan 2θ = tan 2ν cos ϕ
tan 2ε = ± sin 2θ tan ϕ
tan ε = ± ba (−pi/4 < ε ≤ pi/4)
(5.4)
where tan 2ν = 2(E0xE0x)/(E20x − E20y), a2 + b2 = E20x − E20y and ±
ab = E0xE0y sin ϕ.
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5.1.1 Jones formalism
A very common representation of the electric field vector, can be obtained
using column complex vector: E =
[
E0xeiϕx E0yeiϕy
]†
with this math struc-
ture, each optical system can be modelled trough 2 × 2 complex matrix,
called Jones representation matrix. If Ei denotes the Jones vector of an in-
cident wave to an optical system, described by its Jones matrix J, the out-
going waves Eo is related to that by: E0 = JEi. In the case of a series
of optical system, the total electric field can be expressed by the product
of every single Jones matrices. Following the wave propagation direction:
E0 = Jn · Jn−1 . . . J2 · J1 · Ei. where J1 is the first device and Jn represents the
nth.
5.1.2 Stokes parameters
Jones representation does not take into account the depolarization channel.
To extend and complete the model we need to introduce Stokes parameters.
A Stokes vector is structured by four parameters: S0 proportional to the total
density of power of the wave, S1 proportional to the density power in the
vertical and horizontal polarization, S2 proportional to the density power in
the +45° or −45° polarization degree, S3 is proportional to the left-handed
and right-handed polarization. They represent the amplitude, phase and
polarization of a wave and are defined by:
S0 = 〈E2x〉+ 〈E2y〉
S1 = 〈E2x〉 − 〈E2y〉
S2 = 2〈ExEy cos ϕ〉
S3 = 2〈ExEy sin ϕ〉
(5.5)
where ϕ = ϕx(t)− ϕy(t) represents the difference in phase between x and
y components. The 〈〉 operator is the temporal average on the measurement
time. In the case of a completely polarized wave, the parameters vector (5.5),
becomes:
S0 = 〈E2x〉+ 〈E2y〉
S1 = 〈E2x〉 − 〈E2y〉
S2 = 2ExEy cos ϕ
S3 = 2ExEy sin ϕ
(5.6)
where S20 = S
2
1 + S
2
2 + S
2
3.
For an unpolarized wave, the position of the electric field vector is undeter-
mined. Considering a temporal average on the measurement time we can
write:
〈E20x〉 = 〈E20y〉 (5.7)
〈E0x E0y cos 2ϕ〉 = 〈E0x E0y〉〈cos 2ϕ〉 (5.8)
〈E0x E0y sin 2ϕ〉 = 〈E0x E0y〉〈sin 2ϕ〉 (5.9)
the phase variation are equally distributed between −pi and pi. It follows
that:
[
S0 S1 S2 S3
]†
= S0
[
1 0 0 0
]†
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decomposition theorem As reported in the previous paragraph, the
Stokes vectors can be used both with polarized and unpolarized waves.
The formalism enables to express the incoherent superposition of two light
waves. The vector Si of a partially polarized waves (PP) can be decomposed
into two parts: a completely polarized (CP) wave, and a non-polarized wave
(CD); this decomposition is unique:
S0
S1
S2
S3
 =

S0 −
√
S21 + S
2
2 + S
2
3
0
0
0
+

√
S21 + S
2
2 + S
2
3
S1
S2
S3
 (5.10)
PP = CD + CP
coherence matrix and degree of polarization The coherence
matrix (polarization matrix) is defined as the temporal average of the prod-
uct of a Jones vector by its Hermitian conjugate:
Φ = 〈E⊗ E†〉 =
[
〈ExE∗x〉 〈ExE∗y〉
〈EyEx〉 〈EyEy〉
]
(5.11)
In order to define the degree of polarization on an electric field, we have to
connect polarization matrix with the Stokes parameters. It can be done by
the following relationship:
Φ =
1
2
3
∑
i=0
Siσi (5.12)
where σi represents the Pauli matrices. We can define the degree of polariza-
tion as:
P =
Ipol
Itot
=
√[
1+
4 det(Ψ)
Tr(Φ)2
]
=
√
S21 + S
2
2 + S
2
3
S0
, 0 ≤ P ≤ 1 (5.13)
If the measured P = 0, it means that the wave is not polarized, otherwise if
P = 1 the wave is completely polarized.
5.1.3 Poincaré sphere
An useful graphical representation of the polarization states is the Poincaré
sphere. Each point of the sphere is uniquely associated to a Stokes vector.
The Stokes parameters S1, S2, S3 correspond to the coordinates of the 3-axes
of the sphere. For a completely polarized wave the radius of the sphere re-
sults unitary. In the case of optical device where it has a deflated or squeezed
sphere, with a radius less than one the polarization parameter will be lower
than < 1. The linear polarization state are reported in the equatorial line,
while circular states are positioned to the poles of the spere. North hemi-
sphere corresponds to elliptical left-handed states, whereas in the South
hemisphere there are right-handed elliptical states.
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Figure 5.2: Representation of the Stokes vector on the Poincaré sphere.
5.1.4 Mueller matrix
We are going to define the last formalism matrix useful for polarization
study of an electromagnetic wave. Mueller matrix is a 4 × 4 matrix, that
describes completely the polarimetric behaviour of an optical device. It can
be seen as an operator that maps each polarization input state, represented
by a Stokes vector, to an output Stokes vector, corresponding to a defined
polarization output state: S0 = M Si. Each Jones matrix, defined in 5.1.1
section, can be rewritten as a Mueller matrix by:
mij =
1
2
Tr(Jσj J†σi) (5.14)
As for the Jones matrices, also in the case of Mueller matrix, a series of
optical components can be represented via the products of each matrices:
M = Mn Mn−1 . . . M2M1. The Mueller formalism permits better experimen-
tal analysis, thanks to the fact that the terms are perfectly measurable. The
equation (5.14) can be rewritten as:
MJ = A(J ⊗ J†)A−1 (5.15)
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where A is the matrix:
A =

1 0 0 1
1 0 0 −1
0 1 1 0
0 i −i 0
 (5.16)
5.2 laser ranging
The global SLR network station measures the flight time of ultrashort light
pulses retroreflected by satellite in order to study the Earth, Atmosphere,
Oceans from a geodetic point of view. This technique is very precise in
fact it is possible to find out also millimeters changed in the Earth’s crust.
Moreover it is one of the most accurate method to determine the geocentric
position of the satellites around the Earth. Finally but not minor, Laser Rang-
ing results very useful in the study about the variations of the gravity field
of the Earth and it allows a very precise modeling evaluating the long-term
climate change. The SLR stations joint together with VLBI, GPS, DORIS and
PRARE represents an important part of the international network of space
geodetic observatories.
Figure 5.3: Sketch of of Satellite Laser Ranging system. Figure from [2].
5.2.1 Laser Ranging Operation
In order to study and implement a quantum space link, a transmitter/re-
ceiver on space is needed: this requires an hosting satellite. Due to the lack
of this payload, one can use SLR network system to recreate a downlink
channel from satellite to Earth. Usually a laser ranging station is equipped
with:
• high-speed telescope, able to point and track the laser ranging satellite,
normally orbiting in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) range
• high energy pulsed laser
• efficiency detector to receive the retro-reflected laser pulses
• pointing and tracking system
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• data logger system to collect the ranging data
The specifics of the Matera Laser Ranging Observatory (MLRO), site of the
space link experiments are reported in table 5.1. The parameters are given
from NASA in [2]. More information on laser ranging and previous quan-
tum experiments can be found in [100]. Laser ranging satellites are provided
with corner cube reflectors, this because of their property of reflecting the
incident beam in a counterparallel way, regardless of the angle of incidence.
Figure 5.4: Maps of active SLR stations, more informations available at [2].
5.3 experimental study of quantum space channel
The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the properties of a quantum
channel in space within the QKD. The main feature, necessary to develop
such a technique, is that the electromagnetic wave used for the signal trans-
mission keeps its polarization state during all the time of propagation. Pre-
vious works demonstrate its feasibility [111, 18]; on the basis of these, an
instrument capable to measure the state of polarization, in its Stokes vector
description, has been developed. The experiment was carried out in Matera,
inside the ASI facility, that includes a laser ranging station, MLRO. In order
to study the quality of the quantum channel it was used satellites of the In-
ternational Laser Ranging System, equipped with corner cube reflectors: if
the CCRs are metal coated they reflect the incoming beam without modifying
its polarization.
5.3.1 Preservation of polarization
The corner cube reflector is a structure consisting of three mirrors that are
mutually orthogonal so as to constitute a corner of a hollow cube, see Fig-
ure 5.6. This structure has the property of retroreflection, so the radiation
incident on the CCRs from any direction is eventually reflected back in the
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Table 5.1: Specifications of the Matera Laser Ranging Observatory.
Specifications Measure
Telelscope aperture 1.5 m
FOV 0.016°
Focal length primary mirror 2250 mm
Radius of curvature primary mirror −4500 mm
Focal length secondary mirror 148.5 mm
Radius of curvature secondary mirror −297 mm
Back focal length 15 m
Effective focal length 225 m
Laser pulse energy 100 mJ
Laser pulse repetition rate 10 Hz
Laser wavelength 532 nm
Beam divergence angle 45µ rad
Transmission optical efficiency 0.75
Receiving optical efficiency 0.39 (with pass-band filter)
Elevation 536.9 m
Telescope effective area 1.7662 m2
counterparallel direction. For this reason it is widely used for many appli-
cations such as in laser resonators, long-path interferometry, ranging, atmo-
spheric absorption measurements and in road traffic visibility applications.
For more complex applications, i.e. plasma polarimetry and interferometry
or quantum laser ranging, it is necessary to know how the CCRs modify the
state of polarization of the incident radiation. Metal coated corner cubes
tend to preserve polarization in contrast to uncoated ones. The mirror sym-
metry of the trihedral planes (facets) of the corner cube give rise to six
regions in the cube. In a glass corner cube, the output beamlet of each re-
gion presents a different polarization state, whereas in a metal coated corner
cube the output polarization states in all six parts can become identical as in
an ideal planar mirror [59, 60]. In non-normal incident irradiation, the polar-
ization properties of the corner cube become more complicated because six
Mueller reflection matrices are required instead of the single Mueller matrix
for the normal incidence case (collimated beam collinear to the major diago-
nal of the cube). Other than polarization preservation, a metal-faceted cube
tends to reduce the intensity loss encountered by uncoated cubes when the
range of the incidence angle is extended appreciably [77, 80, 97].
5.3.2 Experimental setup
Through the rotation of a quarter-wave plate, a known polarization state
has been given to the SLR pulse coming out from the telescope. The reflected
one then has been analyzed deflecting the incoming radiation toward the
polarimeter, with a beam splitter. All the instrumentation was integrated
with the MLRO facility, so as to receive half of the incoming beam from the
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Figure 5.5: Picture of the MLRO telescope system and coudè path.
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Figure 6.1: Perspective view of a cube-corner retroreflector.
at the point r2 = (x1   wxy1/wy, 0, wzy1/wy), and the direction of the reflected ray is w2 =
(wx, wy, wz).
The third reflection will take place on the x = 0 plane n3 = nx ⌘ (1, 0, 0) at the point
r3 = (0, wyx1/wx   y1, wzx1/wx).
In this case, the succession of the reflection points appears to rotate clockwise, (looking
into the CCR), and it will be indicated as right-handed R. At last, the following relation can
be determined from the expression for n1, n2 and n3
n3 · (n2 ⇥ n1) = 1 (6.1)
On the other hand, if x1 < wxy1/wy (see figure 6.2b), the second reflection takes place
on the plane x = 0 ant the third on the plane y = 0. This sequence of reflecting points
appears to rotate counterclockwise and will be indicates as left-handed L. In this case we
have n1 = nz = (0, 0, 1), n2 = nx = (1, 0, 0), n3 = ny = (0, 1, 0), so
n3 · (n2 ⇥ n1) =  1 (6.2)
The same result can be extended to the case when the first reflection occurs on a di↵erent
face by a convenient rotation of the symbols x, y, z in the previous equations.
Therefore, from the point of view of the ray trajectory and of the polarization properties,
the faces of the CCR consist of six di↵erent incidence zones (i.e. zones of first reflection)
which can be labeled by the two indices (X, Y , Z) and (L, R). The first index indicates the
plane of the first reflection, the second one the sense of the succession of reflections. The six
zones are identified by he point of first impact as follows:
50
Figure 5.6: Perspective view of a corner cube retrorelfector.
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telescope. Then after the first beam splitter the beam is divided into four
directions in order to analyze the polarization state. A detailed diagram of
the device is exposed in Figure 5.11. The device was built to best-fit the
characteristics of the laser ranging station, mostly related to its technology
and limits:
• dimension of the laser ranging beam (45 mm);
• velocity aberration: the tilt of wavefront of the ranging beam compared
to the telescope optical axis.
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Figura 9.3: Schema del polarimetro
Figure 9.1: Polarimeter optical setup.
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Figure 5.7: Polarimeter optical setup.
This effect is induced by the satellite movements that require a continuous
tracking. A continuous tracking causes a tilt on the wavefront that generates
a movement on the detector. To evaluate the image quality of the optical sys-
tem we simulate the Matera Cassegrain telescope 5.5 using the real values
of the telescope. As we show in table 5.1 the primary mirror has an aperture
of 150 mm and a focal length of f = 2250 mm; we are able to determine the
radius of curvature of M1 (primary mirror) from:
f1 =
−R1
2
=⇒ R1 = −4500 mm (5.17)
Likewise from f2 = 148.5 mm we obtain R2 = −297 mm for the M2 (sec-
ondary mirror). M1 is a parabolic mirror, while M2 is a convex hyperboloid
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with conicity parameter about −1.0281. This kind of telescope is not affected
by chromatic aberrations because it is been composed by two main mirrors,
that are quite irrelevant to the wavelength. Chromatic aberrations cannot be
considered because Matera telescope works only at 532 nm, and the other
visible and invisible spectrum are thrown away by dichroic mirror. Another
important parameter about the telescope is the b.f.l (about 15 m); this allows
us to determine the secondary magnification M by:
M =
−b.f.l.
f2
+ 1 = 100 (5.18)
So now we are able to calculate the equivalent focal length of the system:
M =
focal length of the system
focal length of primary
=⇒ feq = 225 m (5.19)
Other important information of the telescope are reported in 5.1. Now let’s
take in exam the optical layout of the polarimeter designed to fit on the
Cassegrain f /150 focus of the telescope; it will works primarily in the 532
nm wavelength. The incoming beam is reduced in size by a 5× Galilean
beam reducer formed by two positive lenses ( f = 500 mm, φ = 2”, f = 100
mm φ = 1”). In the final setup the lenses distance has been set to l = 450
mm in order to get a collimated beam of d = 3 mm from the uncollimated
one coming from the telescope [78]. A non polarizing beam splitter sends
the collimated beam into two orthogonal directions: the transmitted part
into the horizontal-vertical channels and the reflected one into the right cir-
cular linear channels. In the former case a Glan-Taylor polarizer splits the
beam into horizontal and vertical polarization. In the latter, the reflected
portion is splitted again by another NPBS for the circular right-handed and
linear ±45◦ channels, respectively formed by a Quarter wave plate (QWP)
followed by a Glan-Taylor polarizer and by a Glan-Thomson polarizer. In
the last part of the optical system, the light of each channels is focused with
a f = 40 mm, φ = 1′′ lens into Avalanche photo diode (APD). All the sys-
tem is assembled in a cage system that simplifies assembly, alignment and
operations and improve the portability of the instrument. Figure 5.12 show
optical results of the system. We can appreciate the geometrical performance
of the scheme besides a lot of aberrations. Also we can note how the point
spread function (PSF)1 for the cetral ray is very good and satisfies the con-
trast requirement. Analyzing more precisely the aberrations, we note that
the only one present on the spots diagram and confirmed by the ray fan
plot is coma. This kind of aberrations is very annoying if your system is de-
signed for imaging, while in our case where we are concentrated to detect
photons returned by satellite, and so it can be omitted. In Figure 5.12 we can
see the total simulated system, including the seven mirrors that composed
the optical coudè path. An important feature we must underline is that this
system was designed to collect all the photons retroreflected by satellites
without interfere with the normal operation of Matera Laser Ranging sys-
tem, positioning a 50/50 beam splitter at the end of the coudé path. This
total system present a FOV very small, increasing the reception problems
and this is confirmed both from the real experiments also from the simula-
tions. This fact makes very difficult the alignment of the polarimeter with
the telescope and also decreases the number of photons received in every
detector.
1 can be described as the response of an imaging to a point source.
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by a Glan-Taylor polarizer and by a Glan-Thomson polarizer. In the end, the light of each channel
is focused with a f = 50mm   = 1” lens into an avalanche photodiode (APD).
All the system is assembled in a cage system that simplify the assembly, alignment and operations
and improve the portability of the instrument.
Figure 6.6: Photo of the polarimeter for SPOLAR-M experiment.
6.2.2 Mechanical design
The polarimeter has a set of mechanical components needed to integrate it with the Matera Laser
Ranging Facility. The polarization state of the ranging laser is changed by rotating the quarter
wave plate of the Matera facility, that in normal conditions transforms the linear polarization of the
output laser into circular. At this purpose a new motorized holder has been designed and realized.
Again, a beamsplitter has to be inserted in the output optical path to send the incoming light from
satellite into the polarimeter and consequently a beam dump to stop the reflected portion of the
high energy pulses. The mechanical parts are listed below:
• A beam splitter holder used to fix the output beam splitter to the Matera facility optical
bench. In figure 6.7 its CAD design is reported.
A photo of the installation at the MLRO motorized translator is reported in figure 6.8.
• A rotator for the Matera quarter wave plate retarder that allows us to change the output
polarization state. In figure 6.9 the CAD design of the flange is reported.
Coaxially with the central hole of the flange is mounted a crown with ball bearings, retained
by a set of screws inserted around the hole. A separation gasket (see Fig.6.10) combines the
Figure 5.8: Picture of the Polarimeter.
electronic scheme of the experiment For each channel of the po-
larimeter we have a laser pulse whose intensity is proportional to the level
of polarization of the incoming light. In order to reconstruct the polarization
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6.2.3 Electronic design
For each channel of the polarimeter we have a laser pulse whose intensity is proportional to the level
of polarization of the incoming light. To reconstruct the polarization state we need to measure the
relative intensities of the four channels. The detectors have to satisfy the following requirements:
• High sensitivity to detect the faint signal retroreflected from the satellite
• High bandwidth to detect the short pulses of the laser (40ps)
• Large active area to compensate the velocity aberration
The avalanche photodiodes are the solution that meet all these requirements. We chose the
SAR3000 T6 from Laser Components [11] for their short rise time of 500ps corresponding to a
bandwidth of 700MHz and for the large sensitive area of 3mm of diameter. Furthermore they have
an avalanche gain of 100 that means that a single photon can give rise to 100 electrons. In the table
below are summarized the technical specifications of this device.
APD
The avalanche photodiodes (APD) are high speed a d h g sensibility photodiodes, that exploit an
internal avalanche amplifica ion system, based on high voltage reverse biasing.Silicon Avalanche Photodiode, SAR1500x/SAR3000x   
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(b) Pin out
Figure 6.17: APD SAR3000T6
Some common definitions that describe the photo-conversion performance are:
• Photo sensitivity: is the ratio between the radiant power [W] and the photocurrent [A]:
S = A/W . If it is normalized for he sensit v ty at the peak wavelength it represent a relative
sensitivity.
• Quantum Efficiency: the rati between the el c rons or h les detectable as photocurrent and
the incidents photons QE = (S · 1240/ ) · 100
• Spectral response: the photocurrent generated depends on wavelength. Compared with a
photodiode, the spectral response of an APD is subjected to the wavelength dependance of
the avalance multiplication effect.
• Dark current: is the current that flows in a biased photodiode in absence of incident light.
• Shunt resistance: is the ratio voltage over current in the proximity of 0V . Rsh = 10[mV ]/ID
where ID is the dark current at 10mV .
• Terminal capacitance: is the capacitor formed in the p-n junction, and it is the main factor
affecting the time response of the photodiode.
Figure 5.9: APD SAR3000T6.
states, we need measurements of intensity of the four channel. The chosen
detectors satisfied these characteristics:
• high sensitivity to detect the faint signal retroreflected from the satel-
lite
• high band idth to detect the short pulses of the laser (80 ps)
• large active area to compensate the velocity aberration
The avalanche photodiodes are the solution that meet all these requirements.
We c ose the SAR3000 T6 from Laser Components [1] for their short rise
time of 500 ps an a nominal bandwidth of 700 MHz. These detector present
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a large sensitive area (3 mm of diameter) in order to mitigate velocity aber-
ration problem. A screen shot of the acquisition oscilloscope TDS 6124C,
displaying the signals of the four APDs is reported in Figure 5.10. Every
detector has a temperature stabilization implemented inside the base chip
and controlled in feedback by a loop. For more details regard APD charac-
teristic and implementations for this experiment, we advise the reader the
reference [5, 79, 102].
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(b) Preamplifier PCB layout
Figure 6.24: Electrical schemes of the APD preamplifier and PCB layout
Figure 6.25: APDs signals on TDS 6124C oscilloscopeFigure 5.10: APDs signals on TDS 6124C Oscilloscpe.
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(a) Spot Diagram. (b) Spots diagram .
(c) Ray Fan. (d) Encircled Energy.
(e) Huygens PSF. (f) Huygens PSF cross section.
(g) Huygens PSF. (h) Huygens PSF off axis.
(i) Beam reducer. (j) Cassegrain telescope.
Figure 5.12: Image obtained by Zemax simulation.
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5.4 space quantum communication
The polarization analysis for an Earth-Space link starts with the problem of
modeling a real quantum link on space. Physically, one have to deal with a
free-space dynamic optical link through the atmosphere. Another problem
is due to the relative motion between transmitter and receiver. The main
problems for QC are:
• effects due to atmospheric turbulence (as seen in Chapter 3)
• background noise: due to the light pollution, sunlight and moonlight
every source of noise is detected by the receiver
• the relative motions between transmitter and receiver (source of mis-
alignment in the polarization references of the transmitter and re-
ceiver)
• non ideal optics devices ( cause of depolarization, attenuation and
distortion)
From the Stokes and Muller formalism, introduce in the above sections of
this chapter, a simple way to verify the correctness of the transmission is
to minimize the norm of the difference between the sent state and that ex-
pected one:
min
θQ ,θh
‖S−M Mq(θq) Mh(θh)H‖F (5.20)
In this way, knowing the Mueller matrix of the channel, one can compensate
any distortion effect to the polarization introduced by the channel itself. In
a typical transmitting system, channel probing and information exchanging
share the same medium. This implies that the Mueller matrix measurement
should not affect the single-photon exchange in the quantum channel. Two
possible solutions are time-multiplexing and wavelength-multiplexing [17].
5.5 channel polarization analysis
Although this experimental setup would allow one to estimate four differ-
ent polarization states, in the presented case only three of the four channels
were used (corresponding to states V ,H, −, respectively). This was due to
an electronics-related problem that caused the fourth detector (placed at the
R-arm end) to have less signal amplification capability. Before carrying out
the experimental measures, a calibration measure was performed by calcu-
lating the total Mueller matrix of telescope and polarimeter. This procedure
allowed us to verify its behaviour on the polarization that passes through
it and also to calibrate the response of the APD. Figure 5.13 represents the
Mueller matrix obtained from this procedure. In particular we send classi-
cal polarized light from the pupil of the telescope and we analyzed it using
polarimeter, creating the Mueller matrix of the telescope. This measure was
performed with different polarization states and with different angles (az-
imuth and elevation) of the telescope.
5.5.1 Data analysis
The data used for this experiment were acquired during two night of obser-
vations (17 and 18 October 2012) at the MLRO. Several satellites were tracked,
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Table 5.2: Most relevant satellites used in this experiment
Lageos Etalon-1 Etalon-2
Ownership USA-Italy Russia Russia
Launch date Oct, 22th 1992 Jan, 10th 1989 May, 31th 1989
Reflectors 426 2146 2146
Reflectors type uncoated coated coated
Perigee 5620 km 19120 km 19120 km
both with metal-coated CCRs and uncoated ones, with the aim to character-
ize their behaviour on different polarization states. In order to keep the
telescope pointed at the spacecraft, continuous corrections were made to
the position of the former by the facility operator. These corrections had an
impact on the data acquisition time, which decreased with the satellite orbit.
For this reason, only two polarization states were sent, in order to ensure
enough data for every satellite passage, precisely only H and R were gener-
ated through the quarter-wave plate rotation. Table 5.2 shows the satellites
used for the experiment with some critical characteristics, such as the type
of retroreflectors and perigee, which is crucial for signal losses estimations.
While for Lageos-2 satellite the intensities read at the four arms of the po-
larimeter were very high, its CCRs type make it unusable for the realization
of QKD in Space. On the contrary, Etalon satellites are suitable candidates
to demonstrate the polarization preservation, since their retroreflectors are
Aluminum coated.
In figures 5.15 are reported examples of the oscilloscope waveforms of sev-
eral measures for both type of satellites. Each color represent the signal read
from one channel of the polarimeter, which are named CH 1, 2, 3, 4 and mea-
sure states V, H,−, R respectively. The vertical lines limit the time interval
useful for the measure of the incoming signal, which is approximately 1 ns;
the number at the bottom describes the QWP rotation angle, hence, the polar-
ization state outgoing from the telescope. Overall, it can be noticed that the
signal received from Lageos-2 is more intense than the one from the Etalons.
Moreover one can see that both type of satellites behave almost like what
the simulations predicts. In fact, if the reflected laser pulse is completely
depolarized, the intensity read from the four channels should be slightly
different, regardless the sent state.
This phenomenon was clearly seen by considering the signal provided
by the former satellite, which can be noticed by looking at the last frame
of the Figure 5.15. The expected behaviour of the latter type of space-crafts
instead, should show the conservation of polarization degree over the whole
communication channel, i.e. the measured state should be equal to the sent
one. In this case it means that the intensities read on the four channels
change, depending on the polarization outgoing from the ground station: if
the generated state is H, then signal is supposed to be present only in the
H-arm of the polarimeter (CH2); whereas, when R is sent to the satellite,
H and V detector should provide a similar value of intensity, which are
half respect to the one read from R-channel (CH4). These phenomena are
showed in the first and in the second frame of Figure 5.15: for the reasons
explained in section 5.3.2 and for the distance from Earth of Etalon-1, 2, no
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(a) Perspective view.
(b) Projected view.
Figure 5.13: Mueller matrix of the telescope at position el = 0, az = 45, this matrix
was obtained by sending six different polarization states through the
telescope and then measured with the polarimeter.
signal was detected in channel four, even when it was expected to be the
highest, and despite this fact, the data related to CH1 and CH2 readings are
consistent with theory.
5.5.2 Discussion
The data acquired during this observations campaign at MLRO facility per-
mitted us to verify the behaviours of two different type of satellite’s corner
cubes retroreflectors, metal-coated and uncoated ones, from the polariza-
tion point of view. In particular, it was observed that satellites with un-
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coated CCRs have a clear depolarization effect on a polarized laser pulse. On
the other hand, although the data set lacks of direct measures of the right-
handed polarization state, the information provided by the other three chan-
nels of the polarimeter, give us indications about the behaviour of metal-
coated CCRs. In particular, the intensity reads from the three linear polar-
ization arms are consistent with the expect one in the case when H and R
are sent to the satellite. Unfortunately this work was unfinished for various
reasons. We try to resume the main problems encounter during one year of
experiments and test campaigns.
• very noisy detectors, due to the high intensity of the sent pulse
• unstable detectors, oscillate waves owning to the electromagnetic in-
terference
• difficulties to align the Polarimeter, very different angle between the
internal reference CCRs and satellites
• velocity aberrations problems (difficulties to align and to see the return
pulse from very close satellites)
• different response from the APD and above all not stable during the
nightime
• pointing error of the telescope
Due to all this problems it was decide to discard this kind of experiment be-
cause in order to obtain publishable results it would be necessary to change
a lot of the existing setup. It may seems that this experiment wasn’t useful
for the final aim of the thesis, but during the campaigns it was possible to
improve our know-how about the space optical communication and under-
stand what were the main problems of this kind of technique. Moreover
(a) Etalon. (b) Lageos.
Figure 5.14: Picture of SLR satellites.
even if data were not so clear, a first demonstration of the feasibility of send-
ing and receiving polarized photons from satellite was proved. In particular
it was possible for the first time to measure the polarization of a SLR beam
with a polarimeter and detect signal with a detector (not designed for SLR)
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of LEO and Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites. A minor issue but the same
important was that we were able to synchronize two different system with
a precision about 1 ns.
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(a) Waveform example for Etalon-1 satellite, H state sent.
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(b) Waveform example for Etalon-1 satellite, R state sent.
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(c) Waveform example for Etalon-1 satellite, R state sent.
Figure 5.15: Waveform examples of the signal read by the APD at the end of the
polarimeter. The first two pictures are referred to the satellite Etalon-1,
whereas the last one is from Lageos-2.
6S PA C E Q U A N T U M C O M M U N I C AT I O N S
When we talk about QKD and quantum communications it’s natural to look
forward a future scenario where a global network of quantum cryptography
will be present. In this kind of project satellite communications will be the
base for every intercontinental possible link. Furthermore, QC along satellite
links are crucial for the realization of quantum protocols on a global scale
and for fundamental tests of QP [86]. In particular, QKD [12, 66, 50, 9], quan-
tum teleportation and entanglement swapping [118] as well as the measure-
ment of Bell inequalities in a relativistic scenario[44], require QC over long
distances.
However, the absence of orbiting terminals equipped with quantum trans-
mitters or receivers precluded so far the demonstration of satellite to ground
quantum state transmission thus impairing the development of satellite
quantum link.
We start from the results of Chapter 5 to exploit QC using satellite corner
cube retroreflectors as a quantum transmitter in orbit. A stable quantum
link has been established between several low Earth orbit satellites and the
Matera Laser Ranging Observatory (MLRO) of the Italian Space Agency in
Matera (Italy) by transmitting different qubit states encoded in the photon
polarization.
The QBER has been kept steadily low for a total transmission time of 85 s.
Indeed, we measured an average value of QBER = 4.5%, a level that is suit-
able for several QKD protocols and for the violation of Bell inequalities. The
mean photon number per pulse leaving the satellites was estimated to be
of the order of one, as required in QKD [92]. We demonstrated that QC from
an orbiting terminal to a base station is not only a promising idea but is
nowadays realizable. Moreover we proposed a new protocol, where by ex-
ploiting modulated retroreflectors our communication scheme could easily
be turned into a fully operational satellite QKD system. Our results pave the
way to the implementation of future QC worldwide networks, setting a new
record on the distance of single photon transmission.
6.1 towards satellite qc
The first satellite Sputnik 1, launched in 1957, was put into an geocentric
orbit orbit around the Earth. From these years an approximately number of
2456 artificial satellites were launched. Satellites can be classified by their
geocentric orbits in altitude, inclination and eccentricity category. For our
interest we describe only the altitude classifications, the most common clas-
sifications of the orbit:
• Low Earth orbit (LEO): Geocentric orbits ranging in altitude from 0−
2000 km
• Medium Earth orbit (MEO): Geocentric orbits ranging in altitude from
2000− 35786 km. Also known as an intermediate circular orbit
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• Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO): Geocentric circular orbit with an alti-
tude of 35786
• High Earth orbit (HEO): Geocentric orbits above the altitude of geosyn-
chronous orbit 35786 km
Our experiment, due to the high losses of the channel take into account
only LEO an MEO satellite, but in future also QC with Geostationary Earth
Orbit (GEO) satellites would be possible. The envisaging and modelling of
Space QC started a dozen years ago [7, 18, 103, 19, 93], but completely pay-
load system have not been placed in orbit yet. Therefore, since 2008 the
experimental studies of Space-to-ground links simulated a source of coher-
ent pulses attenuated at the single photon level by exploiting satellites for
geodetics laser ranging, which are equipped with CCRs [111, 117]. However,
a full quantum transmitter for polarization encoded QKD in Space also re-
quires qubits prepared in different polarization states. Here we show the
operation of such quantum transmitter. We sent toward selected satellites a
train of laser pulses at the repetition rate of 100 MHz paced with an atomic
clock. The qubit signal is obtained by the pulses reflected by the CCRs (6.1).
From simulating process and an high accuracy measures (4) we set the out-
going laser intensity such that, after the attenuation occurred in the uplink,
the qubit signal has an average photon number per pulse (µsat) close to one.
Moreover we prove the feasibility of the BB84 protocol [15] with the qubits
encoded in four different polarization states, corresponding to two mutually
unbiased basis. A secret key can be established between the transmitter and
the receiver when the average QBER is below 11%1.
As proved from the polarimeter analysis (5), the exploitation of CCRs with
metallic coating on the three reflecting faces is crucial for preserving the po-
larization state during the reflection and thus obtaining low QBER. For this
reason we could not use satellites mounting uncoated or dielectric coated
CCRs. We focus our interest in five LEO satellites (below 2000 km): Jason-2,
Larets, Starlette and Stella with metallic coated CCRs and Ajisai, with un-
coated CCRs, for comparison.
6.1.1 QC with polarized photons
The first proof of QC using generic polarization states from two mutually un-
biased bases, were realized with a single passage of Larets. The passage was
divided in four intervals of 10 s in which we sent horizontal |H〉, vertical |V〉,
circular left |L〉 and circular right |R〉 states. At the receiver the state analy-
sis is performed by two single photon detectors measuring two orthogonal
polarizations, from which the QBER is extracted. Indeed, in a transmission
with polarization encoded qubits, the QBER can be estimated as
Q =
nwrong + 1
ncorr + nwrong + 2
(6.1)
where ncorr and nwrong are the number of detections in the sent and orthog-
onal polarization respectively2. The results are summarized in 6.2. In the
four intervals, we obtained 199 counts in the correct detector and 13 wrong
1 By using the post-selection techniques introduced in[10], QBER up to 15% can be tolerated for
(reasonable) secret key generation.
2 We used the Bayesian estimator of the QBER.
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Figure 6.1: Qubit pulses are sent at 100 MHz repetition rate and are reflected back at
the single photon level from the satellite, thus mimicking a QKD source
on Space. Synchronization was performed by using the bright SLR pulses
at repetition rate of 10 Hz.
counts, giving an average QBER of 6.5%± 1.6% suitable for a secret key ex-
traction. Once considered the average 3.6% duty cycle of our setup, the mean
return rate in the selected intervals is 147± 10 cps. Such rate corresponds to
∼ 104 bits for each Satellite passage in the case of perfect condition if very
fast shutters are implemented.
A further analysis has been carried out to prove the preservation of the po-
larization state for the other coated satellites. In this analysis we divided
the detection period in intervals of 5 seconds: for each interval the data
were analyzed only if the signal of at least one detector was 5 standard de-
viations above the background. The QBER resulting from this analysis are
shown in 6.6 for Ajisai, having non polarization preserving CCRs, and for
the polarization preserving satellites Jason-2, Larets, Starlette and Stella. We
achieved low QBER for several tens of seconds in all the polarization main-
taining satellites, with an average value for each passage not exceeding 7%.
By combining together the results of all the polarization maintaining satel-
lites we achieved an overall communication period of 85 s, with an average
96 space quantum communications
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Figure 6.2: Top: Larets trajectory measured by the 10 Hz SLR pulses. The four se-
lected 10 s intervals correspond to four different polarization input states.
Bottom: the four histograms report the obtained counts at the receiver for
each single photon detector in function of the measured detection time
tmeas, demonstrating an average estimated QBER of 6.5%. The signal on
the two detectors is blue for H/L polarization and green for V/R. Gray
dashed lines represent the 1 σ selection interval around the expected time
of arrival tref.
QBER=4.5%± 0.8%. These results prove that faithful transmission of differ-
ent polarization qubits can be obtained in different conditions and satellite
orbit and show the stability and the reliability of our approach. In 6.6 we
also report the experimental detection rates achieved with the different LEO
satellites.
6.1.2 Single photon investigation
A real earth-satellite QKD system is based on faint laser pulses with a mean
photon number of the Poisson process µ close to 1. Indeed the BB84 protocol
with decoy states [67] in a realistic scenario requires [92] µ . 2 and decoy
signals with mean photon number close to 1 [106] (see Appendix B). In this
section we demonstrate that our experiment was carried out in this regime
by providing a quantitative estimate of the mean photon number of the
downward pulses. The value of µsat can be estimated by the radar equation
[32] introduce in Chapter 4 and now suitably used:
µrx = µsat
Σ
ρAeff
(
1
4piL2
)
Ta Atηrxηdet (6.2)
with µrx the received mean photon number per pulse, Σ and Aeff respec-
tively the satellite cross-section and effective retroreflective area, ρ the CCR
reflectivity, L the slant distance, Ta the atmospheric transmissivity, At the
telescope area, ηrx the optical receiving efficiency and ηdet the single photon
detector efficiency. The values of the parameters used in the µrx estimation
are reported in the Methods section. Concerning the satellite cross-sections,
we used those given in [6, 110, 21] and reported in table 4.1. For the Larets
passage of 6.2 we obtained µsat = 3.4± 0.2 and a corresponding downlink
transmissivity of ∼ 4.3 · 10−7 (63 dB of attenuation). The values of µsat for
the remaining satellites are reported in 6.6. The resulting µsat is of the order
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of unity for the four satellites with metallic CCRs. The reflectivity ρ of the
CCRs was taken as unitary, setting a higher bound on µsat.
In order to have an additional confirmation that the obtained values of
µsat are correct, the full radar equation was used to estimate the number of
received photons in several passages of the different satellites. The theoret-
ical predictions and the experimental data are compared in Figure 6.3. The
results show that radar equation model [32] and eq. (6.2) provide a precise
fit for the measured counts and the µsat values derived in Figure 6.6.
To estimate µsat it is necessary to factorize the radar equation into an up-
link and a downlink factors. While most of the parameters of the radar
equation can be easily separated into uplink and downlink factors, the
satellite cross section Σ plays a role in both and must be split according
to Σ = ρAeffGdown. The parameters ρ and Aeff, corresponding to the CCRs
reflectivity and the effective satellite retroreflective area, contribute to the
uplink, while Gdown gathers all the downlink contributions into an effective
downlink gain. Then, the downlink factor
ηdown
Σ
ρAeff
1
4piL2
Ta Atηrxηdet (6.3)
can be used in equation (6.2) to obtain an estimate for µsat. The values of the
parameters used to evaluate µsat are the following: ηdet = 0.1, Ps = 0.11W
Ps is the laser power, corresponding to µtx ' 2.946 · 109), ηtx = 0.1, At =
1.73m2, ηrx = 0.13. For the cross-sections, we used the following values (we
report the min- and max- values used to draw the shaded ared in Fig. 4):
Σ = 23 for Ajisai, Σ = 0.2÷ 1.7 for Jason, Σ = 1÷ 2.5 for Starlette and Stella,
Σ = 0.2÷ 0.8 for Larets.
The atmospheric absorbance is proportional to the air-mass (AM), defined
as the optical path length through atmosphere normalized to the zenith. In
our model we considered 87% of transmissivity at the zenith for all the days.
This value refers to good sky conditions [32] which were effectively selected
for the experiment.
For a consistency check of our µsat estimation, the full radar equation has
been used to extrapolate the transmitter gain, given by
Gt =
8
θ2t
exp
[
−2
(
θ
θt
)2]
. (6.4)
In the previous equation θt is the divergence angle of the up-going beam
(including beam broadening due to turbulence), while θ is the pointing er-
ror. Since the two parameters θ and θt cannot be directly and separately
measured, we obtained an estimate for Gt by comparison the data obtained
in different passages of the several LEO satellites. As a consequence of the
pointing error, the detection frequency of the 100 MHz laser varies strongly
with time, thus producing localized peaks of detection for few tens of sec-
onds, followed by the absence of signal. Because of this several periods of at
least 10 seconds, in which the detection frequency was significantly above
the background, have been isolated and only the peak frequency within
these periods has been taken into account.
To best approximate of Gt, we averaged the most stable data taken for
Ajisai, Jason and Starlette, thus obtaining an effective gain of Gt = 1.1× 109.
The resulting value of Gt has been used in the radar equation to estimate the
number of received photons. The theoretical predictions and the experimen-
tal data are compared in Figure 6.3. The results show that radar equation
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Figure 6.3: Points represent the return frequencies of the qubits for different satel-
lites along the orbit, compared with the prediction of the link budget pro-
vided by the radar equation model (continuous line). Error bars account
for Poissonian errors only while shaded area comes from the available
uncertainties of the satellite cross-sections ∑. Uncertainties in the orbital
parameters and beam pointing affect trend of the return rate beyond shot
noise. The twin satellites Stella and Starlette show different behaviour
despite similar characteristics, but in line with the SLR statistics
model [32] and eq. (6.2) provides a precise fit for the measured counts and
the µsat values derived in 6.6.
qkd satellite protocol using retroreflectors We now show
that our QC scheme could be turned into a practical satellite QKD system.
Indeed, we note that, if the outgoing and incoming beams travel through the
same optical path, the polarization transformation induced in the uplink by
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the telescope movements is compensated in the downlink (see Appendix B).
Therefore, by transforming the state during the retroreflection, it is possible
to change the qubit sends from satellite to the ground. On this base, we
propose a two-way QKD protocol, working as follows:
• in the ground station, a horizontal polarized beam is injected in the
Coudé path and will exit the telescope rotated by an angle depending
on the telescope pointing
• the outgoing beam is directed toward a satellite with CCRs having a po-
larization rotator, such as a Faraday Rotator, mounted at the entrance
face
• it is possible to rotate the returning polarization by a suitable angle θ
by using the polarization rotator
• in the CCRs a suitable attenuator lowers the mean photon number to
the single photon level
• a measure of the intensity of the incoming beam is desirable in order
to avoid Trojan horse attack [42] and to guarantee the security of the
protocol
• the retroreflected beam then propagates toward the ground telescope,
and thanks to the properties of the Coudé path, a polarization qubit
will be received (see Appendix B).
By this scheme, a decoy state BB84 protocol can be realized between satellite
and ground. The experimental results shown above demonstrate that such
protocol is currently realizable using few centimetres CCRs and that the MLRO
station is suitable for Space QC.
Obviously this is only an idea for a future experiment, but the possibil-
ity to have something very small and integrated as payload is completely
different from a quantum transmitter or receiver in space, where optical
components and the pointing error would be a big issue. Moreover this de-
vice could work both for SLR both for QKD and the integration of a quantum
transceiver in SLR stations would be quite easy.
Incoming	beam
Ougoing	beam	
Modulated	CCR
Figure 6.4: Idea of QKD with modulated CCR: the multi-photons pulses arriving
from Earth is measured, attenuated and modulated by the CCR and
retroreflected to the Earth. In this way it is possible to create a two-way
QKD scheme.
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6.1.3 Setup
The detailed scheme used in the experiment is shown in B.1. A mode-
locking master laser oscillator subjugated at the MLRO atomic clock is used
as events generator. It produces pulses of 100 ps duration at the wavelength
of 1064 nm, with a repetition rate of 100 MHz and about 400 mW of average
power. The master laser beam is split to provide the seed for the SLR signal
and the pump pulse for the qubits. The high intensity SLR pulses are ob-
tained by selecting with a pulse picker one pulse every 107 and then using
a regenerative amplifier and two single-pass amplifiers followed by a Sec-
ond Harmonic Generation (SHG) stage, obtaining pulses at 532 nm with 100
mJ energy and 10 Hz repetition rate. The beam used to generate the qubits
is obtained by sending the rest of the master oscillator laser to a suitable
SHG unit, whose output is 110 mW. The beam divergence is controlled by a
collimator, while the polarization state is changed by two waveplates and a
modulator. Two non-polarizing beam splitters (NPBS) are used to combine
SLR and qubit pulse-train in the upward beam that is directed via the Coudé
path to the MLRO telescope, from which it propagates toward the satellite.
The beams coming from the satellite and received by the MLRO telescope
propagate backward via the Coudé path and are split by the same two NPBS
used in the uplink. The qubit receiver is composed by a focalizing lens, a ro-
tating waveplate, an optical shutter and two single photon photomultipliers
(PMT) placed at the outputs of a Polarizing Beam Splitter (PBS). The signals
detected by the PMT are fed into a time tagger with 81 ps resolution. The
rotating waveplate, controlled by software, is used to change between two
receiving bases, {|H〉, |V〉} and {|L〉, |R〉}.
The pulses generated by the transmitter, passing through the first NPBS
produce a scattering that elevates the background noise at the quantum
receiver. To prevent this effect, we implemented a time division protocol by
using two fast mechanical optical shutters. In the first half of the 100 ms slot
between two SLR pulses, the transmitter shutter is opened in order to send
the qubit pulses toward the satellite, while the reception shutter is closed to
protect the receiver PMT.
In the second half of the slot the transmitter shutter is closed, and, once
the receiver shutter is fully open, the detection phase begin. By using this
protocol, the effective transmission time during a slot cannot be larger than
the round trip time (RTT); however, since the shutters require about 2 ms to
fully open and 2.5 ms to fully close, the effective period is further reduced
by 4.5 ms. Considering that for a LEO satellite the RTT varies between 5 and
20 ms, the effective duty cycle can vary between 0 and 15% . Moreover, the
effective duty cycle varies also in a single satellite passage, approaching its
minimum when the satellite reaches its maximum elevation (see 6.5).
In order to reject the background and dark counts, a precise synchroniza-
tion is needed. For this purpose we exploited the SLR signal. The latter is
generated in a coarse pulse-train of strong pulses (10 Hz repetition rate and
100 mJ pulse energy) whose seed is taken from the same oscillator locked
to an atomic clock used to generate the 100 MHz qubits. The atomic clock
guarantees that the qubit pulses are all separated by 10 ns and that 107
qubit pulses exactly correspond to 100 ms, the time between two SLR pulses.
Two non-polarizing beam splitters were used in the optical path in order to
merge and split the outgoing and incoming SLR signal and qubit stream (see
Figure 6.1 and Figure B.1 in Appendix B on page 129). For qubits discrimi-
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Figure 6.5: Schematic demo of shutter operation.
nation, we synchronized the state analyzer by using the time-tagging of SLR
pulses provided by the MLRO unit, which has few picosecond accuracy. In-
deed, by dividing the intervals between two consecutive SLR detections in
107 equidistant subintervals, we determined the sequence of expected qubit
times of arrival tref. This technique compensates for the time scale transfor-
mation due to satellite motion with respect to the ground. Our detection
accuracy σ was set equal to the detector time jitter (0.5 ns), as other con-
tributions to time uncertainties coming from detection electronics or laser
fluctuations are negligible. Counts registered within 1 σ interval around tref
were considered as signal, while the background has been estimated from
the counts outside 3 σ.
6.2 single photon link with meo satellite
Once we have obtained the results presented in the above paragraphs, we
decided to improve the limit of single photon transmission in space, fixed
at LEO orbits. From our simulation and with the same setup of the QBER
measurement, a single photon transmission from a MEO satellite had to be
possible. We focus our experiment on Lageos satellite because it is very
brilliant and relative easy to center with SLR station. The high signal loss, due
to the satellite slant range exceeding 7000 km, imposes stringent limitations
to the background level tolerable by the receiver. To minimize the effect of
the stray light, the incoming beam has been filtered spatially, reducing the
detector field of view down to 40 µrad, and on the basis of the wavelength,
with a 3 nm wide band-pass filter. This reduced the stray light effect to
a negligible level compared to the ∼ 50 Hz intrinsic detector dark count
frequency.
To further reduce the background a second filtering stage, based on the
time synchronization, has been implemented. This technique requires the
determination of photons expected the times of arrival tre f and it must take
into account the ”Doppler-like” squeezing and expansion effect of the 100
MHz pattern as the satellite goes toward or away from the MLRO station
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Figure 6.6: We fixed the sent polarization to |V〉 and measured in two orthogonal
polarization |H〉 and |V〉. For each satellite we show the bare QBER
(blue dots) calculated according to (6.2), and the QBER calculated after
the background subtraction (red dots). Error bars represent Poissonian
errors. Qd and Qn represent the bare and background subtracted QBER
for the whole satellite acquisition. For Larets we observed no detection
in the wrong state, and we did not estimate the QBER with background
subtraction. The coating of Ajisai retroreflectors depolarizes the qubits,
while the other satellites preserve the photon polarization. We also indi-
cate the mean detection rate and the average photon number per pulse at
the satellite.
(see Figure 6.7). The estimate of tre f was obtained by dividing the interval
between the detection of two consecutive 10 Hz pulses by 107. This pro-
cedure relies on the fact that the two laser patterns are locked one to the
other, with a fixed phase relation. Therefore a single calibration is needed to
measure the offset of the 100 MHz pattern with respect to the 10 Hz pulses,
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Figure 6.7: Experimental setup: two 532 nm beams are sent towards satellites, one
for Laser Ranging observations and the other one for quantum communi-
cations. SLR pulse is a 10 Hz 532 nm beam combined with a train pulses
at 100 MHz 532 nm. Photons are collected with two different system: a
more precise PMT (Photomultiplier) was used for SLR in order to achieve
a better resolution on datas. This characteristic was also useful for QC be-
cause we were able to control more precisely the Doppler effect and the
velocity aberration due to the trajectory of the satellites.
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which results form the different optical path of the two beams. This pro-
cedure automatically compensate for the ”Doppler-like” distortion, as both
beam undergoes the same transformation.
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Figure 6.8: Estimation of mean number of photons per pulse.
As discussed in [32] and presented in paragraph 6.1.2, the radar equation (6.2)
can be used to estimate the average photon detection frequency at the re-
ceiver starting from the average photon transmission frequency.
The return frequency depends on the instantaneous satellite slant range
both directly, due to the factor 1/L4, and through Ta, which. In fact Ta as-
sumes the form
Ta = exp(−σ hs sec( θzen ) e−h/hs) (6.5)
with σ the attenuation coefficient, h the altitude over the sea level of the
ground station and hs = 1.2Km a scaling height.
All the parameters of (6.2) are known with the exception of the transmitter
gain Gt which can be expressed as:
Gt =
8
θ2t
exp
[
−2
(
θ
θt
)2]
.
where θt is the time independent divergence angle of the upgoing beam
(including beam broadening due to turbulence), and θ is the time dependent
telescope pointing error, due to satellite fluctuations from the ideal trajectory.
These two parameters are not known separately, however, it is possible to
gather their effects on the beam widening into an effective divergence angle
θe f f defined as Gt =
8
θ2e f f
. Since both parameters are unknown, it is possible
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to compute a mean value of Gt from the parameter a obtained from the
fit. From this we can extract an effective divergence angle θe f f defined as
Gt =
8
θ2e f f
.
The obtained value of θe f f is 52 µrad, which is lower than that computed
in the above paragraphs. If we compare this value with the ones obtained in
the case of LEO link, we can see that this value is lower. We can explain this
with the fact that a MEO has a higher perigee compared to a LEO satellite,
that lead to a lower angular velocity and thus makes the tracking more
stable over time.
Figure 6.8 shows a good agreement of the measured frequencies with the
overall fit, with the exception of the interval between minute 75 and 76. This
is due to a temporary problem with the telescope pointing and because of
that those points where not used in the analysis.
It’s important to note that due to the telescope instantaneous pointing
error the mean number of photons per pulse hitting the satellite varies over
time, as the uplink attenuation is higher in instants with worse pointing and
viceversa. This effect is evident in the deviation of the measured detection
frequency from the global fit. Because of this an estimation of the µsat based
on the mean uplink attenuation would produce high errors as it would not
consider local fluctuations of the pointing error.
For this reason we computed µsat as the average number of received pho-
ton per pulse µrec divided by the downlink part of the radar equation. With
this method it’s possible to get the µsat corresponding to each return fre-
quency point precisely.
With this method we computed µsat for each analysis slice, distinguishing
those where µsat ≤ 1, 1 < µsat ≤ 2, and µsat > 2. The first two cases are
the ones that have a µ that can be considered practical to be used in proto-
cols such as BB84 with decoy states (Appendix B). As we can see in 6.8, we
were able to receive pulses with less than unitary photons per pulse in the
moments when the satellite was in the farthest points from the the ground
station, which corresponds to the maximum geometric attenuation. More-
over the intervals which lead to the useful µsat correspond to periods of bad
telescope pointing, which increase the uplink losses even more.
We analyzed two satellite passages, one for the Ajisai satellite, a LEO with
perigee of 1478 km, and one for Lageos-2, comparing the timestamp of
each photon detection with the nearest tre f . In both cases we identified a
peak with strong statistical significance (more than 15 σ over background
in both cases), corresponding to the detection of the 100 MHz pattern (see
Figure 6.8). On the basis of a Gaussian fit we extracted both the residual
offset (∆0) and the full width at half maximum (FWHM) of the distribu-
tion. The measured ∆0 is 0.04± 0.03 ns for Lageos and 0.02± 0.02 ns for
Ajisai, resulting in both cases compatible with the values that obtained dur-
ing the calibration, thus demonstrating the reliability of the synchronization
technique for LEO and MEO satellites. The FWHM measured for the two pas-
sages is 1.20± 0.08 ns for Lageos and 1.28± 0.05 ns for Ajisai, a value that
allows a background reduction of a factor 10 while maintaining ∼ 70% of
the data. Moreover, the fact that the two values are compatible, within the
experimental errors, indicates that the synchronization procedure doesn’t
depend on the slant range, and can be effectively applied to any satellite
distance. It is worth noting that the FWHM is dominated by the time jit-
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ter of the single photon detector, from datasheet 1.5 ns . The 80 ps pulse
width of the 100 MHz laser is thus not significantly broadened during the
transmission through the atmosphere as well as during the reflection on
the corner cubes. As a consequence the adoption of a lower jitter detector,
such as single-photon avalanche diode or microchannel plate with a FWHM
∼ 50 ps, would improve the efficiency of the whole synchronization system
allowing a further enhancement of the SNR amplification by more than one
order of magnitude.
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Figure 6.9: Return from Lageos satellite with different µ value
We selected the intervals with µsat ≤ 1 and µsat ≤ 2 which resulted in an in-
tegrated acquisition period of 360 s and 720 s respectively. For all the data in
these intervals, we compared the timestamp of each photon detection with
the nearest tref. As shown in 6.9, in both cases we observed the reception
peak with a strong statistical significance over the background. For the data
with µsat ≤ 1 we measured a peak signal to noise ratio SNR= 1.8 with a
mean reception frequency of 1.4 Hz, while for the data with µsat ≤ 2 we
measured a SNR= 2.1 with a mean reception frequency of 4.3
6.3 discussion
In conclusion from the plots reported above it results very clear that we ex-
perimentally demonstrated the preservation of single photon polarization
over a channel with unprecedented length, showing QC from several satel-
lites acting as quantum transmitter and with MLRO as the receiver. Moreover
we perform the first measure of QBER from photons coming from satellites
and we found that it was low enough to demonstrate the feasibility of quan-
tum information protocols such as QKD along a Space channel. In addic-
tion, we propose a new protocol with a very simple trusted device in orbit,
formed by active CCRs mounted on a spacecraft and operated in the two-
way scheme. This solution may provide a simple alternative to a full space
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Figure 6.10: Comparison of the actual time of detection with the expected time of
photon arrival. The peak centered at ∆ = 0 represents the detection
of the 100 MHz beam. The compatibility of the fit parameters for LEO
and MEO satellites demonstrates the robustness of the analysis method
independently from the satellite distance.
terminal since all the existing SLR facilities can be turned into QC stations
with minor upgrade, fostering a faster expansion of QC around the planet
and beyond. We improve the actual limit of single photon transmission, per-
forming an experiment where Alice was positioned about 7000 km from
Bob. it was possible to demonstrate out technique works both for LEO and
MEO, allowing a good detection of the quantum signal over the noise counts.
Unfortunately being Lageos an uncoated aluminium satellite, it was not pos-
sible to measure the QBER in the case of MEO satellite, but near future also
this kind of experiment will be done. All the experiments and simulation
was perform in the regime of photon encoding polarization, where the in-
formation about the bit is encoded in the state of polarization of the photon.
However we must pay attention to other protocols, like time-bin encoding
where using a non balanced Mach-Zender (MZ) interferometer it is possible
to delay the phase between the wave-packet of the photons and so encoding
our information in the phase delay of the qubit.

7I N T E R S AT E L L I T E L I N K
The space-to-ground quantum key distribution, as demonstrated in Chap-
ter 5 and in Chapter 6 can be considered feasible. A future different sce-
nario for the QC are the inter-satellite links between two or more satellites
exchanging informations among them. In this chapter we focus our atten-
tion on the extension of inter-satellite communications into the quantum
domain. Classical optical communication in a very long distance link be-
tween two moving terminal is already a great effort, but several missions
(LLCD, LCRD ) demonstrated that is achievable. A further request introduc-
ing quantum light in this context is of enormous interest, but also a very
challenging project. We present a scheme for a quantum payload based on
B92 protocol, which could be used in a future GNSS satellite mission. In fact
we realized, in collaboration with TASI (Thalens Alenia Space Italia) a space
QKD terminal whole based on optical communications. Both the quantum
channel, for the key generation, both the classical channel for the informa-
tion reconciliation process were realized in a free-space link. This system
was implemented and tested in a line of sight terrestrial link in order to
demonstrate that a quantum payload application is available and possible
for GNSS constellation.
7.1 optical link model
For an optical characterization of the beam, the propagation through vac-
uum of a laser beam can easily be modeled. Better, in the case of inter-
satellite link the background noise is lower than considering downlink or
uplink scenario(presented in Chapter 4). The propagation equation of a
Gaussian beam in vacuum has at least the divergence:
θ =
λ
piw0
(7.1)
obviously the lower is the beam waist at the receiver side, the more energy
can be collected by the telescope increasing the total efficiency of the link.
The divergence factor, from equation (7.1) can be decreased depending on
the color (λ) of the laser and also increasing the beam waist w0 of the beam.
Another good point of an optical propagation in vacuum is the absence
of the broadening effects due to atmosphere [65, 39], which simplify the
propagation equation:
w2LT = w
2
0
(
1+
L2
Z20
)
(7.2)
where L is the propagation link distance and Z0 = piw0/λ is the Rayleigh
parameter of the beam. The total power P collected by the receiver of radius
R can be estimated as:
P = 2pi I0
∫ R
0
ρe−2(ρ
2/w2LT) dq (7.3)
109
110 intersatellite link
00101110
11	·····
·····	00101
11011
	···
·11
01
11
01
00
	.0
01
01
11
01
1	·
···
Figure 7.1: Future scenario of satellite QC network. Every satellite can exchange quan-
tum and classical information both with other spacecrafts, both with OGS.
This quantum network will allow to exchange information in an uncon-
ditionally secure way.
To get a quantitative idea of the link energy-transfer we introduce the η
parameter, defined as the ratio between the transmitted over received energy
as:
η = η0
(
1− e−2R2/w2LT
)
(7.4)
In a real scenario where satellites are moving, limitations like optical effi-
ciency and pointing error are present. In order to establish secure communi-
cations, the SNR achieved in all the transmission must be greater than fixed
threshold value, depending on how much informations we allow to Eve. As
reported in Chapter 4, SNR ratio can be defined as:
SNR =
η
N
(7.5)
where for a fixed detection time ∆t = 1 ns and a bandwidth ∆λ = 1 nm, the
number of noise photons N of an optical quantum receiver results:
N = HbΩ f ovpiR2 ∆t∆λ (7.6)
where Hb is the brightness of the space background [photons · s−1 · cm−2 ·
nm−1 · sr−1], Ω f ov is the field of view of the telescope in [sr], R is the tele-
scope radius in [cm], ∆λ is the optical bandwidth [nm] and ∆t is the detec-
tion time [s].
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The principal noise sources in inter-satellite link are the Zodiacal light (ZL)1
and integrated starlight (ISL) that comes from direct starlight and from scat-
tered light by interstellar dust. The highest noise level in the milky-way are
on the Galactic Plane, but obviously the intensity and the numbers of source
depending on the chose direction.
• Beam wander occurs when a laser beam is refracted by
an eddy with size larger than the beam diameter, causing
a displacement of the beam center.
• Short-term beam spread is due to the laser beam being
refracted by an eddy smaller than the beam diameter.
The short-term beam spread is an additional spread with
respect to the standard spread due to the free space laser
beam propagation (without turbulence effects).
• Long-term beam spread is the combination of the beam
wander and the short-term beam spread. It can be ob-
served over a time interval that is sufficiently long, with
respect to the dynamics of beam wandering. While the
short-term beam spread represents the additional broad-
ening around the displaced beam center at a given instant,
the long-term beam spread represents the area where
at least 84% of the intensity1 will be, as long as the
parameters of the turbulent environment do not change.
For the system link budget and loss calculations, the short
term beam spread radius is more important than the beam
wander, as the displacement of the beam center can be
compensated by fast tracking systems but the short term
turbulent spreading of the beam can not.
• Scintillation the wave front is disturbed when it passes
through turbulence, which leads to local changes of the
electric field phase. When the wave impinges on the
receiver, different parts of the wave interfere, resulting
in a non-uniform distribution of the intensity that fluctu-
ates about its average value. These spatial and temporal
fluctuations in received irradiance are called scintillation.
The scientific and technological contribution of an inter-
satellite or a ground-to-satellite quantum link design represents
a crucial step towards an effective deployment of Quantum
Communications. In fact, it makes for a scenario in which the
effects of turbulence in terrestrial atmosphere are substantially
reduced or removed [15], [16].
Simulations of propagation outside the atmosphere for
different laser wavelengths and telescope radii show that
by decreasing the wavelength and increasing the telescope
radius, the beam size at the receiver is reduced, and so is
the attenuation, while the SNR increases: this is due to the
dependence of beam divergence with wavelength and telescope
radius. In Fig. 1 we report the simulated SNR results vs link
distance for three different telescope diameters: 0.2m, 0.3m,
0.5m, and for the following wavelength values:   = 404 (not
yet proposed for space use),   = 800 nm (see e.g., [3], [4]),
  = 1064 nm (as used in [5]), or   = 1550 nm (proposed in
[6], [7], [8]).
The wavelength selection is mainly dictated by the availabil-
ity of sources and detectors and by their space qualification
level, and within such constraints, a shorter wavelength pro-
vides lower diffraction losses along the free space channel.
Therefore, although previous works have used longer waves,
1For a uniformly illuminated circular aperture this is the energy fraction
that falls inside the first dark ring in the Airy pattern. The above definition
represents its generalization to an arbitrary aperture and illumination [14].
SNR [dB]
d [km]
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0 10 000 20 000 30 000 40 000 50 000
 = 404 nm
 = 850 nm
 =1064 nm
 =1550 nm
D = 20 cm
D = 30 cm
D = 50 cm
Fig. 1. Simulated SNR vs link distance for different telescope diameters and
wavelengths. The background noise level is assumed to be 106 ph/(s · cm2 ·
nm · sr), the source bandwidth is 1 nm, and the detection time 1 ns.
we aim to adopt   < 800 nm. However, if links to ground
station have to be established too, then issues related to the
presence of atmosphere have to be considered. On the other
hand, telescope diameter is subject to the general space design
rule of small dimensions and weight [13]. Considering the
dimensions of current space optical terminals, it seems that
a good compromise between achieveable antenna gain and
instrument size is given by telescope diameters around 0.2m.
As regards its optic configuration, this would ideally be of the
Ritchey-Chre´tien type, but a Cassegrain configurations is also
appropriate.
III. GALILEO CONSTELLATION ARCHITECTURE
The GNSS Galileo architecture is constituted [13] of 27
satellites, 9 in each of three different orbital planes (called A,
B ,C), with a 56  inclination. The space segments of the con-
stellation are characterized by a “phasing angle” (difference
between the argument of latitude of two consecutive satellites,
placed in adjacent planes) of 2⇡/27.
Given the GNSS satellite motions, the choice of the time
windows in which the optical quantum link (OQL) transmis-
sion is performed for secure communication, quantum laser
ranging and time transfer acquires a crucial importance. Here
we present the result of a MATLAB simulation evaluating
the time intervals in which two spacecrafts reach the minimal
inter-satellite distance, in order to investigate the feasibility of
the OQL system and to evaluate its expected performance.
To model GNSS orbiting satellites we choose a reference
frame whose origin is the Earth center and with z-axis orthog-
onal to the Earth Equatorial Plane. To simplify the simulation
we assume satellite orbits to be circulars.
We fix the GNSS orbital mean radius at R = 29 595 km
Figure 7.2: Simulated SNR versus link distance for different telescope diameters
and wavelengths. The background noise level N (7.6) is assumed to be
106 ph/(s · cm2 · nm · sr). The source bandwidth is 1 nm, and the detection
time is 1 ns.
7.2 hybrid networks
7.2.1 Navigation system
The possibility of determining the relative position into the Earth with a very
precise measure, is provided by the GNSS satellite network. The next genera-
tion of European navigation systems will be better both in terms of accuracy,
availability and integrity, but also it will have the possibility of a dual-use
in terms of more robustness, resilience and security. As saw in the previous
Chapter 6, a good number of space missions have successfully tested optical
communication techniques in space [101 64, 105, 58]. Th s fact encourages
additional developments of new devices for security applications looking to
1 Zodiacal light is sunlight reflected by interplanetary dust
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a global network of secure and robust satellites. Security issues are a key
point in the development of GNSS system, not only looking at the protection
of the GNSS service signals against spoofing and/or jamming5 [54, 82], but
even more relevantly for the authentication, integrity and confidentiality of
the control signaling traffic. The impact of a malicious adversary hijacking
GNSS satellites and acquiring the control may prove catastrophic implica-
tions.
The use of optical satellite-to-satellite and satellite-to-ground quantum links
will allow unconditionally secure generation of cryptographic keys over
satellite links and the construction of a secure key distribution space net-
work [76, 53]. In fact most of the protocols that offer secure communica-
tion services (such as confidentiality, message authentication, access control,
message integrity, . . . ) rely on cryptographic mechanisms (encryption, dig-
ital signature, etc.) that require the communicating parties to share secret
keys. In this context QKD schemes offer unconditional security ensuring an
high level of safety independently from the computation capabilities of the
eavesdropper [41].
galileo constellation architecture The GNSS Galileo architec-
ture is formed by 27 satellites, 9 in each of three different orbital planes
(called A, B, C), with a 56° inclination. Due to the relative motion of the
satellite, the time windows available for the OQL transmission is a very cru-
cial parameter. QC for key generation, pointing operation and time for trans-
fer data are all necessary operations taking a slot time which have to be
considered in the design analysis. Here we report the result of a simula-
tion evaluating the slot time intervals depending the distance between the
satellites, in order to evaluate the performance of a possible OQL like [41].
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Fig. 4. Block diagram for the B92 SaNeQKD transmitter (left) and receiver (right)
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Fig. 5. Link switching sequence for satellite A1 that obtains the maximum balanced rate when only one telescope is available on each satellite. The shaded
areas represent the total secret key length achievable in one period.
secret sharing scheme, it allows to exchange perfectly secret
keys between two non adjacent nodes even if one (unknown)
intermediate node is hijacked and controlled by the adversary.
Another more complex solution requires 1 quantum trans-
mitter, 1 quantum receiver, 2 classical transceivers and 2
telescopes that can be independently pointed in different
directions; and provides degree 6 for each node, and higher
secret key length.
C. Expected parameters and key lengths
In the design of the SaNeQKD system, the expected final
secret key rate has to be derived by taking into account several
parameters, namely:
• R0, the raw key rate;
• µ, the average number of photons per qubit at the
transmitter output;
• ⌘, the QKD protocol efficiency (e.g., ⌘ = 0.25 for B92,
⌘ = 0.5 for BB84);
• Alink, the free space link attenuation;
• Arc the attenuation due to devices at the receiver side
(Bob);
• ", the quantum bit error rate (QBER).
Given these parameters, one could derive the sifted key rate
as
Rsift = R0⌘AlinkArc
 
1  e µ  (1)
That said, in order to compute the final secret key rate,
some further processing of the sifted key is required, namely:
channel estimation (for both QBER and link attenuation),
Figure 7.3: Simulation of link switching sequence for satellite A1. The shaded areas
represent the total secret key length achievable in one period.To simplify
the simulation it was assumed that orbi s are circulars with a mean radius
of R = 29634 km.
network topology Looking towards a satellites network, a natural
trade-off between an high degree of connectivity and the volume of the
payload must b sought. H wever a certain level of redundancy for reliable,
safe and secure QKD is required. By alternately it is possible to think a dif-
ferent scenario where each satellite point, transmit and/or receive towards
the closer satellites. Each terminal can share a sufficient amount of secret
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key bits with more than one node per transceiver in each revolution period.
There are two different feasible ways: a minimal one where is required one
quantum transmitter, one telescope (suitably pointed) and one receiver over
a classical communication system for exchanging public data. In figure 7.3
it is reported an example of this solution, where the satellite A1 can connect
with other 4 satellites. The second way requires two quantum transmitter,
one quantum receiver, two classical transceiver and two telescopes which
can be pointed in different positions independently. This more complicated
solution offers more possibilities of connection and higher secret key rate.
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Fig. 6. Connectivity graph of the proposed QKD network scheme over the
GNSS Galileo constellation, employing only one telescope per satellite. Red
edges represent links that have a minimum distance of 6 623 km, blue edges
represent links that have a minimum distance of 7 687 km
information reconciliation and privacy amplification.
In the hypothesis of sifted keys of infinite length, it can be
proven that the optimal upper-bound on the secret key rate is
Rsec = Rsift (1  2h2("))µe µ/
 
1  e µ  (2)
where h2(") =  " log2 "  (1  ") log2(1  ") is the Shannon
binary entropy function. In the SaNeQKD setting, however,
assuming sifted keys of arbitrary length is not reasonable, as
the passage of one terminal over the other is restricted to a
few tens of minutes. While coping with keys of finite length,
the following issues should be taken into account:
• the estimation of losses and QBER have large variance;
• the detection of some attacks has higher uncertainty.
Hence, while designing the information reconciliation and
privacy amplification, some margin is needed, thus yielding to
a loss in the secret key rate, as shown in some recent works
[18], [20], [21].
Also, the amount of compression which privacy amplifi-
cation should apply depends on the assumed attack model.
In this analysis, we consider selective individual attacks, i.e.,
we assume that Eve measures each qubit separately and
independently with probability 0  q  1, by using either
the (h |, h |) or the (h |, h |) basis. In particular, three
possible attack strategies are considered
• intercept and resend (IR) [22]: each measured bit is resent
with the same encoding as used by Alice. The QBER at
Bob’s side is increased, i.e., if we denote by "0 the QBER
at Bob’s side after eavesdropping, we get " ! "0 = " +
q( 14   "), while transmission losses are unaffected.
quantum bit error rate (QBER)
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Fig. 7. Number of required sifted bits vs QBER for extracting a secret
key of Lkey bits given a quantum channel attenuation between 40 and 45
dB. The dashed lines represent values obtained with the infinite key length
approximation
• unambiguous state discrimination (USD) [23]: only the
0s that are measured with the (h |, h |) basis and the 1s
that are measured with the (h |, h |) basis are resent.
Transmission losses are increased, i.e., if we denote by
Alink the link attenuation after eavesdropping, we get
Alink ! A0link = Alink   34qAlink, while the QBER is
unaffected.
• photon number splitting (PNS) [24]: only qubits with at
least 2 photons (nph   2) are measured. This attack
leaves both losses and BER unaffected, but it must be
q  P [nph   2|nph   1] = 1  µe µ/(1  e µ)].
Hence, in order to successfully thwart these attacks, it is of
crucial importance to get an estimate, as precise as possible,
of both the channel attenuation, Alink, and the QBER, ".
Furthermore, the variances of these estimates have to be taken
into account as they provide the choice of the parameters for
the information reconciliation, an upper bound on the attack
rates qIR, qUSD, a reliable detection of both selective IR and
USD attacks for large qIR, qUSD and, finally, the maximum
length of the secret key that can be extracted by means of
privacy amplification; a detailed description of this finite-key
analysis can be found in [25].
Fig. 7 shows the number of sifted bits that must be available
to Alice and Bob after the transmission on the quantum layer
and the sifting phase in order for them to be able to extract
a secret key of the desired key length Lkey. In particular, the
dashed lines represent the asymptotic limit in the asymptotic
infinite key length regime, while the solid lines represent the
values obtained by means of the finite-key analysis described
above. Furthermore, these results assume an attenuation Alink
of the quantum channel between  40 dB and  45 dB (corre-
sponding to a wavelength   = 350 nm and a telescope diame-
Figure 7.4: Connectivity graph of the pro sed QKD network scheme over t GNSS
Galileo c nstellation, employi only one telesco per satellite. Red
edges represent links that have a minimum distance of 6623 km, blue
edges represent links that have a minimum distance of 7687 km
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secret sharing scheme, it allows to exchange perfectly secret
keys between two non adjacent nodes even if one (unknown)
intermediate node is hijacked and controlled by the adversary.
Another more complex solution requires 1 quantum trans-
mitter, 1 quantum receiver, 2 classical transceivers and 2
telescopes that can be independently pointed in different
directions; and provides degree 6 for each node, and higher
secret key length.
C. Expected parameters and key lengths
In the design of the SaNeQKD system, the expected final
secret key rate has to be derived by taking into account several
parameters, namely:
• R0, the raw key rate;
• µ, the average number of photons per qubit at the
transmitter output;
• ⌘, the QKD protocol efficiency (e.g., ⌘ = 0.25 for B92,
⌘ = 0.5 for BB84);
• Alink, the free space link attenuation;
• Arc the atte uation due to devic s at the receiver side
(Bob);
• ", the quantum bit error rate (QBER).
Given these parameters, one could derive the sifted key rate
as
Rsift = R0⌘AlinkArc
 
1  e µ  (1)
That said, in order to compute the final secret key rate,
some further processing of the sifted key is required, namely:
channel estimation (for both QBER and link attenuation),
Figure 7.5: Block diagram for the B92 SaNeQKD transmitter (left) and receiver
(right).
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qkd protocol Due to the limitation impose by the dimension of satel-
lite, the quantum payload must be chosen as light as possible, obviously
ensuring reliability and security. In this context, the easiest QKD protocol
which employs as few quantum state as possible is the B92, introduced in
Chapter 2. From a security point of view, it is well known that the B92 pro-
tocol can be assumed insecure over a threshold channel efficiency, mostly
in the case of a simplest implementation without a decoy-state method. Un-
fortunately in our experiments we adopt this protocol to demonstrate the
perfect integration of a QKD system with an optical classical communica-
tion one (provided by Thales) without focusing on the security of the QKD
protocol. In our implementation of B92 protocol we choose the following
encoding maps: 0→ | 〉, 1→ | 〉 for Alice and | 〉 → 1, | 〉 → 0 for Bob.
The scheme of the used setup, is reported in figure 7.2.
7.2.2 Expected parameters and key length
In order to allow a comparison between the theoretical rate and the experi-
mental one, we introduce the main parameters playing a crucial role in the
final rate. In the design of the SaNeQKD system, the expected final secret
key rate is influenced by:
• R0, the raw key rate
• µ, the average number of photons per qubit at the transmitter output
• η, the QKD protocol efficiency (e.g. η = 1/2 for BB84 and η = 1/4 for
B92 )
• Alink, the free space link attenuation
• Arc, the attenuation due to devices at the receiver side (Bob)
• ε, the quantum bit error rate (QBER)
the sifted key rate can be written as:
Rsi f t = R0ηAlink Arc(1− e−µ) (7.7)
It is worth to note that in order to compute the final secret key rate, some
further processing of the sifted key is required, channel estimation (for both
QBER and link attenuation) information reconciliation and privacy amplifi-
cation. We remand the reader to Chapter 2 for discussion about infinite and
finite key regime, and in particular for the correct selection of the parame-
ters according to the QKD chosen protocol.
7.3 experimental results
Once we have designed and simulated the behavior of the OQL system, we
proved experimentally in THALES (Torino) the entirely system. In Figure 7.5
is reported the implemented scheme for the free-space link experiment. Two
Newtonian telescopes, with a primary mirror of 200 mm, were used for the
pointing and for the link establishment. In particular in Figure 7.6 is re-
ported an optical diagram of the principals components of the telescopes.
A consideration about the telescope design must be done: in Chapter 3 we
proposed an atmosphere turbulent model based on the Gaussian beam. This
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choice was made both for simplicity but above all because the propagation
of Gaussian beam is less prone to the degradation thanks to the greater
amount of energy locked up in the center of the beam. The Newtonian re-
flector telescope however presents an obscuration (mirror M2) in the center
of the spider. This leads to lose about half of the transmitting power, increas-
ing the total loss of the channel. Moreover this fact affects also the average
mean photons leaving the transmitter, reducing the security of the system.
Here we report a preliminary analysis of the data, having just finished the
experimental part in Torino during the last days of December. From a prin-
ciple point of view, we created an entirely QKD system only based on optical
communication (see section 7.4 for more details) able to generate and pro-
cess keys. Moreover it was proven how our QKD system can be very portable
and easily integrable. All the data reported in Figure 7.11 were collected in
different run with different noise and attenuation conditions.
We obtain an average QBER of 5.7% in the case of quasi single photon trans-
mission with an average sifted key length of 144 counts per packets. From
a more mathematicians point, a further analysis in order to perfectly match
the simulation system with the experimental one must be done. In addition
we only reported the sifted key rate, that as we known from Chapter 2 is
only the first step of QKD layer.
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Figure 7.6: The completely optical scheme of the Newtonian reflector OQL telescope
can be summarized with a system composed by three lenses. This permits
to study the beam propagation inside the telescope and to estimate the
intrinsic lossy.
Another important parameter in a QKD system is the errors introduced by
the channel and from the depolarization of the photons. In Figure 7.8 we
reported the experimental QBER as a function of the attenuation factor. In
addition we plotted the theoretical expected QBER function calculated as:
Q =
Q0 + (1− 2Q0)N/S
1+ (1− 2Q0)N/S (7.8)
where Q0 represents the intrinsic QBER of the channel.
7.4 experimental setup
A B92 protocol based on the Weak coherent pulse (WCP) laser is imple-
mented in the OQL system. The lasers are controlled by a Virtex 6 FPGA,
which permits a maximum theoretically rate about 2.4 Mbit/s. More details
about the FPGA structure are reported in 2.11 on page 44. The two 850
nm single photon laser are injected in an optical fiber, to facilitate the in-
tegration between Alice part and the optical classical transceiver. In order
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Figure 7.7: Sifted bit versus attenuation factor. Black diamonds is the measured ex-
perimental data, while the dotted blue line represent the theoretical rate
in function of the attenuation of the channel. Red dotted line et the aver-
age background level for the experiment.
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Figure 7.8: In this plot we reported the experimental QBER (blue dots) versus the mea-
sured SNR. The dotted red line represent the expected QBER depending
on the attenuation factor.
to syncrhonize the two FPGA a 5 mW 808 nm infrared laser was used in a
parallel contemporary channel. This fact is not a limitation because in the
final system it can be easily integrated into the optical channel. During the
experiment we have prefered to use a parallel channel due to a filter in-
side the optical transceiver. The quantum channel and the classical one (100
mW 1560 nm infrared laser) are combined together with a BS and then sent
through the Newtonian telescope.
The corresponding receiver, employing a dichroic mirror in order to sep-
arate classical beam from quantum one. The receiving telescope is identical
to the transmitter one and the structure is totally symmetric. From a clas-
sical point of view the infrared beam is collected by an optical fiber and
then analyzed by an external photodiode. This permits the completely ac-
cess to the classical pattern signal. From the other hand, a small receiver is
mounted on the top of the telescope so allowing a better sensibility on the
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quantum signal. The arriving photons are collected by a multimode optical
fiber and then detect by SPAD. The detectors are linked to the FPGA, which
through an Ethernet cable can pass the raw key to the transceiver, so as to
allow Information Reconciliation (IR), PE and Privacy amplification (PA) op-
erations. In order to decrease the dark counts, we filter background photons
using an interferential filter before the SPAD aperture.
As reported we choose an experimental setup based on polarization en-
coding B92 protocol. As reported in Chapter 2 there exists a lot of QKD
protocol based on different assumption and degree of freedom (e.g. phase
distance between two wave packets). In this scenario the best feasible solu-
tion could be the alignment-free protocol proposed in [31]. In fact using the
rotational invariant phase of single photons, it is possible to obtain a perfect
alignment-free QKD system.
(a) Picure of Alice. (b) Optical fiber connections.
(c) Virtex 6 FPGA. (d) Alice quantum system.
(e) Picture of the receiver. (f) Bob quantum receiver.
Figure 7.9: Picture of the OQL experiment made in collaboration with THALES
(Torino).
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7.5 space environment
Considering the possibility of a future quantum payload on satellites, we
must take into account the space environment problem. This argument does
not fall in the task of this thesis, but we would like to introduce some basic
concepts useful for a completely description. It is known that the radiation
flux is influenced by orbital altitude and inclination, see Figure 7.10. The
most delicate instrument of a QKD are surely the detectors, both if you use
SPAD both in the case of an APD detector [29]. Depending on the energy
of the single particle and on the annual dose of radiation, the behavior of
the detectors will change. For example experimental analysis of the LEO
radiation environment suggests that uncooled Si APDs detectors, with thin
shielding in a 400 km equatorial orbit, can operate for several years before
dark counts saturate the quenching circuit.
Geiger mode APDs up to a maximum altitude of 37 km [12].
3. Space radiation environment
Space radiation consisting mainly of electro s, proton and he vy ions is t gr atest degrada-
tion factor for spacecraft electronics [13,14]. The vast majority of radiation flux in LEO comes
from trapped particles in two radiation belts above the Earth [15]. Radiation flux has two major
effects on Si APDs: total ionizing dose damage and accumulated displacement damage within
the Si lattice caused primarily by protons. In both cases, the effect on Si APDs is an increased
rate of dark counts and a possible shift in the breakdown voltage.
-90
-60
-30
0
30
60
90
-180 -120 -60 0 60 120 180
L
a
tit
u
d
e
Longitude
(a)
Proton Flux
101
102
103
104
105
F
lu
x
>
0
.1
0
M
e
V
(c
m
-2
s-
1
)
a
t
8
0
0
km
-90
-60
-30
0
30
60
90
-180 -120 -60 0 60 120 180
L
a
tit
u
d
e
Longitude
(b)
Electron Flux
102
104
106
F
lu
x
>
0
.0
4
M
e
V
(c
m
-2
s-
1
)
a
t
8
0
0
km
Fig. 3. Radiation flux at 800 km altitude and 98 degree inclination. The South Atlantic
Anomaly (SAA) is the region of increased radiation in the southern hemisphere. (a) Proton
flux via the AP-8 Max model. (b) Electron flux via the AE-8 Max model. (Color online).
The Space Environment Information System (SPENVIS) [16] is used to analyse in-orbit
radiation flux for LEO satellites. Data from SPENVIS reveals an important feature in LEO
radiation known as the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA), a region where an inner radiation belt
extends down to an altitude of 200 km due to the mismatch between the Earth’s magnetic and
rotational axes (see Fig. 3). Accumulated radiation effects and the resultant electronics lifetime
is a function of both altitude and orbit trajectory.
3.1. Ionizing damage test and results
Energetic particles traversing a solid can ionize the material in its surrounding path, generating
electron-hole pairs. Under an applied electric field, the more mobile electrons are swept out
immediately, and the holes are left behind. This causes charge accumulation which changes the
electrical properties of the devices [13,14]. From SPENVIS data, a satellite payload at 800 km
with a 98 degree inclination behind 1.85 mm of Al shielding experiences a total ionizing dose
of approximately 5 krad per year. We conducted ionizing damage testing with γ-radiation in
a 60Co chamber (dose rate of 8.8 krad/hr) at the Centre for Ion Beam Application (CIBA),
National University of Singapore. Three Si APDs were irradiated with γ-radiation in steps of
1 krad up to 5 krad.
In this test series, we investigated the effects of ionizing radiation on breakdown voltage and
the dark count rate. We applied the step-stress approach whereby measurements were made af-
ter each predetermined dosage was reached using the window comparatormechanism described
in the previous section. All the APDs were stored and operated at a temperature of 22±2◦C.
Figure 7.10: Radiation flux at 800 km altitude and 98 degree inclination: (a) Proton
flux; (b) Electron flux.
environment str ss The space devices are subjected to a lot of stress:
mechanical, thermal and electromagnetic damage will be possible. We re-
port here a little analysis of these problems, trying to explain what are the
main damages caused by space environment.
thermal Electronic devices used in space missions are usually enclosed
in a controlled thermal environment inside the spacecraft interior. The inter-
nal temperature is determined by the external heat absorbed by the space-
craft and above all from the heat generated by the functioning electronic
components. It is regulated by passive heat distribution and active heating
elements. The increase of the temperature inside the satellite can be due to
three kind of sources:
• incoming solar radiation (solar constant): 0− 1367 W/m2;
• reflecte solar energy (albedo): 0− 0.32 of the solar radiation; 0− 450
W/m2 global annual mean;
• outgoing long-wave IR radiatio emitted by the Earth and atmosphere:
100− 270 W/m2.
The reported values refer to an Earth orbiter.
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vibrations Usually flight hardware is exposed to vibrations during launch
and during the mission, in particular the launch vibrations originate from
engine ignition and operations, atmospheric drag, and stage separations
must be taken into account. Trajectory corrections using on-board engines
cause vibrations while in orbit. The vibration environment can be subdi-
vided in three different categories: acoustic vibrations, random vibrations
and pyroshock. Acoustic noise represents the major source of vibrations.
electromagnetic The electrostatic environment for parts and assem-
blies depends on the charging of a spacecraft, to which both the surrounding
plasma environment and the spacecraft design contribute. Near the Earth,
the plasma is dense and cold. Farther away, the density drops fast, however,
the plasma energy increases out to geosynchronous orbit. The plasma envi-
ronment is a dynamic one, determined by the interaction of the Earth mag-
netic field and the solar wind. Solar flares affect the plasma environment
by heating and expanding the boundary of the neutral atmosphere, and by
providing energetic particles, which increase the plasma density and tem-
perature. The photo-effect under direct sunlight counteracts the charging
by providing an outflow of low-energy electrons. This, however, may create
potential differences between shaded and illuminated areas of a dielectric,
which can cause electrostatic discharge. Satellites in LEO are exposed to cold
dense ionospheric plasma.
7.6 conclusion
Once that space-to-ground quantum key distribution was considered feasi-
ble, as demonstrated in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6, we consider a different
scenario for the QC like the inter-satellite link between two or more mov-
ing terminals. In particular satellite like GPS or Glonass or future mission
like Galileo are fundamental for the security point of view, and also a small
tampering system could have disastrous consequences. In this perspective
in order to increase the security of the GNSS satellite it was proposed a quan-
tum system available on orbital spacecraft. We report an OQL experiment,
in collaboration with TASI (Thalens Alenia Space Italia) where a space QKD
terminal was implemented and tested in a free-space terrestrial link in order
to demonstrate that a quantum application payload is available and possi-
ble for a GNSS constellation. It was proved that quantum system and optical
classical payload could be entirely integrated in order to achieve secure key
generation between to very distant satellites.
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Figure 7.11: Plots of the obtained sifted bit L versus different attenuation scenarios.
We report the rate achievable in different conditions of SNR. The dotted
red line represents the average sifted bits and the average QBER in that
environmental conditions. The data was acquired during several tests
in different noise and weather conditions. A decreasing of the number
of sifted bits during the same run, might be due to sudden change in
the weather conditions. In particular during the observation nights the
weather was foggy an cloudy.
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In this chapter we resume the overall results obtained during this three
years, explaining how these experiments pave the way for future Quantum
communications and a Quantum satellites network.
In a global context, people doing Research have to look in the same direc-
tion, omitting general barriers or physical boundaries and work all together
always seeking better results. With these words we look outside Europe,
where there are a lot of projects about satellite QC and, in particular three
of that deserve to be reported here. In Japan there exists a collaboration
between JAA (Japan National Spatial) and University of Tokyo in order to
demonstrate and improve actual quantum and classical optical communica-
tions. In particular during the month of May, Japan has launched the first
satellite of their project, named SOCRATES that should orbit approximately
for 2 years. SOCRATES is a LEO satellite equipped with a small optical
payload (SOTA), able to send polarized weak coherent pulse between Space
and an OGS; this future results should finally demonstrate the possibility to
generate a single qubit into space and sending to the Earth. It is well known
by the theory and demonstrated in a lot of experiments, that this kind of
results should be possible, but a completely realization with an orbiting
satellite has yet to be proven.
Instead in China there is a bigger project towards quantum Space called
Chinese Quantum Science Satellite. The first satellite will be launched in the
first months of 2016 and it will be equipped with a decoy state BB84 source,
for finally demonstrating the possibility of satellite QKD. This satellite will
orbit in a LEO distance and could be visible and trackable for a lot of OGS
stations. In this perspective, collaborations with China project could be pos-
sible in order to create a small QKD network. Moreover this satellite should
also have an entangled source, useful for experiments like Bell’s violation
and teleportation protocol. The plans of China are to create a network of
satellites, both quantum and classical including an own Internationl Space
Station (ISS), which will be launched before 2020 and where they can also
test quantum experiments.
For what concerns American lands, Canadian universities like IQC has a
project in collaboration with Canadian Space Agency (CSA) and other exter-
nal companies, to realize a satellite for QC. In this case there are not available
information about the future launch data. From their works and article we
guess for a system in a downlink scenario, where the OGS should work as
source and the satellite as receiver. They are studying from many years this
solutions and they have proved, only by simulation, that in principle it could
be possible, but obviously more lossy than the downlink solution.
In this context the work presented here shows how important the field
of Quantum communications is, not only from theoretical physics point of
view, but also with experimental implementation that could be very useful
for the security of the people in the next years.
We would like to resume the main results of the four experiments, con-
textualizing into a possible field of application. As we known nowadays
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telecommunications plays a crucial role in our daily lives. The possibility of
exchanging secure information become more and more important in many
areas, e.g. on-line purchases, emails and video chats. We use some funda-
mental laws of quantum physics to guarantee secure communications. Due
to the natural imperfections of the devices and in the case of real QKD ap-
plication, a theoretical analysis of the security isn’t enough. We reported
in Chapter 2 a finite key analysis of a real cryptographic system based on
an asymmetric BB84 protocol, one of the most used in the polarization en-
coding scheme. This kind of analysis will offer a novel approach against
the classical one, allowing an improvement of the final rate especially in a
very bad scenario like satellite communications, where the attenuation of
the channel is very high. We have experimentally demonstrated the feasi-
bility of key distillation according to the finite-key analysis proposed and
defined a less stringent definition of security, called pragmatic, that protects
the protocol against intercept and resend attacks (the most probably in a
real QKD system).
Once we have studied from a security point of view the QKD protocol
implementation and realization, we took into exam the propagation of a
quantum beam through the atmosphere, paying attention to some partic-
ular effects, like beam wondering, beam spreading and scintillations. We
demonstrated in Chapter 2 how it is possible to establish secure key also
in presence of noise and in the case of finite key regime. In order to in-
crease the communication distance and to extend laboratory experiments
in real life conditions, we performed a free-space QKD link in 2012 between
La Palma and Tenerife islands in the Canary archipelago. It represent one
of the most interesting scenario for a possible quantum link, because the
proximity of Sahara desert and bad weather conditions make the environ-
ment very particular. From the astronomical point of view, the blanket of
clouds that hide the scattering of city light, create a perfect conditions for
space study and exploration; from the other side these clouds create a very
turbulent channel once you look for an horizontal link, where a sender, po-
sitioned in the JKT telescope communicates with a receiver situated in OGS
telescope. We explored atmosphere’s effects, and we proved that polarized
photons sent through 143 km of atmosphere have not be degraded. More-
over we introduced a new method of analysis in order to use atmospheric
effects as a resource, so that increasing the SNR ratio. This method makes QC
possible also in worst case conditions. Moreover we experimentally demon-
strated that ARTS method is able to decrease the measured QBER allowing
to extract secret key in extreme conditions, namely when the initial QBER is
above the security threshold of 11%.
The most promising application of QKD is the generation of a provable un-
conditionally secure key at very distance location, which is not possible with
classical cryptography. The use of satellites allows QC on a global world
scale, an impossible task on ground with current optical fiber technology
limited to 300 km. In order to achieve QKD through a Earth-Space channel,
in the case of polarization encoding protocols, the degree of polarization
of the transmitted radiation must be preserved. A possible way to verify
this fundamental requirement is the study of the space channel using Laser
Ranging system and a polarimeter. In a SLR system the reflection is done by
optical components called CCRs, which ensure that the laser beam is retrore-
flected to the telescope direction. The behavior of polarization reflected by
a CCRs is well known, in particular it has been widely proved that devices
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with a metal coated reflecting surface maintain the degree of polarization,
while the ones without it cause a depolarizing effect on the incident beam.
In fact data acquired at MLRO facility permitted us to verify the behaviour
of two different type of satellite’s corner cubes retroreflectors. In particular,
it was observed that satellites with uncoated CCRs have a clear depolariza-
tion effect on a polarized laser pulse. On the other hand, the information
provided by the channels of the polarimeter give good indications about
the behaviour of metal-coated CCRs. In this experiment it was done a first
demonstration of the feasibility of sending and receiving polarized classi-
cal photons from moving satellites. In this perspective we started from the
results obtained in Chapter 5 to exploit QC using satellite corner cube retrore-
flectors as a quantum transmitter in orbit. A stable quantum link has been
established between several low Earth orbit satellites and the MLRO of the
Italian Space Agency in Matera, by transmitting different qubit states en-
coded in the photon polarization. The QBER has been kept steadily low for
a total transmission time of 85 s. Indeed, we measured an average value of
QQBER = 4.5%, a level that is suitable for several QKD protocols and for
the violation of Bell inequalities. Moreover, an important parameters like
the mean photon number per pulse leaving the satellites was estimated to
be of the order of one, as required in QKD. Better we proposed a new two-
way protocol, in fact by exploiting modulated retroreflectors, which need a
minimal payload on a satellite, our communication scheme could easily be
turned into a fully operational satellite QKD system.
We improved the actual limit of single photon transmission, performing
an experiment where Alice was positioned about 7000 km from Bob. Besides
it was possible to demonstrate that our method works both for LEO and MEO
satellite, allowing a good detection of the quantum signal over the noise
counts. Unfortunately being Lageos an uncoated aluminum satellite, it was
not possible to measure the QBER in the case of MEO satellite, but in a near
future this kind of experiment will be done too.
Once that space-to-ground quantum key distribution was considered feasi-
ble, as demonstrated in Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6, we considered a dif-
ferent scenario for the QC like the intersatellite link between two or more
moving terminals. In this chapter we focused on the extension of intersatel-
lite communications into the quantum domain. The long distances involved
and the fast relative motion are severe constraints, partially compensated by
the absence of beam degradation due to the propagation in the atmosphere
as well as the relatively low background noise level. In particular satellite
like GPS or Glonass or future mission like Galileo are fundamental for the
security point of view, and also a small tampering system could have dis-
astrous consequences. In this perspective in order to increase the security
of the GNSS satellite it was proposed a quantum system available on or-
bital spacecraft. We reported an OQL experiment, in collaboration with TASI
(Thalens Alenia Space Italia) where a space QKD terminal was implemented
and tested in a free-space terrestrial link in order to demonstrate that a quan-
tum application payload is available and possible for a GNSS constellation. It
was proven that quantum system and optical classical payload could be en-
tirely integrated in order to achieve secure key generation between to very
distant satellites.
The presented experiments could be represented as a perfect circle, start-
ing with the choice of an achievable QKD protocol, moving in the direction
of extending the actual limit of QC in different scenario. In this case we
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increased the actual transmission of a quantum beam in a very turbulent
link in order to look behind terrestrial link, implementing a QC system with
moving terminal and fixing new limits in the quantum single photon prop-
agation. Closing the circle with a very distant link point to point scenario,
we demonstrated the feasibility of a completely optical payload for satellite.
Our results pave the way to the implementation of a future Quantum world-
wide network, extending the actual limit of QC and opening new scenarios
for quantum satellite experiments and applications.
AA P P E N D I X A
a.1 classical post-processing
After the parameter estimation phase, information reconciliation, error veri-
fication and privacy amplification are performed. Information reconciliation
aims at correcting the discrepancies between X and X′ that the channel may
have introduced, thus allowing Bob to compute an estimate Xˆ of X. As a
practical solution, we have chosen the Winnow scheme [23] which, by lever-
aging Hamming codes of different lengths over multiple iterations, allows
an adaptive and lowly interactive error correction and represents a good
trade-off between the high interactivity required by CASCADE and the low
flexibility of LDPC code with limited key length. We fix an upper bound
Pfail to the probability of a reconciliation failure and, under this constraint,
we optimize the parameters of the Winnow scheme in order to minimize
the expected (average) classical information leakage E[LEC]. First, given the
average QBER on the X basis QX, a threshold QXmax > QX is fixed so that the
empirical QBER QˆX in the sifted key is higher than QXmax with probability
less than Pfail/2. Then, the block sizes are chosen so that the output QBER
is lower than Pfail/(2n) whenever QˆX < QXmax and E[LEC] is minimized,
as detailed in [25]. Subsequently, an error verification mechanism such as
the one proposed in [104] ensures that the protocol is εcor-correct, i.e., that
P[X 6= Xˆ] < εcor, by comparing hashes of (dlog2(Pfail/εcor)e) bits. Namely,
Alice chooses the hash function g randomly and uniformly from a class of
universal2 hash functions [27] (the class of Toeplitz matrices in our experi-
mental setup) and computes her hash value gA = g(X). She then sends gA
and a compact representation of g to Bob, who computes gB = g(Xˆ). The
protocol aborts if the two hashes are different, i.e., if gA 6= gB. Finally, dur-
ing the so-called privacy amplification, X and Xˆ are compressed by means
of a function which is, again, randomly and uniformly chosen from a class
of universal2 hash functions, in order to get the final secret keys S and Sˆ.
The length ` of the final key and the corresponding amount of compression
depend on the required level of secrecy, on the overall classical informa-
tion leakage LEC + dlog2(Pfail/εcor)e, on the assumed attacker’s model and
on the estimate of the information leaked to the eavesdropper during the
transmission over the quantum channel.
a.2 proof of pragmatic secrecy
Proof of Theorem 1. Let t be the number of qubits observed and measured by
Eve on the X basis among the n sifted bits. Then the Rényi entropy of order
2 for the sifted key, given all the information available to the eavesdropper,
is lower-bounded by
R(X|V) ≥ nEC − t, (A.1)
being R(X|V) = −∑v pV(v) log2
(
∑s p2S|V(s|v)
)
.
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Let us define the following pairs of complementary events, namely: let A =
{QˆZ > QZtol} and A¯ = {QˆZ ≤ QZtol} be the aborting and non-aborting
events, whereas R = {R(X|V) ≥ nEC − a} and R¯ = {R(X|V) < nEC −
a} define the events of acceptable and non-acceptable eavesdropping rate,
respectively. Then,
H(S|V) = E[log2P(S|V)|A¯] = (A.2)
= E[log2 p(S|V)|R, A¯]P[R|A¯] +E[log2P(S|V)|R¯, A¯]P[R¯|A¯] . (A.3)
The multiplication of H(S|V) by the probability of not aborting yields
P[A¯]H(S|V) = (A.4)
= E[log2 p(S|V)|R, A¯]P[R, A¯] +E[log2P(S|V)|R¯, A¯]P[R¯, A¯] (A.5)
≤ E[log2 p(S|V)|R, A¯] + `P[R¯, A¯] . (A.6)
Finally, by applying corollary 4 in Reference [13] to a possibly aborting pro-
tocol that outputs a `-bit key (i.e., H(US) = `), we have, for every a, `,
P[QˆZ ≤ QZtol](`− H(S|V)) ≤ (A.7)
≤ 2
−(nEC−`−a)
ln 2
+ `P[R(X|V) < nEC − a, QˆZ ≤ QZtol] . (A.8)
From (A.1), we can upper bound the probability on the right-hand side of
(A.7) as
P[R(X|V) < nEC − a, QˆZ ≤ QZtol] ≤ P[t > a, QˆZ ≤ QZtol] (A.9)
= P[t > a]P[QˆZ ≤ QZtol], (A.10)
since the two events in the right-hand side brackets of equation (A.9) refer to
disjoint qubit sets, namely those encoded in the X and Z basis, respectively,
and are therefore independent. Furthermore, according to the selective indi-
vidual attack model with attack rate q, t is a binomial random variable with
parameters (n, q). Similarly, the number of measured errors on the Z basis,
kQˆZ is a binomial random variable with parameters (k, QZ) and QZ = q/2.
Therefore, we can rewrite equation (A.10) as
P[t > a]P[QˆZ ≤ QZtol] = (1− Fn,q(a))(Fk,q/2(kQZtol)) = (A.11)
= Iq(a + 1, n− a)I1−q/2(k(1−QZtol), kQZtol + 1), (A.12)
with Fn,q(·) denoting the cumulative distribution function of a binomial ran-
dom variable with parameters (n, q), and similarly for Fk,q/2(·). The last step
is then assured by equation 6.6.4 in Reference [3].
Eventually, condition (2.30), together with definition (2.31) and given that
P[QˆZ ≤ QZtol] = 1− pabort, ensures that for any q ∈ [0, 1] we get
`− H(S|V) ≤ δsec
1− pabort , ∀ a, `. (A.13)
Relationship between equation (2.28) and (2.26). The Pinsker inequality (see
section 11.6 in [30] and [116]) ensures that
1
2
‖pSV − uSqV‖1 ≤
√
ln 2
2
D(pSV ||uSqV) (A.14)
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where uS is the uniform distribution on S andD(p||q) is the relative entropy
between the p and q distributions. By minimizing each term with respect to
qV , we get
min
qV
1
2
‖pSV − uSqV‖1 ≤ minqV
√
ln 2
2
D(pSV ||uSqV) (A.15)
=
√
ln 2
2
D(pSV ||uSpV) (A.16)
=
√
ln 2
2
(H(US)− H(S|V)) , (A.17)
where (A.16) is due to D(pSV ||uSqV) = D(pSV ||uSpV) +D(pV ||qV) ≤
D(pSV ||uSpV). It is then straightforward to see that
H(US)− H(S|V) ≤ 2ln 2
ε2sec
1− pabort ⇒
⇒ min
qV
1
2
‖pSV − uSqV‖1 ≤ εsec(1− pabort) .
(A.18)
Relationship between equation (2.28) and (2.29). The uniformity condition
trivially derives from the fact that H(S|V) ≤ H(S). Also, from basic infor-
mation theory, we know that
I(S; V) = H(S)− H(S|V) ≤ H(US)− H(S|V), (A.19)
since S has maximal entropy (i.e., H(S) = `) if and only if it is uniformly
distributed. Now, since condition (2.28) is verified for any IS attack strategy,
and therefore for any outcome V of the eavesdropper measurement on the
quantum system E, the security condition directly follows.

BA P P E N D I X B
Figure B.1: Detail scheme of the experiment.
b.1 polarization compensation in the downlink
The polarization state generated on the optical table of the MLRO observa-
tory is subjected to a unitary transformation due to the Coudé path of the
telescope. Indeed, the Coudé path is composed of mirrors M1, . . . , M7 as
in B.2, with M1 and M2 the primary and secondary mirror of the telescope.
If the mirrors are coated to have pi phase shift between s- and p- polariza-
tion (corresponding to a σz transformation), the transformation in the uplink
channel is given by
Uup = σz R
(pi
2
− θel
)
σz R(θaz) σz R
(pi
2
)
,
where θaz and θel are the azimuth and elevation angles of the telescope and
R(θ) is a rotation of the reference frame given by:
R(θ) = e−iθσy =
(
cos θ sin θ
− sin θ cos θ
)
.
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stable data taken for Ajisai, Jason and Starlette, thus obtaining an effective gain of Gt = 1.1⇥
109. This value forGt has been used in the link budget equation to estimate the received photons
frequency and then the fit has been compared with the collected data as shown in Figure 4.
Polarization compensation in the downlink
The polarization state generated on the optical table of the MLRO observatory is subjected to
a unitary transformation due to the Coude´ path of the telescope. Indeed, the Coude´ path is
composed of mirrors M1 · · · ,M7 as in figure 7, with M1 and M2 the primary and secondary
mirror of the telescope. If the mirrors are coated to have ⇡ phase shift between s- and p-
M7
M6
M5
M4
M3
M2
M1
✓az
✓el
Optical table
Figure 7: Coude´ path of the MLRO telescope
polarization (corresponding to a  z transformation), the transformation in the uplink channel is
given by
Uup =  z R
⇣⇡
2
  ✓el
⌘
 z R(✓az)  z R
⇣⇡
2
⌘
,
16
Figure B.2: Schematic scheme of the Coudé path.
With an input polarization |ψ〉 =
(
cos α
eiφ sin α
)
, the polarization at the output
of the telescope is given by |ψ′〉 = Uup|ψ〉. Since the CCRs induce a transfor-
mation of σz and the downlink channel can be written as
Udown = R
(pi
2
)
σz R(θaz) σz R
(pi
2
− θel
)
σz ,
the received polarization state is given by
|ψrec〉 = Udown σz Uup|ψ〉 .
By using the property σz R(θ) = R(−θ) σz, it is easy to demonstrate that
|ψrec〉 = σz |ψ〉 ,
showing that the uplink rotation is compensated by the downlink transfor-
mation.
This compensation is at the base of our proposed two-way protocol. In-
deed, if the CCRs is equipped with an active element like a Faraday Rota-
tor at the entrance face, the transformation induced by the CCRs is given by
UCCR(φ) = R(−φ)σzR(φ) with R(φ) = e−iφσy . The overall transformation is
then obtained as
|ψrec(φ)〉 = Udown UCCR(φ)Uup|ψ〉 = R(2φ)σz|ψ〉 .
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If the input state is horizontally polarized, the received state is thus rotated
by an angle of 2φ in the laboratory reference frame. By modulating φ, the
two-way QKD protocol can be realized.
b.2 three decoy states protocol
As demonstrated in [106], it is possible to improve the key rate of the QKD
protocol by using more decoy states. The secret key rate of the BB84 protocol,
namely the ratio between secure and sent bits, is given by
r = Q0 + Q1[1− h2(e1)]−Qµ f (Eµ)h2(Eµ) , (B.1)
where Qµ is the total gain (the fraction of detected bits over the sent bits),
Q1 is the gain of the one-photon states, Q0 the gain of the vacuum states,
Eµ the total QBER, e1 the upper bound of errors of the one-photon states, h2
the binary entropy h2(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x). The term f (Eµ)
represents the efficiency of the classical error correction protocol.
While the term Q0, Q1 and e1 cannot be directly measured by using the
attenuated source with mean photon number µ, the decoy state method
allows to bound such quantities. By using infinite number of decoy states
Q0, Q1 and e1 can be perfectly estimated. For a lossy channel with error
ech and overall transmittivity η, the expected parameter are Q˜0 = Y0 (the
background rate), Q˜1 = Y0 + 1− e−ηµ and e˜1 = echη+Y0/2Y0+η .
More simply, as shown in [67], by using a single decoy state with mean
photon number ν1 and the vacuum decoy it is possible to obtain the follow-
ing bounds
Q0 = Y0 (background rate) ,
Q1 ≥ QL1 ≡
µ2e−µ
µν1 − ν21
(
Qν1 e
ν1 −Qµeµ ν
2
1
µ2
− µ
2 − ν21
µ2
Y0
)
,
e1 ≤ Eν1 Qν1 e
ν1 −Y0/2
QL1 e
µ ν1
µ
,
(B.2)
with Qν1 and Eν1 the measured gain and QBER of the decoy signal. A low
value of ν1 improves the bounds and for ν1 → 0, the lower bound QL1 ap-
proaches to Q˜1. However, for any ν1 < µ a looser bound is obtained still
allowing positive key rates for low losses.
Alternatively, a better bound on QL1 with ν ∼ 1 can be obtained by using
more than one non-vacuum decoy state as demonstrated in [106]. In the case
of three decoy states plus vacuum, the bound QL1 can be improved to
QL1 =
3
∑
k=0
eνk Qνk −Y0
νk
4
∏
j=0,j 6=k
νj
νj − νk , (B.3)
with ν0 = µ.
The advantage can be appreciated by the simulation shown in Extended
Data B.3, illustrating the key rate in function of the losses for the one de-
coy+vacuum and three decoy+vacuum case. We used the following param-
eters: dark rate Y0 = 2 · 10−8, channel error ech = 0.01, f (Eµ) = 1.2 and
µ = 1.3. From the figure it is evident that three decoy states with mean pho-
ton number given by ν1 = 0.9, ν2 = 0.95 and ν3 = 1 well estimate the key
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rate achievable with infinite number of decoys. Then pulses with mean pho-
ton number close to 1 are sufficient to implement QKD over long distances.
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one decoy state (ν1) + vacuum
three decoy states (ν1, ν2, ν3) + vacuum
Figure B.3: Key rate in function of the losses for the one decoy+vacuum and three
decoy+vacuum case.
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